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ABSTRACT 
The results and analyses of the third U.S. 
manned orbital mission are presented. The mission 
was  accomplished October 3, 1962, as a phase of 
Project Mercury. Spacecraft and launch-vehicle 
descriptions, mission operations, and postflight 
analyses are included. Particular treatment is 
given to the investigations of spacecraft systems 
performance and aeromedical analyses of the pilot. 
ii 
FOREWORD 
The f i r s t  U. S. manned six-pass orbital mission was an  extension of the two pre- 
vious manned three-pass orbital missions and added significantly to the knowledge 
gained in those two limited-duration missions. An overall analysis of the mission 
performance is presented, and only the minimum necessary supporting data are 
included. 
General acknowledgment is made of the extensive effort on the par t  of the entire 
Mercury team. The team consisted of many organizations external to the NASA Manned 
Spacecraft Center and included the Department of Defense, the spacecraft prime 
contractor and subcontractors, the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center for the Mercury 
Worldwide Network, the launch-vehicle prime contractor and subcontractors, and the 
many organizations and Government agencies which directly o r  indirectly made the 
success of the mission possible. 
This report represents the contributions of an assigned flight evaluation team 
which was comprised of systems specialists and operations personnel from throughout 
the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, without whose analytical and documentary efforts 
a report  of this technical completeness would not be possible. 
The Mercury-Atlas 8 (MA-8) report is being published at this time to complete 
the Mercury technical documentation series and provide a source of historical data in 
much greater technical detail than that previously available. Further,  to  preserve a 
public record of the state of knowledge at the t ime of the mission, discussions and 
engineering conclusions remain essentially as they were written at the end of the MA-8 
postflight data evaluation, despite any results f rom subsequent flight programs. 
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FIRST U. S. MANNED SIX-PASS ORBITAL MISSION 
(MERCURY-ATLAS 8, SPACECRAFT 16) 
DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Edited by John H. Boynton 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
SUMMARY 
The Mercury-Atlas 8 mission was the third U. S. manned orbital mission; all 
mission objectives were accomplished. 
tives, and a comprehensive postflight evaluation are presented. 
A description of the mission, the test objec- 
During the Mercury-Atlas 8 countdown, a single unscheduled hold of approxi- 
mately 15 minutes was made for  required repairs  to a Canary Islands radar  facility. 
Weather conditions at the launch site were satisfactory in the primary landing areas. 
Lift-off occurred at approximately 7:15 a. m. eastern standard time, October 3, 1962, 
2 hours 35 minutes after the pilot, Walter M. Schirra, Jr. , entered the spacecraft. 
Launch -vehicle performance was satisfactory, and trajectory data indicated a 
mission-continue (go) condition at orbital insertion. An acceptable orbit was attained, 
with deviations from nominal values of space-fixed flight-path angle and velocity of 
-0.0079" and 15 ft/sec, respectively. The perigee and apogee of the orbit differed 
from the planned values of 86.97 and 144.2 nautical miles by 0.03 nautical mile and 
8. 6 nautical miles, respectively. 
Spacecraft separation and manual turnaround were accomplished satisfactorily. 
The performances of the spacecraft systems and the pilot were excellent throughout 
the mission, as were the support activities from all ground elements, including flight 
control, Mercury Worldwide Network, and recovery. Minor problems encountered 
during the mission included an elevated suit -circuit temperature condition during the 
first 1. 5 orbital passes  and a reduction in the quality of air-to-ground voice transmis- 
sions. 
The pilot performed the manual turnaround, checked out the spacecraft control 
system periodically, performed extended periods of drifting flight, took photographs of 
terrestrial features, and performed visual spacecraft yaw-alinement experiments. 
Pilot adherence to the flight plan was excellent, and his performance added confidence 
to the feasibility of future long -duration manned missions. 
Retrofire was accomplished on time by the spacecraft clock and with the control 
system in the automatic mode. Spacecraft attitudes were excellent prior to and during 
retrofire. Computed data based on retrofire conditions indicated a normal spacecraft 
landing, and the prediction was transmitted to the recovery forces. All spacecraft 
events occurred on time during reentry, and the pilot actuated the drogue parachute 
near the 40 000-foot-altitude level as planned. 
Recovery forces tracked the spacecraft by radar  and visually sighted it during 
descent. The spacecraft landed approximately 4 nautical. miles from the recovery air- 
craft car r ie r  U. s. s. Kearsarge at  4:28 p. m. , eastern standard time. 
Helicopters from the aircraft  ca r r i e r  deployed swimmers who immediately in- 
stalled the spacecraft auxiliary flotation collar as a precautionary measure. The ca r -  
r i e r  picked up the spacecraft with the pilot still inside 40 minutes after landing. Five 
minutes later, the pilot released the spacecraft hatch aboard the car r ie r  and egressed 
in excellent condition, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The third manned orbital mission of Project Mercury was successfully accom- 
plished October 3, 1962, from the Missile Test  Annex at Cape Canaveral, ' Florida. 
This was the fifth orbital mission of a Mercury specification spacecraft and the eighth 
of a ser ies  of Mercury missions utilizing the Atlas launch vehicle. The mission was, 
therefore, designated as the Mercury -Atlas 8 (MA-8) mission. Walter M. Schirra, Jr. 
(figs. 1 and 2), was pilot of the spacecraft for the MA-8 mission. The data and infor- 
mation presented add to the data previously published (refs. 1, 2, and 3) on the first 
and second U. S. manned orbital missions. 
The MA-8 mission was planned for six orbital passes,  the ground tracks of which 
are shown in figure 3. The mission was a continuation of a program to acquire opera- 
tional experience and information for  extended manned orbital space flight. 
jectives of the mission were to evaluate the performance of the man-spacecraft system 
in a six-pass orbital mission; to evaluate the effects of an extended orbital space flight 
on the pilot and to compare this analysis with those of previous missions and pilot- 
simulator programs; to obtain additional pilot evaluation of the operational suitability 
of the spacecraft and supporting systems for a manned orbital mission; to evaluate the 
performance of spacecraft systems replaced o r  modified as a result  of the previous 
three -pass orbital missions; and to evaluate the performance of and further exercise 
the Mercury Worldwide Network and mission support forces  and to establish their suit- 
ability for an extended manned orbital mission. All objectives were successfully ac-  
complished. 
The ob- 
Analyses of the significant data have been made, and the important findings a r e  
All significant 
presented in this report. 
launch vehicle precede the performance analysis and supporting data. 
events of the MA-8 mission are documented, beginning with delivery of the spacecraft 
to the launch site and continuing through recovery and postflight examinations. 
Brief descriptions of the mission, the spacecraft, and the 
The first public release of the MA-8 mission resul ts  w a s  made (ref. 4) as a con- 
tinuation of a NASA policy to provide the technical community -at -large with preliminary 
information at an early date. 
report  therefore supersede and add to the information presented in cursory form in 
reference 4. 
The detailed scientific and engineering analyses in this 
Lift-off time for the MA-8 mission was  07:15:11.84 a. m. eastern standard time 
(e. s. t. ), and all t imes in this document a r e  given in ground elapsed time (g. e. t. ) from 
07:45:16.00 a. in. e. s. t. (range-zero time) unless otherwise noted. 
Although the graphical information in this par t  of the MA-8 report  supports the 
text, a complete presentation of all MA-8 time-history data has been compiled for 
technical reference purposes. 
'Since' renamed Kennedy Space Center. 
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Figure 1. - Pilot Schirra prior to insertion into spacecraft. 
Figure 2. - Pilot Schirra on the deck of the recovery aircraf t  
ca r r i e r  after the MA-8 mission. 
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Figure 3. - Ground track for the MA-8 orbital mission. 

SPACE-VEHICLE -~ DESCRIPTION 
The MA-8 space vehicle, consisting of a Mercury specification spacecraft and an 
Atlas D launch vehicle, is shown at lift-off in figure 4. The spacecraft and the launch 
vehicle used in the MA-8 orbital mission were very similar to those used in the MA-6 
and MA-7 orbital missions. The MA-6 space vehicle is described in reference 1 and 
compared with the MA-7 space vehicle in reference 2. 
between the MA-8 and MA-7 vehicles are presented in the following paragraphs. 
The more significant differences 
SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION 
Spacecraft 16 (fig. 5) was employed for the MA-8 orbital mission and was  basi- 
cally the same as spacecraft 18 utilized for the MA-7 mission (ref. 2). The refer.ence 
axis system for the spacecraft is depicted in figure 6. However, a number of changes 
were made in the configuration to increase reliability, to save weight, to aid in fuel 
conservation, and to provide additional tape-recording capability. To provide a con- 
venient reference, all of the changes are listed according to the major spacecraft sub- 
system. 
Electrical and Sequential 
1. The Zener diode package was removed. 
2. The flashing recovery light was  powered by a standby bus rather than by a 
separate battery. 
3. A standby inverter position was  added to the ac voltmeter selection knob. 
4. The hold-power circuits were eliminated. 
5. Postlanding cutoff circuits were made, independently of the squib bus power. 
6. The auxiliary battery of the maximum-altitude sensor was  removed, and the 
sensor was  powered from the main 24-volt dc squib bus only. 
7. The power source for automatic abort circuits (May-day relays) w a s  changed 
from the isolated squib bus to the main squib bus. 
8. Provision was made to a s su re  that the launch-abort sequence was  not dis- 
armed before spacecraft separation from the launch vehicle. 
9. An arm-disarm switch and bypass relay were added to the pyrotechnic par t  of 
the retrof i re  circuit. 
10. The retroattitude telelight indication was  changed to function during the retro- 
sequence period. 
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11. The 21 000-foot barostats for  drogue-parachute deployment were wired in 
series and powered from the main bus. 
12. The 10 000-foot barostats for  main-parachute deployment were wired in  
series and powered from the main bus, with an alternate source of power from the 
isolated bus. 
13. The attitude-control, fuel-jettison, and main-parachute-disconnect fuses 
were changed to switch fuses. 
14. The 6-, 12-, and 18-volt external-power diodes were removedfrom the 
spacecraft and incorporated into ground-support-equipment circuitry. The 6-, E-, 
and 18-volt supplies for the spacecraft were monitored in  the launch blockhouse. 
15. Two of the four cabin floodlights were removed. 
16. Provisions were made for  more comprehensive testing of inverters during 
hangar checkout. 
17. One series diode was added to each catastrophic-failure circuit from the 
launch-vehicle abort  sensing control unit (ASCU). 
18. The landing-system control barostat, located in the cabin for the h4A-7 mis- 
sion, was removed. 
19. An arm-disarm switch and a 10 000-foot bypass were added to the pyrotechnic 
segment of the recovery system. 
20. Panel switches for suit fans, control-system-mode select, and cabin lights 
were replaced with more reliable types. 
21. The retrof i re  warning-light time-delay relay was changed from 20 to 15 sec- 
onds. 
22. The sustainer-engine cutoff (SECO) signal was locked out of the spacecraft 
until tower separation. Previously, the spacecraft could accept a premature SECO 
signal immediately after separation from the launch vehicle. 
23. The automatic retrojettison switch was changed to allow interruption of the 
squib circuits to the jettison bolt, retroumbilicals, and the new high-frequency (hf) 
antenna coaxial cutters. 
24. The emergency reserve-parachute-deployment fuse switch, emergency 
landing-bag fuse switch, and periscope fuse switch were replaced with fuses. 
25. Squib circuits were added to effect deployment of the hf orbital dipole antenna 
at 60 seconds after spacecraft separation from the launch vehicle. 
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Environmental Control System 
1. A retainer pin was added to the bellcrank spring for the emergency-oxygen 
rate valve. 
2. A maximum leakage ra te  of 600 cc/min for the spacecraft cabin was specified. 
3. An additional 15 pounds of coolant water were added to the existing tank. 
4. Instrumentation was revised to aid in monitoring cabin and suit heat-exchanger 
performance by replacing the heat-exchanger steam-vent-temperature measurements 
with heat-exchanger dome-temperature measurements. 
5. Insulation was added to the suit environmental circuit. 
6. The cabin-pressure relief valve was replaced with a type that did not include 
a mechanical lock in the closed position. 
7. The four Freon check valves were replaced by a newer type. 
8. Squibs were removed from the cabin inlet and outlet valves. 
9. The suit-inlet hose w a s  shortened from 38 to 18 inches. 
10. The oxygen-supply transducer w a s  changed from a 7500- to a 10 000-psia 
range. 
11. The coolant-water pressure bottle was  removed, and pressure was  supplied by 
the suit o r  cabin. 
12. A panel indicator was added to permit monitoring of cabin-oxygen partial 
pressure.  
Automatic Stabilization and Control System 
1. The operating band for the orbit mode of the automatic attitude control system 
was changed from 3.0 O to 5.5 O and the second pulse shortened to 0.075 second. 
2. The cover for the pitch horizon scanner was modified to provide better ther- 
mal protection during the launch phase. 
3. An attitude-select switch was added to permit normal automatic-control- 
system operation at 0 O, 0 O, 0 O attitude. 
4. Rate gyros were normally unpowered during automatic orbit-mode operation 
until 10 minutes pr ior  to retrofire, but a switch w a s  added to power rate gyros during 
orbit-mode operation at the discretion of the pilot. 
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Reaction Control System 
1. A high-thruster arm-disarm switch was added to the fly-by-wire (FBW) mode 
with automatic enable at retrofire. 
2. A thruster-solenoid current monitor was  added to aid malfunction detection. 
3. Improved nitrogen and hydrogen peroxide relief valves were incorporated. 
4. The fuel-warning switch was  replaced with an improved type. 
5. A modification was  made to prevent premature hydrogen peroxide jettison as 
a result  of a single-point failure. 
6. All thruster heat sinks were removed. 
Instrumentation System 
1. The pilot-observer camera slow-frame-speed mode was deleted. 
2. The vernier clock and the mixing of events on the clock channel were deleted. 
3. The oxygen-flow sensors  were removed. 
4. The Z-calibration for horizon-scanner output was deleted. 
5. The R- and Z-calibrations for the respiration sensor were deleted. 
6. The lip transducer w a s  changed to a chest impedance pneumograph for respi-  
ration sensing. 
7. Time-since-retrofire instrumentation was  added, and the integrating acceler- 
ometer and 4- and 8-minute t imers  were deleted. 
8. Magnetic recording tape w a s  changed to a thin-base type to provide an 11-hour 
total recording capability. 
9. A temperature-survey indicator and a 12-position rotary switch were added 
to monitor seven hydrogen peroxide B-nut temperatures, the cabin heat-exchanger air 
outlet temperature, three inverter temperatures, and the right retrorocket tempera- 
ture. 
10. A boresight yaw-navigation device was  added. 
11. Two Goddard radiation packs were substituted for two of the four standard 
Schaeffer radiation packs. 
12. An automatic 5-second hold provision was  added to the blood-pressure meas- 
uring system (BPMS) start-button circuitry. 
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13. A switch was added to the cutoff correlation-clock edge lighting. 
14. The BPMS assembly was located on the spacecraft structure rather than on 
the leg restraint. 
15. The BPMS cuff hose incorporated a right-angle adapter. 
16. The cabin-pressure audio-tone warning and tone switch were removed (cabin- 
pressure switch and warning light remaining). 
Communications System 
1. One command receiver-decoder was removed, and the remaining receiver- 
decoder was powered from the standby bus. 
2. The hf orbital voice transmitter-receiver was rewired to operate after 
landing. 
3. The hf rescue voice transmitter -receiver was removed. 
4. An hf dipole antenna was  installed on the retropackage. 
5. An antenna switch was  added to permit selection of either dipole, bicone, o r  
whip antenna for hf voice. 
6. Improved microphones were installed in the pilot's helmet. 
7. An extension cord was  added to allow operation of the spacecraft communica- 
tions system from outside the spacecraft after landing. 
8. Shielding was  added to the audio center to eliminate interference from the 
auxiliary rescue, search and rescue and homing (SARAH), beacon. 
9. A hand-held voice transceiver was added to the survival kit. 
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems 
1. The retrorocket heater blankets were removed. 
2. The sound fixing and ranging (SOFAR) bomb (2500 feet) was  added to the main- 
parachute r iser .  
3. Dye markers  were added to the antenna canister to aid in postflight recovery 
of the canister. 
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Heat Protection System 
1. The heat-shield center plug was bolted to the heat-shield structural  laminate 
to re tard warping upon landing. 
2. Experimental ablation samples were bonded and thermocouples added to the 
beryllium shingles. 
3. A triangular, three-color paint patch was added to the spacecraft exterior for 
postflight thermal evaluation of the paint samples. 
4. A rectangular white-painted patch w a s  added to the spacecraft to evaluate the 
effect on spacecraft shingle temperatures. 
Personal Equipment 
1. The Polaroid window filter was removed. 
2. Leg restraints  were deleted; and knee, heel, and toe supports were added. 
The weight and balance data for spacecraft 16, according to actual flight usages, 
a r e  summarized in table I. 
LAUNCH-VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 
The MA-8 launch vehicle, an Atlas 113 series D (113-D) missile, w a s  modified 
(as on previous Mercury-Atlas missions) for the mission. 
The Atlas 113-D launch vehicle underwent no major modifications for the 
MA-8 mission. A summary of minor configuration changes from the MA-7 launch 
vehicle, the Atlas 107-D (ref. 2), follows. 
1. The fuel-tank insulation bulkhead was removed at the factory. 
2. Baffled injectors were installed in the two booster-engine thrust chambers for 
improved combustion characteristics (fig. 7). 
3. At ignition,. the booster engines were started by hypergolic instead of pyro- 
technic igniters (fig. 8). 
4. No hold-down delay w a s  programed between main-engine completion and 
start of the release sequence because of the expected improvement in combustion char- 
acterist ics resulting from the use of baffled injectors. 
5. The programer staging backup time w a s  changed from T + 136 to 
T + 132.3  seconds. 
6. Closed-loop guidance steering was planned to start at 24 instead of 25 sec- 
onds after booster-engine cutoff (BECO). 
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7. Sustainer pitch-program time duration was planned for 16.5 instead of 
20 seconds. 
8. The range-safety command receivers had circuit changes to eliminate the 
possibility of initiating an inadvertent destruct signal should power to the receivers be 
momentarily interrupted during external-internal power switching. 
9. The rough combustion cutoff (RCC) capability w a s  removed, but the RCC 
monitoring instrumentation w a s  retained. 
10. A redundant head-suppression solenoid control circuit was incorporated in the 
engine-relay box to improve reliability. 
11. 'The hydraulic instrumentation and sensing lines for the abort sensing and 
implementation system (ASIS) in the thrust section w e r e  rerouted, and the insultation 
w a s  improved to prevent possible freezing in the cryogenic environment. 
12. The telemetry package was modified to include instrumentation for  improved 
temperature measurement in the boattail area.  
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TABLE I. - SPACECRAFT 16 WEIGHT AND BALANCE DATA 
~- 
Center-of-gravity 
station, in. IMission phase - Moment of inertia, 2 slug-ft 
Launch 
Orbit 
Normal reentry 
Main-parachute 
deployment 
Flotation 
~~~ 
167.97 
121.03 
124.45 
122.24 
119.63 
Weight, 
lb 
-0.13 -0.11 353.2 
-.20 -.07 286.8 
-.23 .02 275.3 
-.18 .14 271.1 
-. 52 .05 264.0 
4324.55 
3028.89 
2732. 50 
2602.32 
2441.43 
I 
X 
7865.9 
650.7 
571.6 
459.0 
386.2 
__ 
IY 
7872.9 
659.0 
578.8 
466.3 
390.5 
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Figure 4.- MA-8 lift-off configuration. 
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Figure 5. - MA-8 spacecraft and adapter pr ior  to lift-off. 
16 
Y 
I C +  
Y 
YAW 
Figure 6. - MA-8 spacecraft axis diagram. 
Figure 7. - Booster-engine baffled injector. 
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(a) Igniter locations. 
r Diaphragm 
(b) Igniter configuration. 
Figure 8. - Booster-engine hypergolic igniter. 
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MISSION OPERATIONS 
The various ground operations required to support a Mercury orbital mission 
were grouped according to appropriate mission phases, that is, prelaunch, launch, o r -  
bital flight, and recovery. The prelaunch operations included preparations necessary 
to bring the pilot, spacecraft, launch-vehicle, and ground-support personnel up to 
flight -ready status. The launch operations commenced with the countdown, when all 
flight systems and flight-control stations were checked for  readiness, and concluded 
with insertion of the spacecraft into its orbital trajectory. 
mission entailed the flight -monitoring and data -acquisition operations of personnel sta- 
tioned along the Mercury Worldwide Network. The recovery operations began when a 
landing point was predicted by appropriate network stations and involved the combined 
efforts of thousands of Department of Defense personnel stationed at the various pre-  
scribed landing locations along the orbital ground track. 
The orbital phase of the 
PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS 
The prelaunch operations consisted of training the pilot for a specific flight, con- 
ducting preparations at the launch site for  the spacecraft and the launch vehicle, and 
conducting flight-safety reviews. Although each pilot had received training after his 
introduction into Project Mercury, special training was required for the mission in- 
volved. 
sent realistic operational situations which required assessment and action. 
simulations were often conducted in conjunction with the detailed checkout operations 
for  the spacecraft, launch vehicle, and the Mercury Worldwide Network. 
The training involved participation in a ser ies  of mission simulations to pre-  
The 
Program -management personnel attended scheduled review meetings to evaluate 
the status of prelaunch preparations for the spacecraft and launch vehicle and to initiate 
necessary remedial action in order  to maximize pilot safety throughout the mission. 
The following paragraphs outline the operations required for prelaunch. 
Pilot Training 
The pilot-training program for Project Mercury was divided into six basic cat-  
egories which were essentially dependent on the training devices used. 
were academics , static training, environmental familiarization, dynamic training, 
egress  and survival training, and specific mission training. The first five categories 
were discussed briefly in the report  on the MA-6 mission (ref. 1). A discussion about 
specific training for  the MA-8 mission follows. 
The categories 
Preflight operations schedule. - During the preflight preparation period, the 
MA-8 pilot was involved in a diversity of activities which often required considerable 
travel and resulted in a crowded schedule. 
in briefings and meetings concerning every aspect of the mission, but managed to com- 
plete such training requirements as recovery training, survival-pack exercises, ac - 
celeration refamiliarization on the centrifuge, and review of the celestial sphere at the 
The pilot spent a large portion of his time 
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Morehead Planetarium. 
tance in which the MA-8 
Table 11 summarizes all preflight activities of major impor- 
pilot participated. 
Spacecraft checkout activities. - Participation in  the spacecraft preflight activities 
enabled the pilot to become fammar  with the MA-8 spacecraft and launch-vehicle sys-  
tems. In particular, the involvement of the pilot in the activities permitted the pilot to 
manipulate and evaluate his flight equipment, along with the various systems and 
switching-procedure modifications peculiar to the MA-8 spacecraft. The checkout 
activities, along with other events, a r e  listed in table 11. The pilot spent 31 hours 
27 minutes in the spacecraft and many additional hours before and after each checkout 
operation in preparation, observation, troubleshooting, and discussion. In addition, 
the pilot spent approximately 45 hours in the MA-7 spacecraft, which added to his gen- 
e ra l  knowledge of the Mercury spacecraft and launch-vehicle systems. 
Training activities. - An important a rea  of pilot-preparation training was to main- 
tain proficiency in high-performance fighter aircraft ,  since the pilot must make rapid 
and accurate decisions under true operational conditions. Aerial flights complemented 
static t ra iners  by emphasizing the need and consequences of decisions, which kept the 
pilot a ler t  and aware of the operational mission requirements. The pilot logged ap- 
proximately 30 hours during the period from August 11, 1962, to 4 days pr ior  to the 
miss  ion. 
The pilot received three ser ies  of formal systems briefings which were oriented 
to the operational requirements of the mission. In addition, the pilot spent many more 
hours with various systems and operations specialists to establish mission operational 
procedures. 
during the last  2 months of his preflight preparation period. 
The pilot spent more than 100 hours in reviewing spacecraft systems 
Table III summarizes the training activities in the Cape Canaveral procedures 
The table does not include the 28 hours trainer from August 20 to October 1, 1962. 
spent in the Cape Canaveral procedures trainer during the MA-7 preflight period, o r  
the 8 hours spent in the Langley Research Center procedures trainer during June 1962 
to practice manual control of the reentry -rate oscillations and to evaluate flight-plan 
control tasks, During the MA-8 training period at Cape Canaveral, the pilot spent 
29 hours 15  minutes in the trainer accomplishing 37 fast-time simulated missions, 
40 simulated turnaround maneuvers, and 68 simulated retrofires and experiencing 
68 simulated failures of spacecraft systems. The pilot consumed almost as much 
time in the briefing and debriefing periods associated with each formal training session 
as was spent during training. 
The main emphasis during the simulations was on the basic operational aspects 
of the mission because of their relative importance and because the procedures trainer 
was best equipped to accomplish these requirements. The pilot, therefore, spent the 
majority of his time during the sessions on the detection and correction of systems 
failures, on mission anomalies which usually require an abort  during the launch phase 
of the mission, and on overall systems monitoring and management. 
devoted a few sessions to attitude control, control-mode switching, maneuvering flight, 
and other inflight activities specified in  the flight plan. The pilot also participated in 
several  launch-abort and network simulations during which the mission rules were 
rehearsed and discussed. 
Also, the pilot 
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Training analysis. - The pilot achieved a high level of skill in the procedures 
trainer in performing such maneuvers as the turnaround and retrofire maneuvers. Use 
of the transparent gyro simulator and an understanding of the spacecraft control sys-  
tems and their operation prepared him for inflight activities such as control-mode 
switching, flight maneuvering using external reference, and the gyro-realinement pro - 
cedures that cannot be meaningfully simulated in the procedures trainer. 
Pilot preflight preparation included familiarization with emergency procedures, 
responses to mission anomalies, and egress  and recovery procedures. Since the mis-  
sion proceeded normally, evaluation of the effectiveness of these training activities 
under actual emergency conditions was not possible. However, the pilot reported 
during postflight briefings that he believed his preparation in these a reas  was adequate. 
A training activity which could not be accomplished during the final preparation period 
was manual control and damping of simulated reentry-rate oscillations. The pilot had 
practiced the maneuver on the Langley procedures trainer during June, pr ior  to re- 
location of the trainer at Houston, Texas. However, the pilot would be required to 
damp the reentry-rate oscillation manually only if both the auxiliary damping and rate- 
command systems failed. The pilot reported during debriefing that practice in damping 
reentry -rate oscillations just before the mission would have been desirable, but the 
procedures trainer at Cape Canaveral had not been mechanized in time for reentry s im- 
ulations. 
The pilot exerted maximum effort in learning the various spacecraft systems and 
Particular concentration was placed on resolving the best  procedures 
The approach of the pilot in preparing for the mission was  to prac- 
flight hardware. 
for  smoothly accomplishing maneuvering flight and control -mode switching with mini - 
mum fuel usage. 
tice the activities in the t ra iners  and in the spacecraft only after he thoroughly knew 
each system and its operation. 
in preparing for the mission with a minimum of time spent in the procedures trainer 
and in the spacecraft. 
The practice permitted the pilot to make rapid progress 
As a result of experience gained from previous Mercury missions, the pilot was 
able to prepare for the mission in a more efficient manner. Consequently, the flight 
plan was more flexible and was finalized at an ear l ier  date, operational requirements 
were emphasized, and the number of last-minute flight requirements was reduced. 
Thus, the pilot had additional time to become more familiar with the spacecraft and 
launch -vehicle systems. 
Spacecraft Prelaunch Preparation 
Prelaunch preparations for  spacecraft 16 were basically the same as the prepa- 
rations for spacecraft 13 and 18 used in the MA-6 and MA-7 missions, respectively. 
These preparations a r e  described in the MA-6 mission report  (ref. 1). Major changes 
and modifications made on spacecraft 16 prior to launch a r e  presented chronologically 
in the following spacecraft history. 
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Spacecraft History 
Spacecraft 16 arr ived at hangar S, Cape Canaveral, January 16, 1962. Prepara-  
tion activities for  the spacecraft  and the onboard systems consisted of final installa- 
tions, systems checkouts, and configuration changes. Actual work days in the hangar 
totaled 185 days which included 43 days spent an tests, but which did not include 
4 . 5  days that the spacecraft was returned to the hangar during launch-pad operations. 
There were 69 1 mission preparation sheets, which authorized required work, and 
481 discrepancy reports, which described i tems that required rework, as of Septem- 
ber 28, 1962. 
The spacecraft was transported to the launch site September 10, 1962, but was 
returned to the hangar September 2 1  for  replacement of the reaction control system 
(RCS) manual-system selector valve as a result  of high pull forces  and subsequent 
leakage encountered during prelaunch tests. RCS tests,  normally performed 4 days 
pr ior  to launch at the launch complex, were performed in the hangar S RCS cell  fol- 
lowing the valve change. The spacecraft was returned to the launch complex and re- 
mated to the launch vehicle September 26, 1962. 
The prelaunch tests performed, major changes, and preflight events in the his- 
tory of spacecraft 16 at Cape Canaveral are shown chronologically in table IV. 
Launch-Vehicle Preparation 
Prelaunch preparations for the Atlas 113-D launch vehicle were basically the 
same as those for  the Atlas 107-D and 109-D launch vehicles, which were used in the 
MA-7 and MA-6 missions, respectively. The preparations a r e  described in the MA-6 
mission report  (ref. 1). 
Flight-Safety Reviews 
Flight-safety and mission review meetings were held to determine the flight- 
worthiness of the spacecraft and launch vehicle and to ascertain the readiness of all 
supporting elements for  the MA-8 mission. 
Spacecraft, - Two spacecraft 16 review meetings were conducted. The f i r s t  
meeting was held September 20, 1962, to discuss spacecraft history while at the At- 
lantic Missile Range (AMR) and the corresponding status of the spacecraft systems. 
A faulty manual-system selector valve in the RCS was discovered September 21, 1962. 
In order  to replace the valve, the spacecraft was demated and returned to hangar S. 
The subsequent mating with the launch vehicle was conducted September 26, 1962. The 
second review meeting was held September 28, 1962. All systems were approved as 
ready f o r  flight, pending the successful completion of the final simulated flight test, 
which was satisfactorily completed the following day. 
Launch vehicle. - Two meetings were held to determine the status of the Atlas 
113-D launch vehicle. 
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) management regarding the decision to off -load 
The first meeting was conducted September 27, 1962, to brief 
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liquid oxygen and fuel in an  amount equivalent to that previously consumed during the 
2 -second hold-down at launch. If the launch vehicle was not off -loaded, an indefinite 
combination of regulator action and ullage volume could cause an undesirable longitu- 
dinal oscillation near  lift-off, which might compromise the structural  integrity of the 
intermediate bulkhead. The amount of off -loaded propellant only reduced the extra 
fuel margin at SECO and did not affect the orbital-insertion probability. 
The second meeting, which was termed the Booster Review, was held Septem- 
ber 28, 1962, and launch-vehicle systems were approved ready for flight, pending 
successful completion of the simulated flight previously noted. 
Mission. - The MA-8 mission review meeting was held September 30, 1962. All 
elements of the flight were adjudged to  be ready. The X - l-day Flight-Safety Review 
Board met October 2, 1962. The board was advised that the Status Review Board had 
met at 8:30 a. m. that morning and had determined the launch vehicle to be ready for 
flight. The Flight-Safety Review Board then approved both the spacecraft and launch 
vehicle for flight. 
LAUNCH OPERATIONS 
The launch operations discussed in the following paragraphs include the launch 
procedure, weather conditions, and photographic coverage. The section on "Launch 
Procedure" presents the major events which occurred during the countdown. 
weather section includes a summary of the weather conditions reported at lift-off, at 
the launch site, and in the Atlantic and Pacific recovery areas. 
tion presents a summary of the launch-site photographic coverage for the mission and 
contains a discussion of the quality and usefulness of the data obtained. 
The 
The photographic sec-  
Launch Procedure 
The spacecraft launch operations were planned for a 560-minute split countdown 
with a scheduled 17. 5-hour hold at T - 390 minutes for spacecraft RCS fuel and pyro- 
technic servicing. 
7 : O O  a. m. e. s. t. , October 3, 1962, could be met, a 90-minute built-in hold was 
scheduled at T - 140 minutes. 
To provide additional assurance that the projected launch time of 
The second half of the split countdown was started at 1 1 : O O  p. m. e. s. t. , Octo- 
b e r  2, 1962. Launch occurred at 07:15:11 a. m. e. s. t. , October 3, 1962, after one 
hold of 15-minute duration at T - 45 minutes. The sequence of major events which 
occurred in the minutes of countdown are as follows: 
Star t  of second half of countdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  T - 390 
Pilot insertion into the spacecraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  T - 140 
Spacecraft hatch closure s tar ted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  T - 108 
Spacecraft hatch secured, shingle installation started . . . . .  T - 96 
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Spacecraft shingle installation complete . . . . . . . . .  T - 88 
Service tower (gantry) removal started . . . . . . . . . .  T - 64 
Hold to repair  Canary Islands radar . . . . . . . . . . .  T - 45 
Liquid oxygen pumping started . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  T - 38 
Liquid oxygen overfill probe reached . . . . . . . . . . .  T - 20 
Liquid oxygen topping at 2500 pounds below overfill . . .  T . 14 
L a u n c h . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  T -  0 
Weather Conditions 
Weather conditions in  the launch area were satisfactory for  operations several  
days pr ior  to and on the day of the launch. However, several  tropical s torms  caused 
some concern because of their proximity to planned recovery areas. On the day pr ior  
to scheduled launch, Atlantic recovery area 3- 1 (section on "Recovery Operations") was 
shifted 213 nautical miles down the orbital path in a southeasterly direction because of 
tropical s torm Daisy. 
northeast of Puerto Rico at  approximately longitude 24. 5O N latitude 67. 5' W, which 
was between recovery areas 3-1 and 4-1. These recovery areas were planned to be 
used only in the event of a contingency; therefore, the probability of their use was suf- 
ficiently low to justify assuming the r i sk  of the remotely located storm. 
On launch day, Daisy was located about 400 miles north- 
In the Pacific, Typhoon Emma was located 750 miles east-southeast of the Pacific 
Command ship. In addition, Typhoon Frieda was forming 500 miles east of Guam. Si- 
multaneously, Typhoon Dinah, which had been of some concern earlier, had moved into 
the vicinity of Hong Kong and was far removed from the orbital ground track. 
covery time, there were no disturbances in the planned end-of -mission recovery area 
At re- 
6-1. 
Weather observations at the launch site at launch time (taken at  7:17 a. m. e. s. t. ) 
were as follows: 
5/10 a Total cloud cover (horizon to horizon) . . . . . . . . .  
Wind direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  From 150" (SSE) 
Wind velocity, knots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
Visibility, miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
The cloud cover consisted of high c i r rus  clouds at 30 000 feet, a 
some low cumulus clouds with a base at 2200 feet, and some strato- 
cumulus clouds with a base at 4500 feet on the eastern horizon. 
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Pressure,  sea level, in. Hg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29.99 
Temperature, OF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80 
Dewpoint, OF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75 
Wet bulb temperature, OF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76. 3 
Relative humidity, percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85 
A plot of the launch-site wind direction and velocity for altitudes up to 60 000 feet is 
shown in figure 9. 
Weather conditions in the planned terminal landing a rea  (recovery area 6-1) were 
reported at the time of recovery from the aircraft  car r ie r  U. S. S. Kearsarge as fol- 
lows : 
6/10 a Cloud cover (horizon to horizon) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Wave height, f t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 
Wind velocity, knots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 
Wind direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  110" (ESE) 
Sea direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90" (E) 
Visibility, miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
Temperature, "F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78 
Pressure ,  sea level, in. Hg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30.15 
Wet bulb temperature, "F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71 
Dewpoint, "F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75. 5 
Relative humidity, percent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92 
Water temperature, "F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80 
aThe cloud cover consisted of cumulus clouds with a base at 3000 feet 
and altocumulus clouds at 14 000 feet. 
Photographic Coverage 
Photographic coverage obtained by the AMR facilities, including quantity of in- 
strumentation committed and data obtained during the launch phase, is shown in table V. 
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Additional coverage was obtained by the recovery forces-at the landing site. Launch- 
phase photographic coverage was good, and adequate data were available for  a detailed 
photographic evaluation had it been necessary. Coverage of the mission in other re- 
spects was also good. The photographic coverage discussed in the following sections 
was based on film available for  evaluation during the postlaunch reporting period. 
Metric film, - Metric film from 15 cameras  was processed, and the results were 
The data were not required for  evaluation by NASA MSC, since tabulated by the AMR. 
the power-flight phase was normal. 
Engineering . .  sequential . . .  film. - Engineering sequential coverage of the launch 
phase is shown in figure 1-0,which indicates the time interval when either the launch 
vehicle o r  the exhaust flame under reduced visibility was visible to the tracking cam- 
era. 
launch site.  
fixed cameras  and 11 tracking cameras.  
posure, focus, and film quality was good. 
oxygen (lox) boiloff, umbilical disconnect, periscope retraction, and umbilical-door 
closure. 
launch-vehicle displacement pr ior  to lift- off. 
coverage was good, with the exception of two items which were slightly underexposed 
and three i tems which were grainy. 
ignition and lift-off. 
tower separation. 
an irregular launch-vehicle roll rate and rapid vernier engine gimbaling at  lift-off. 
Refer to the section on "Launch-Vehicle Performance" for details of these irregularities. 
Optimum coverage was achieved as a result of good weather conditions a t  the 
Fifteen fi lms were reviewed, including 16- and 35-mm film from four 
Fixed-camera coverage with respect to ex- 
Two fixed cameras  indicated normal liquid 
The two other fixed cameras were positioned to show any spacecraft and 
The quality of the tracking- camera 
Six tracking cameras showed launch-vehicle 
All tracking cameras indicated normal launch-vehicle staging and 
Three of the tracking camera fi lms which were reviewed indicated 
Documentary film. - Documentary coverage used for  engineering evaluation of the 
mission was providedby 16- and 35-mm motion picture film and 8- by 10-inch sti l l  
photographs. 
One aer ia l  motion picture camera tracked the space vehicle f rom lift-off through 
staging. The film showed excellent tracking, focus, and film exposure, but was in- 
adequate for  detailed evaluation because of camera vibration which produced a blurred 
image. The remaining three aer ia l  f i lms recorded no usable data. A film copy of the 
Boston University television coverage, as recorded at Patrick Air Force Base, was 
reviewed and indicated good tracking from after lift-off through tower separation, A 
large image size was maintained, but quality was restricted by the limitations imposed 
in reproducing from television tape to photographic film. One motion picture film of 
recovery operations was available for review. The film showed aer ia l  and shipboard 
coverage of the spacecraft  while on the main parachute, the spacecraft landing in the 
water, pararescue personnel activities in the water, spacecraft retrieval f rom the 
water by the recovery aircraf t  car r ie r ,  removal of the spacecraft hatch, pilot egress  
f rom the spacecraft, and shipboard coverage of the pilot during his physical examina- 
tion. 
Four aerial motion picture fi lms of the launch sequence were received. 
Documentary coverage of the mission by still photography was good in both qual- 
ity and quantity. Still photographs of prelaunch activities included views of pilot prep- 
aration at hangar S, insertion of the pilot into the spacecraft, and securing for  launch. 
Also included were prelaunch photographs of the spacecraft, separately and mated with 
the launch vehicle. Flight and recovery coverage provided several  views of the launch 
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sequence, views showing the spacecraft and recovery personnel in the water before r e -  
trieval by the recovery ship, the spacecraft on board the ca r r i e r  after pickup, removal 
of the hatch, pilot egress,  physical examination of the pilot, and closeup views of the 
spacecraft after recovery. Also available were numerous engineering still photographs 
showing closeup views of the spacecraft during the postflight inspection a t  the launch 
site, 
FLIGHT -CONTROL OPERATIONS 
The preparation of the flight-control team and the Mercury Worldwide Network 
followed the same procedure used for the MA-6 and MA-" manned orbital missions. 
Simulations carr ied out pr ior  to the mission were considered to be one of the most im-  
portant steps in the preparation of the flight controllers and the pilot for the mission, 
particularly in view of the extended mission duration intended for the MA-8 mission. 
The process of flight-control simulation and support preparation was essential to the 
safety of the mission. 
Prelaunch Period 
Network operations began September 14, 1962. Flight-control teams were 
cleared for departure to their respective network stations between September 14 and 18. 
The flight-control team to staff the Mercury Control Center was  on station Septem- 
b e r  17, 1962. 
Command signal tes ts  at remote s i tes  and preparations for launch simulations 
were performed September 18 and 19, 1962. 
with the mission pilots while exercising the Mercury Control Center and Bermuda 
flight-control teams. A ser ies  of MA-8 mission reentry simulations was  performed 
September 20, 1962. The simulations involved the Canton, Hawaii, California, and 
Guaymas stations; the Mercury Control Center; and the Goddard Computing and Com- 
munications Center. The simulations were conducted to familiarize appropriate net- 
work stations with reentry -decision techniques when faced with various spacecraft 
problems. A network simulation was  performed September 22, 1962, which began 
with a full launch countdown and continued in real  time (actual time intervals) from 
lift-off to 3 hours 20 minutes elapsed time. The computers were fast timed from that 
point until 7 hours 10 minutes, and the mission simulation then continued in rea l  time 
until termination during the sixth orbital pass. The fast-time procedure was utilized 
for  all of the six-pass orbital simulations. 
were performed September 28 and October 1, 1962. 
Ten launch simulations were performed 
Additional six-pass mission simulations 
Approximately 50 percent of the network flight controllers had never participated 
in a Mercury mission. 
tirely by new capsule communicators (Cap Coms) and systems monitors. The major- 
ity of the remaining stations had at least one new flight controller. 
again, as in the MA-7 mission, used as a training facility for the MA-8 mission, and 
three new flight controllers were trained at the site. 
The Kano, Zanzibar, and Woomera stations were staffed en- 
The Texas si te was  
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The documentation for the mission was good. A total of 24 instrumentation sup- 
port  instructions were generated during the prelaunch preparation period, which was a 
significant reduction over those required for previous missions. The majority of the 
documentation required only one revision during the prelaunch period. The spacecraft 
configuration and flight plan were firmly fixed several  weeks pr ior  to launch; and only 
minor changes were made to the data-acquisition plan, countdown, and flight plan. A 
major revision was written for  the mission rules  (primarily concerning the Bermuda 
Mercury Control Center Standard Operations Procedures) for the use of command re- 
moting functions. The contractor document, which contained the spacecraft systems 
schematics used by flight controllers, was also revised. 
Launch Phase 
The launch and network countdowns proceeded smoothly, and no ,major discrep- 
ancies were noted. 
site calibrations were good. No major discrepancies were noted in network voice com- 
munications, although stations affected by the day -night frequency transition were not 
as good as had been experienced during previous missions. 
The confidence summaries transmitted by the network to verify 
At approximately T - 45 minutes, a 15-minute hold was instituted for repairs  to 
the Canary Islands radar  equipment. After the countdown was resumed, it was con- 
tinued without further holds, Minor calibration discrepancies between pilot and telem- 
etry readouts were reported from the blockhouse and were noted on the meters in the 
Mercury Control Center. Messages were sent to network stations advising them of the 
calibration changes. 
Powered flight was normal, although air -to -ground (A/G) communications were 
poor to unreadable at the launch-vehicle staging. The communications rapidly im-  
proved and were satisfactory during the remainder of powered flight. BECO occurred 
early; consequently, SECO occurred late. The ports -open indication from the missile 
telemetry monitor occurred at approximately 10 seconds of powered flight remaining 
and caused some concern. The event normally occurs about 10 seconds before lox 
depletion. 
The launch-vehicle guidance data became noisy during the last 1 5  to 20 seconds of 
powered flight, but the computer was able to make the go - no-go recommendation 
without difficulty. 
final orbit, as w a s  determined f rom later radar  tracking information. 
The cutoff conditions measured at this point were very close to the 
Orbital Phase 
Following turnaround and checkout of the various spacecraft control systems be - 
tween Bermuda and the Canary Islands, the suit-inlet temperature began to increase. 
The pilot increased the suit comfort-control valve (CCV) setting to a value greater than 
the lift-off setting of 4. The dome temperature of the suit  heat exchanger was approxi- 
mately 80" F and indicated unsatisfactory cooling by the suit circuit. The suit-inlet 
temperature, as indicated by ground read-out, continued to r i se  and reached a value of 
89" F over Muchea. From the time the spacecraft passed over Muchea until it passed 
over Canton, the ground read-out showed a tendency to suit-inlet temperature to 
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decrease. 
81" F level during the period. 
creased the suit setting to 7.5, and he felt that the system was beginning to cool the 
suit properly. 
The dome temperature of the suit heat exchanger remained at an 80" to 
By the time of contact with Canton, the pilot had in- 
Upon contact with Guaymas, the pilot reported that he was feeling warm, but not 
uncomfortable, and that the suit cooling system had begun to decrease the suit temper- 
ature. He also reported that all other systems were performing perfectly, and ground 
read-outs confirmed his  report. Based on these considerations, the decision was made 
to continue for another orbital pass. The environmental systems monitor requested the 
pilot to reduce the suit valve setting to position 3 to examine the response of the suit 
dome temperature. The valve reduction was made shortly after the beginning of the 
second pass,  and when the dome temperature rose  rapidly, the valve was reset to 7.5. 
By the time the spacecraft reached Woomera on the second pass,  the suit-inlet tern - 
perature had decreased to 72" F and appeared to have stabilized. The suit-inlet tem- 
perature continued in the vicinity of 70" F for the remainder of the mission, and the 
pilot was apparently quite comfortable. 
Because of the excellent performance of the pilot and the spacecraft; the flight- 
control task became one of monitoring, gathering data, and assisting the pilot with his 
flight plan. After the go decision at the end of the first pass,  the remaining orbital go 
decisions were made without hesitation, but with one exception. 
cations between the Indian Ocean ship and the Pacific Command ship at  the end of the 
fifth orbital pass  required the Pacific Command Ship to make the go decision without 
an input from the Mercury Control Center. There was no question that the mission 
should be continued, but had an emergency situation developed, the loss of communi- 
cations would have caused concern. 
The loss  of communi- 
In spite of the smoothness of the mission, the ground communications were in- 
ferior to that of previous missions because of propagation effects. However, sufficient 
information was available a t  all times, either by voice o r  teletype circuits, to maintain 
proper surveillance of the mission. 
The remote -site flight controllers queried the pilot and obtained any information 
needed. The 
average tolerance on all telemetered parameters was approximately 2 percent. 
gross  deviations were noted in summary data, and it is believed that these good data 
were the result  of the new verification procedures and confidence tapes that were pre-  
pared specifically for the mission. 
many useful real-time inputs to the Mercury Control Center, and no difficulty existed 
in determining the exact status of the spacecraft, pilot, and mission at  any time. 
The network data presented on the summary messages were excellent. 
No 
The postpass analysis by network stations provided 
Retrofire and Reentry Phases 
The retrofire maneuver, which took place over the Pacific Command ship, 
appeared to be nearly perfect, except for an apparent 2-second delay in retrofire (sec- 
tion on "Electrical and Sequential"). The attitudes of the spacecraft were held extreme- 
ly well by the attitude-control system, as indicated by both the pilot and ground 
telemetry and as verified by the subsequent landing accuracy. Other than voice 
communications with the pilot and some telemetry data obtain2d from the Watertown 
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radar  ship, no further trajectory information was received. 
gave the Mercury Control Center the initial time of communications ionization blackout 
during reentry, and the information provided confirmation of the time of retrorocket 
ignition and spacecraft attitudes at retrofire. 
The Watertown Cap Com 
Relay communications between the aircraft in the sixth-pass recovery area and 
the Hawaii station worked well and provided communications with the pilot almost con- 
tinuously from the end of ionization blackout to landing. 
Center had absolute confidence that the reentry phase had been completed successfully. 
Thus, the Mercury Control 
The MA-8 mission was the best  coordinated effort in Project Mercury to date 
and was a resul t  of the experience gained in previous missions. 
new flight-control personnel, who acted as Cap Coms, medical monitors, and systems 
monitors for the first time, performed well and reflected effective training to the time 
of deployment to their stations. 
pilots and flight-control personnel was a major contributing factor in making the MA-8 
mission a successful operation. 
The large number of 
The cooperation between the MA-8 mission and backup 
RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
The MA-8 recovery operations discussed in the following paragraphs include the 
recovery plans, recovery procedure, and postlanding aids. The section on "Recovery 
Plans" contains a descriptive and graphical presentation of the planned recovery areas 
and the associated recovery forces.  The section on "Recovery Procedure" shows in 
chronological order  the significant events pertinent to the actual recovery operation. 
The section on "Recovery Aids" summarizes the effectiveness of the spacecraft equip- 
ment, which was utilized to assist recovery forces  in the location and retrieval of the 
spacecraft after landing. 
Recovery Plans 
Figure 11 shows the areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans where recovery 
ships were positioned. 
some of the ships and aircraf t  changed position during the course of the mission to 
provide a location and retrieval capability for more than one landing site. 
through F were available, if i t  became necessary, to abort the mission during powered 
flight. Recovery forces were distributed to provide for  recovery within a maximum of 
3 hours after landing in area D; a maximum of 6 hours in areas A, C, E, and F; and a 
maximum of 9 hours in area B. Periodic landings from orbit were provided during 
each orbital pass. Areas  2-1, 3-1,  and 4-1 were available for  landings in the Atlantic 
Ocean at the beginning of the second, third, and fourth orbital passes,  respectively. 
Areas 4-2, 5-1, and 6-1 were available for  landings in the Pacific Ocean near the end 
of the fourth, fifth, and sixth passes,  respectively. Recovery forces  were distributed 
to provide for recovery within a maximum of 3 hours in these areas. 
ships and 13 aircraft  were on station in the Atlantic recovery areas, and 7 ships and 
4 aircraft  were on station in the Pacific recovery areas. Additional search aircraft  
The locations of recovery vehicles were not fixed because 
Areas A 
A total of 16 
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w e r e  available to back up the aircraf t  on station in the recovery areas. Also, helicop- 
ters, amphibious surface vehicles, and small  boats were positioned for  recovery sup- 
port  near the launch complex. 
Locations of staging bases are shown in figure 12. Contingency recovery a i r -  
craft were on alert status at these bases to provide support, if a landing were to occur 
at any place along the orbital ground track. 
spacecraft and to provide emergency onscene assistance if required. 
The aircraft  w e r e  equipped to locate the 
Recovery Procedure 
All recovery forces were in their proper positions at the appropriate t imes 
during the mission. Weather forecasts on the morning pr ior  to launch indicated that 
Hurricane Daisy could cause adverse recovery conditions in recovery area 3 -1, which 
at that time was located at latitude 29"39' N longitude 62"OO' W (section on ''Weather 
Conditions"). 
relocate down range along the ground track to an a rea  with more favorable weather. 
As a result, the center of a rea  3-1 was moved 213 nautical miles down range to a posi- 
tion located at latitude 26"25' N longitude 58"18' W. All recovery forces assigned to 
a rea  3-1 were shifted down range without difficulty. At launch time, weather conditions 
were favorable for location and retrieval in all planned Atlantic and Pacific recovery 
areas ,  and conditions were good in most contingency recovery a reas  along the space- 
craft ground track. 
Therefore, the recovery ships assigned to area 3 -1 were instructed to 
A communications network linked the deployed recovery forces  to the Recovery 
Control Center located in the Mercury Control Center at the launch site. 
communications were satisfactory throughout the operation, and the recovery forces 
were  given information regarding mission status during the launch, orbital, and re- 
entry phases. 
Recovery 
During the sixth orbital pass,  recovery units in a rea  6-1 were alerted to expect 
a landing in their area.  At the elapsed time from lift-off of 08:53:00 g. e. t. (20 min- 
utes prior to landing), a rea  6 -1 recovery forces were informed that the retrorockets 
had ignited normally, and the landing position had been predicted as nominal. 
units in a rea  6-1 made contact with the descending spacecraft before any calculated 
landing predictions based on reentry tracking were available f rom the Mercury World- 
wide Network support. At 09:05:00 g. e. t . ,  the aircraft  ca r r i e r  U. s. s. Kearsarge, 
positioned in the center of a rea  6-1, made radar contact with the spacecraft at a slant 
range of 178 nautical miles and held contact until the spacecraft descended to an alti- 
tude of 1200 feet. 
Recovery 
At 09:08:00 g. e. t., the destroyer U. S. S. Renshaw, positioned about 80 nautical 
miles up range from the center of area 6-1, reported a sonic-boom noise. A contail 
w a s  observed by personnel aboard the U. S. S. Kearsarge, and at 09:lO:OO g. e .  t . ,  the 
U. S. S. Kearsarge reported visual sighting of the spacecraft a t  a range of 5 nautical 
miles. A few personnel on board the car r ie r  observed drogue -parachute deployment, 
and many observed main-parachute deployment and subsequent spacecraft landing 
(fig. 13). Personnel on the aircraft  car r ie r  also reported that two almost-simultaneous 
sonic -boom noises occurred 10 seconds prior to main-parachute deployment. The 
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spacecraft landed at 09:13:15 g. e. t. at the location of latitude 32"05' N and longitude 
174O28.5' W, which was 4 nautical miles down range of the landing point (fig. 14). 
The pilot reported at 09:14:00 g. e. t. that conditions were normal, that he was 
comfortable, and that the spacecraft was dry and floating upright. Helicopters were 
launched from the aircraft  car r ie r  at 09:17:00 g. e. t. and established communications 
with the pilot. Helicopter crews reported that the spacecraft flotation attitude was 
never more than 20" from the vertical. A team of three swimmers, with a spacecraft 
auxiliary flotation collar (fig. 15), was deployed from a helicopter at 09:19:80 g. e. t. , 
and 4 minutes later the spacecraft was secured within the collar. At 09:21:00 g. e. t. , 
the pilot reported that he preferred to remain in the spacecraft and to be retrieved by 
the aircraft  car r ie r  U. S. S. Kearsarge. The aircraf t  ca r r i e r  approached within 
400 yards of the spacecraft, and a motor whaleboat f rom the car r ie r  towed a lifting 
line to the spacecraft. 
to the spacecraft at 09:50:00 g. e. t. 
The shepherd's crook on the end of the lifting line was attached 
At 09:54:00, the spacecraft was lifted clear of the water (fig. 16); and at 
09:56:00 g. e. t. , the spacecraft was secured on deck. The pilot actuated the side-hatch 
explosive mechanism at 09:59:00 g. e. t. (46 minutes after landing) and 2 minutes later 
(fig. 17) was clear of the spacecraft. The pilot remained on board the U. S. S. Kear- 
sa rge  for a 72-hour period of rest and debriefing. 
The antenna canister and drogue parachute landed 300 yards from the spacecraft 
and were retrieved by helicopter at 1O:OO:OO g. e. t. 
time of retrieval was reported by the U. S. S. Kearsarge: 
The following information at the 
Position of pickup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32'05.5' N 174O28.5' W 
Winds, velocity and direction, knots . . . . .  13 from 120" true 
Waves, height and direction, f t  . . . . . . . .  3 from 130" true 
Water temperature, " F . . . . . . . . . . . .  80 
Air temperature: 
Wetbulb, "F . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  71 
Dry bulb, "F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78 
The spacecraft was transferred from the U. S. S. Kearsarge to a tug near Mid- 
way Island on the morning of the day after launch. 
Midway from the tug to a C-130 aircraft  for delivery to Cape Canaveral. 
craft arrived at Cape Canaveral 2 days after the day of launch. 
The spacecraft was transferred at 
The space- 
At the time of recovery, the spacecraft appeared to be in excellent condition. 
The swimmers who attached the spacecraft auxiliary flotation collar reported that 
none of the stainless-steel s t raps  attached to the heat shield w e r e  broken, and the 
damage to the landing bag consisted of five small  holes and a 6-inch slash. 
shield center plug remained in place. The experimental ablation materials appeared to 
be intact at landing and were protected from damage during spacecraft handling by a 
covering of foam rubber. The antenna canister appeared normal, and there were no 
The heat- 
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r ips  or tears in the drogue parachute o r  the parachute risers. The main parachute, 
normally jettisoned upon landing, w a s  not recovered. 
Recovery Aids 
All spacecraft recovery aids appeared to function normally, although no reports 
of high-frequency directional-finding (hf/DF) beacon reception were noted, and it was 
reported that the flashing light ceased to operate shortly after landing. Pr ior  to being 
extinguished, the light was sighted by a helicopter pilot at a range of one-half mile. 
The green dye from the spacecraft dye marker  was sighted by a search-aircraft pilot 
at a range of 9 miles. 
A C-54 search aircraf t  reported contact with the Super SARAH recovery beacon 
at a range of 105 nautical miles. Three JC-130B search aircraft  reported receiving 
the SARAH recovery beacon at ranges of 60, 60, and 280 nautical miles, respectively, 
but their detection equipment did not have the capability of discerning between the 
code A of the Super SARAH beacon and the code C of the Mercury SARAH beacon. Four 
JC-130B aircraft  from the 6594th Recovery Control Group at  Hickam Air Force Base, 
Hawaii, were utilized as search aircraft  for areas 4-2, 5-1, and 6-1. The aircraft  
were capable of locating the spacecraft by homing in on the spacecraft ultrahigh- 
frequency (uhf) recovery beacons. The aircraft  also tracked the spacecraft telemetry 
signal during the second through the sixth orbital passes and provided DF bearings on 
the spacecraft. 
blackout period, but reacquired the signal and provided reliable DF bearings on the 
spacecraft until landing. 
The aircraf t  lost the telemetry signal during the communications 
The SOFAR bomb signal w a s  received, and a quick f i x  location was provided 
20 minutes after spacecraft landing. 
landing. Both of the fixes, shown in figure 14, were within 2 miles of the spacecraft 
retrieval position. 
A final location f i x  w a s  provided 45 minutes after 
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TABLE 11. - PILOT PREFLIGHT PREPARATION HISTORY 
Date 
Ju ly  11 
July 12 
July 13 
July 14 
July 16 
July 17 
July 18 
July 20 
July 23 
July 24 
July 25 
July 26 
July 27 
July 28 
Aug. 1 
Aug. 2 
Aug. 3 
Aug. 4 
Aug. 6 
Aug. 8 
Aug. 10 
Aug. 11 
Aug. 12 
Aug. 13 
Aug. 14 
Aug. 15 
Aug. 16 
Aug. 17 
Aug. 20 
Aug. 21 
Aug. 22 
Aug. 23 
Aug. 24 
Aug. 25 
Aug. 27 
Aug. 28 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Fri. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Mon. 
Wed. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Sun. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Activity 
Flight-plan meeting, flight-film meeting 
Flight-plan review 
Scheduling meeting 
Flying (T - 33) 
Flight-plan review 
Scientific panel meeting 
Mission rules review; flying (T - 33) 
Camera and onboard equipment briefing 
A. m. : Flight activities discussion, scheduling 
P. m. : 
Blood-pressure cuff discussion, systems briefing ~ 
meeting 
TV interview (Telstar) 
(ASCS)(automatic stabilization and control 
system) 
system (RCS)) 
Systems briefing (ASCS and reaction control 
Systems briefing (sequential) 
Flight -plan presentation 
Flying (T - 33) 
A. m. : 
P. m. : 
A. m. : Systems briefing 
P. m. : Weather briefing 
Geology briefing (terrestrial photography) 
Flying (F - 106) 
Scheduling meeting, flying (T - 33) 
Flying (T - 33) 
Review of contractor documents 
Systems test 
Systems tests concluded 
Sequential system checks 
Sequential system checks concluded 
Survival equipment meeting, flying (F - 106) 
Recovery training 
Weight and balance 
Mercury procedures trainer, flying (F - 106) 
Survival-pack exercise 
A. m. : Flight-plan activities meeting 
P. m. : Mercury procedures trainer 
Mercury procedures trainer 
Johnsville centrifuge Atlas g refamiliarization 
Morehead Planetarium celestial review 
Meeting on checklists 
Mercury procedures trainer, flying (F - 106) 
Systems briefings (communications and 
Ultraviolet camera briefing 
environmental control system) I 
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Date 
Aug. 29 
Aug. 30 
Sept. 1 
Sept. 4 
Sept. 5 
Sept. 6 
Sept. 7. 
Sept. 8 
Sept. 10 
Sept. 11 
Sept. 12 
Sept. 13 
Sept. 14 
Sept. 15 
Sept. 17 
Sept. 18 
Sept. 19 
Sept. 20 
Sept. 21 
Sept. 22 
Sept. 24 
Sept. 25 
Sept. 27 
Sept. 28 
Sept. 29 
Sept. 30 
Oct. 1 
Oct. 2 
Oct. 3 
Wed. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Thurs. 
Fri. 
Sat. 
Sun. 
Mon. 
Tues. 
Wed. 
Activity 
~ 
A. m. : 
P. m. : Scheduling meeting 
Flight-plan meeting 
Flying (T - 33) 
Flight-controller briefing 
Flying (T - 33) 
Systems briefings (ASCS and RCS) 
A. m. : Systems briefings (electrical and 
P. m. : Launch-vehicle meeting 
Mercury procedures trainer 
Mercury procedures trainer 
A. m. : Simulated flight no. 1 
P. m. : 
A. m. : Readiness examination 
P. m. : 
Flight-plan activities review, checMists review, 
Simulated flight no. 2 and flight acceptance 
Mercury procedures trainer 
Questionnaire review, A/G communications 
check, flying (F - 102) 
Bermuda Mercury Control Center simulation 
Flight configuration sequence and aborts 
A. m. : Mission review 
P. m. : 
Launch simulation and radio-frequency 
compatibility, flying (F - 102) 
Network simulation 
Training facilities meeting (Houston), 
Flying (T - 33) 
Mercury procedures trainer 
A. m. : Flight-plan discussion, mission 
P. m. : Mercury procedures trainer 
Launch simulation and radio-frequency 
Simulated flight no. 3 
Mission review 
A. m. : 
P. m. : Physical examination 
Pilot briefing, study 
Launch 
Mercury procedures trainer 
sequential) 
Briefing of the President of the 
United States; Mercury procedures trainer 
Mercury procedures trainer 
flying (F - 102) 
test, A/G communications check 
Mercury procedures trainer 
review 
compatibility, flying (F - 102) 
Mercury procedures trainer 
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TABLE JII. - PILOT TRAINING SUMMARY IN THE MERCURY PROCEDURES TRAINER NO. 2 (CAPE CANAVERAL) 
[68 simulated failures, 40 turnaround maneuvers, 53 retrofire attitude control maneuvers] 
Sept. 12 
Sept. 15 
Sept. 18 
Sept. 19 
Sept. 20 
Sept. 22 
Sept. 25 
Sept. 27 
Oct. 1 
-- 
Failure number and type 
Total 29:15 37 
Date, 1962 
10 5 22 15 5 11 
Type of training 
_ _  
(a) Special 
training 
activities 
Time, Number ------ 
of 
(b) missions ECS RCS SEQ ELEC COMM Other 
hr:min 
L 
New switch function familiarization 
One -orbital-pass mission 
Flight-plan familiarization, simulated sys - 
Flight-plan familiarization 
Simulated systems failures 
Simulated systems failures 
Simulated systems failures 
Simulated systems failures 
Simulated systems failures 
Bermuda Mission Control Center simulation 
Bermuda Mission Control Center simulation 
Simulated attitude-control -system failure 
Network simulation 
Flight-plan work 
Simulated attitude -control -system failure 
Network simulation, simulated systems 
tems failures 
failures 
01:30 
01:30 
01:45 
00:35 
03:OO 
01:35 
01:30 
01:15 
02:25 
03:35 
00:30 
02:30 
01:oo 
02:oo 
01:05 
03:30 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
3 
4 
3 
4 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
SEQ -Sequential system 
ELEC - Electrical system 
COMM -Communications system 
3 -Orbital and reentry emergencies 
4 -Turnaround maneuvers 
5 -Retrofire attitude control 
6 - Flight-plan activities (equipment manipulation, 
control-mode switching, yaw maneuvering, 
etcetera) 
TABLE N. - MODIFICATIONS AND TESTS MADE TO SPACECRAFT 16 
Modification or test 
Checkout of spacecraft electrical power systems 
Checkout of spacecraft instrumentation system 
Checkout of spacecraft sequential system 
Checkout of spacecraft communications systems 
Replacement of 7500 -psi oxygen -supply pressure 
transducers with 10 000 -psi transducers 
Checkout of spacecraft environmental control system 
Altitude -chamber test  of spacecraft 
Removal of maximum-altitude -sensor battery 
Disablement of retrorocket heater wiring 
Wiring of parachute -system barostats in se r i e s  
Checkout of spacecraft RCS 
Spacecraft communication system radiation tes t  
hstallation of A-11 -type amplifier -calibrator in the 
automatic control system 
Removal of photographic lights 
4ddition of volts to the heat-shield center plug 
Qddition of the low-thrust-only select switch to the 
FBW control mode 
4ddition of wiring for  the time-from-retrofire signal 
iemoval of squibs from the cabin snorkel valves 
lddition of a liferaft communication hardline 
iddition of a temperature display and associated 
selector switch 
Completion 
date, 1962 
Feb. 23 
Feb. 26 
Feb. 28 
Mar. 3 
Mar. 7 
Apr. 2 
Apr. 17 
May 16 
June 13 
June 14 
June 18 
June 21 
June 22 
June 25 
June 25 
June 29 
July 9 
July 13 
July 13 
July 24 
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TABLE IV. - MODIFICATIONS AND TESTS MADE TO SPACECRAFT 16 - Continued 
Modification or test 
Lddition of an automatic -solenoid malfunction detector 
iddition of retrofire and recovery -squib -arm switches and 
automatic bypass relays 
Eemoval of the Zener diode panel 
Lddition of temperature pickups to the dome location of 
the suit and cabin heat exchangers 
teplacement of the Freon check valves with a more 
reliable type 
iimulated flight in hangar S 
rest  of automatic control system 
nstallation of beryllium shingles with advanced ablative 
material bonded thereon 
llinement of retrorockets and conduct of spacecraft weight 
and balance measurement 
4ddition of the hf orbital antenna to the retropackage 
Spacecraft moved to launch site and mated with launch 
vehicle 
jimulated flight no. 1 
Electrical mate and abort tests 
simulated flight no. 2 
Flight configuration sequence and abort tests 
RCS proof pressure test. Spacecraft demated and returned 
to hangar S to replace manual RCS selector valve 
Spacecraft returned to launch site and remated to launch 
vehicle 
Completion 
date, 1962 
July 24 
July 25 
July 26 
Aug. 3 
Aug. 16 
Aug. 14 
Aug. 18 
Aug. 23 
Aug. 27 
Aug. 28 
Sept. 10 
Sept. 11 
Sept. 12 
Sept. 14 
Sept. 19 
Sept. 21 
Sept. 26 
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TABLE IV. - MODIFICATIONS AND TESTS MADE TO SPACECRAFT 16 - Concluded 
~~ 
Modification o r  test  
Simulated flight test no. 1 (repeated) 
Launch simulation 
Simulated flight no. 3 
Electrical interface test  
Launch countdown and lift -off 
Completion 
date, 1962 
Sept. 27 
Sept. 28 
Sept. 29 
Sept. 29 
Oct. 3 
TABLE V. - ATLANTIC MISSILE RANGE OPTICAL LAUNCH COVERAGE 
Film type 
Metric 
Engineering sequential 
Documentary 
Station Number of i tems committed 
15 
47 
102 
Number of i tems 
obtained 
15 
46 
99 
40 
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Figure 9. - Wind direction and velocity at the launch site. 
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Figure 10. - AMR engineering sequential tracking camera coverage. 
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Figure 11. - Recovery areas and ship locations. 
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Figure 11. - Concluded. 
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Figure 12. - MA-8 contingency recovery support forces. 
(b) Eastern Atlantic Ocean, Africa, and Indian Ocean, 
Figure 12. - Continued. 

Figure 13. - MA-8 spacecraft at landing. 
48 
34 ‘7 
E T a u t i c a l  miles 
33 1- 0 
0 Aircraft carrier 
0 Destroyer 
0 Location aircraft 
A Telemetry aircraft 
- --- 
and recovery SOFAR final fix 
31 t 274 nautical miles 0 t o  Midway / 
180 179 178 177 176 175 174 173 172 171 170 169 168 
West longitude, deg 
Figure 14. - Details of landing area 6-1. 
Figure 15. - MA-8 spacecraft in auxiliary flotation collar with motor whaleboat 
personnel attaching line from recovery aircraf t  ca r r i e r  to spacecraft. 
Figure 16. - MA-8 spacecraft being lifted on board recovery aircraft  carr ier .  
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Figure 17. - Pilot egressing from the MA-8 spacecraft after activating side hatch. 
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MISSION PERFORMANCE 
The technical resul ts  of the MA-8 mission and analyses of the flight data are 
presented. 
spacecraft performance, aeromedical analysis, pilot flight activities, pilot flight 
report, launch-vehicle performance, trajectory and mission events, and Mercury 
Worldwide Network performance. In addition to discusssons of each major spacecraft 
subsystem, the section on "Spacecraft Performance" contains details of the postflight 
inspection and the performance of scientific equipment installed in the spacecraft. A 
postflight .meteoroid-impact analysis is included as a par t  of the postflight inspection. 
The sections on I'Aeromedical Analysis" and "Pilot Flight Activities" discuss the well- 
being of the pilot, his activities, and the personal narrative of his flight experience. 
The section on "Launch-Vehicle Performance" is a brief synopsis of Atlas systems 
operation, while the section on "Trajectory and Mission Events" showing computed and 
measured flight parameters.  Finally, the Mercury Worldwide Network is analyzed in 
the specific performance areas of trajectory computation, command, and tracking and 
in the a reas  of telemetry and voice communications. 
The performance analyses are grouped into the following major areas: 
SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE 
The entire MA-8 spacecraft performed exceptionally well; the only significant 
systems irregularity was the inability to adjust the suit-circuit cooling level rapidly at 
the outset of the mission. When the adjustment was accomplished satisfactorily during 
the second orbital pass,  the mission continued in a routine fashion and was described 
later by the MA-8 pilot as of "textbook" quality. 
experienced and are discussed in the discourses on specific subsystems which follow, 
but they were not sufficient to jeopardize the success of the mission. Flight data and 
measurements a r e  generally not shown, other than to support o r  otherwise clarify the 
analysis presented. 
Other minor irregularit ies were 
Reference 1 provides a more detailed systems description. 
Spacecraft Control System 
All spacecraft control-system components functioned normally throughout the 
MA-8 mission. 
stabilization and control system (ASCS) orbit mode to FBW, short-duration voltage tran- 
sients were noted across  the solenoid coils of the 24-pound automatic thrusters.  
magnitudes of the transients were insufficient to actuate the solenoid valves and produce 
thrust, but they were retained by the memory in the flight telemetry circuits. 
At various t imes during control-mode changes from the automatic 
The 
System description. - The spacecraft control system was designed to provide 
attitudeand rate control of the spacecraft and was capable of operation in the following 
modes: 
1. ASCS with secondary choices of orientation, orbit, and auxiliary damping 
modes 
2. FBW with pilot choice of high and low thrusters  o r  low thrusters only 
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3. Manual proportional ( M P )  
4. Rate stabilization control system (RSCS) 
Modes 1 and 2 employed the automatic RCS thrusters, while modes 3 and 4 used 
the manual RCS thrusters. Each RCS had its own fuel supply and was independent of 
the other systems. Combinations of modes 1 and 3, 2 and 3, or  2 and 4 were available 
to provide double authority at the discretion of the pilot. 
To eliminate inadvertent fuel usage, the circuitry of the FBW mode was modified 
to contain a special thrust-select switch which permitted the pilot to disable the FBW 
high thrusters,  with an automatic return to normal occurring at  the time of retrofire. 
Because of the change, the operation of the normal FBW mode differed from that of 
the MA-7 spacecraft in that the MA-8 automatic low thrusters  continued to operate 
during periods of high- thruster actuation. 
The amplifier-calibrator employed was the A- 11 model. The changes from the 
The orbit-mode operation is outlined in previous model (A-9) a r e  shown in table VI. 
table VII. 
The changes were intended to conserve fuel by increasing the time period of 
spacecraft oscillation between attitude-limiting maneuvers, An attitude-select switch 
was provided in the ASCS orbit mode to give the pilot a choice of either -34" or  0" as 
a fixed attitude in pitch, with an automatic return to retroattitude at the beginning of 
the 30-second retrosequence period. The attitude-select switch used in conjunction 
with the gyro free-normal switch also provided an autopilot operation with a spatial 
reference a t  any spacecraft attitude. All other control- system components were iden- 
tical to those employed in the MA-7 spacecraft. 
Performance analysis. - Operation of the spacecraft control system was satis- 
factory throughout-the mission. Some discrepancies were noted and a r e  discussed in 
the following paragraphs, but the discrepancies did not compromise the success of the 
mission. The pitch and roll scanners became enabled at tower separation, and slaving 
of the gyros was effective from that point throughout the mission. 
the turnaround maneuver, the outputs of the gyros and the scanners matched within 2" .  
At completion of 
A 0. 5-deg/min rate of disparity between the roll scanner and the roll gyro was 
evident during a period of 27. 5 minutes, beginning a t  about 07:20:00 g. e. t. 
craft was in ASCS orbit mode at  the time with gyros free, and since a misalinement in 
yaw can produce a precession of the roll gyro, this possibility was investigated. 
example, if the spacecraft were at a yaw heading of go", then the roll horizon would 
revolve at  the orbital precession rate of 4 deg/min. At any other yaw heading, the 
precession rate of the roll scanner w is 
The space- 
For  
S 
sin + w = (4 deg/min) -
S cos 8 
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where I) is the yaw attitude and 6 is the pitch attitude. By assuming a constant 
pitch attitude, an average yaw attitude of 6" would be required to produce a precession 
rate of 0.5 deg/min. The roll discrepancy noted was eliminated by the pilot at 
07:47:36 g. e. t. 
The ASCS orbit mode, with the new pulse widths and attitudes, operated in con- 
junction with the interim-thruster configuration and did not produce a spacecraft limit 
cycle within +5 .5"  as predicted. While the fuel consumption was extremely nominal, 
two o r  three pulses were required for  rate reversal, and the limit cycle about all axes 
averaged approximately +8". The deviation was further increased by the effects of 
scanner slaving. Therefore, it was concluded that pulse durations were not as long as 
expected and were insufficient to meet the limit- cycle requirements. 
Small-voltage transients appeared across  the solenoids of the 24-pound automatic 
thrusters  when the pilot switched from ASCS orbit mode to the FBW-low mode, but the 
transients were insufficient to operate the solenoid valves and produced no effect on 
spacecraft attitudes. The transients were duplicated in postflight testing and did not 
significantly affect the ASCS operation. 
Replacement of the three-position mode-select switch pr ior  to flight with a more 
reliable two-pole center-off unit required the addition of an extra relay to duplicate the 
original circuit operation. The operating time of the relay was then added to that of 
the auxiliary-damper relay, which permitted the amplifier-calibrator to revert  to the 
orientation mode for  approximately 3 .8  milliseconds during the switching operation 
from ASCS orbit mode to ASCS auxiliary damper. The increased orbit-mode attitude 
limits previously described permitted the amplifier- calibrator orientation- mode logic 
to command high thrusters whenever the switching occurred at attitudes in excess 
of *5. 5". 
The voltage transient was detected and remembered by the high-speed capacitive 
network in the telemetry channels for the 24-pound automatic thrusters. Similar low- 
thruster commands were not seen with mode changes at attitudes of less than +5. 5", 
since the amplifier-calibrator returned immediately to the orbit mode pr ior  to re- 
ceiving i ts  auxiliary-damper command. 
Control- system utilization. - The spacecraft separation signal, which was re- 
ceived-by the amplifier-calibrator at 0:05:17 g. e. t . ,  initiated automatic damping. 
Three seconds la ter  the pilot switched to auxiliary damper and then to FBW low to 
execute the turnaround manually. By 0:12:51 g. e. t., sustainer-stage tracking was 
completed, and the spacecraft was placed in the ASCS orbit mode of control. This 
mode was employed for  approximately 80 percent of the time when the spacecraft 
power was on pr ior  to reentry, and its use resulted in a significant decrease in fuel 
usage when compared with the previous missions when the control modes were pri-  
marily manual. Utilization of other control modes was confined to the minimum time 
necessary to accomplish the scheduled maneuvers. 
Four short  periods of double-authority control were noted, that is, when more 
then one control mode was in operation. At 2:06:09 g. e. t., while utilizing manual 
proportional control, the FBW mode was inadvertently selected approximately 17 sec- 
onds before the MP mode was removed. At 6:28:13 g. e. t . ,  the pilot selected ASCS 
with the spacecraft at -34" pitch and the attitude-select switch in reentry. The 
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resulting pitch-up command was promptly removed by utilizing the FBW system com- 
bined with 31 seconds of rate command for  faster response. At 7:45:14 g. e. t., during 
the gyro free check, the pilot was advised of discrepancies between the roll  gyros and 
scanners; the pilot elected to sealine the spacecraft with the MP system while re- 
maining in ASCS orbit mode. The fourth period of double authority occurred during 
the firing of the retrorockets. The pilot selected M P  control to backup the automatic 
control system if it failed to  control the spacecraft attitudes properly during the event. 
Atttiudes at re t rof i re  were maintained by the ASCS, with MP as a backup, and the 
attitudes were held to  within *lo for  the ret rof i re  period. The pilot commanded reentry 
attitude manually with the FBW mode and then switched to RSCS at 9:00:27 g. e. t. to 
obtain the 0.05g roll rate with pitch and yaw damping. Reentry was normal except f o r  
some slight yaw oscillations which occurred at 9:05:07 g. e. t. These minor oscillations 
probably resulted from a dynamic imbalance in the control-stick mechanism, coupled 
with the inherent neutral stability characterist ics of the Mercury spacecraft under cer-  
tain Mach number regions. 
Reaction control system. - The RCS was of the standard configuration except f o r  
thrust-chamber modifications s imilar  to those used in spacecraft 18 (MA-? mission). 
In comparison with spacecraft 18, there were no heat sinks attached to the automatic 
and manual roll thrust-chamber assemblies. The pilot reported no malfunctions in the 
RCS and this was substantiated by the onboard recorded data. Fuel-consumption rates 
were appreciably lower than for  the MA-6 and MA-7 missions. The low fuel usage was 
consistent with the lack of FBW high-thruster action and frequency and duration of low- 
thruster activity. The amount of fuel used during the mission is shown in table VIII. 
The angular accelerations imparted to the spacecraft by the l-pound thrusters were 
near the nominal value of 0.5 deg/sec , consistently throughout the mission, and were 
substantiated by the onboard data. 
2 
Propellant feedline temperatures were measured during the mission, and the 
following a r e  the maximum temperatures recorded: 
Thruster position 
(low automatic) 
Yaw, left 
Yaw, right 
Pitch, up 
Pitch, down 
Roll, counterclockwise 
Roll, clockwise 
Maximum temperature of 
solenoid B-nut, " F  
103 
117 
111 
106 
127 
117 
Approximate t ime of 
measurement, 
01 :36 
02:25 
01:12 
02:26 
08 :20 
08:17 
- h r  :min 
Environmental Control System 
The environmental control system (ECS) consisted of equipment which provided 
fo r  and controlled the environment of the pilot's pressure suit and the spacecraft cabin. 
The ECS provided 100 percent oxygen for the metabolic requirements of the pilot and 
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maintained cabin pressure  at a nominal value of 5.1 psia by supplying oxygen to com- 
pensate for cabin leakage. Heat loads resulting from pilot metabolism, operation of 
spacecraft equipment, and solar radiation were removed to maintain comfortable tem- 
perature and specific-humidity levels in the pressure  suit and to maintain a tempera- 
ture  level in  the cabin suitable for efficient equipment operation. 
The above-normal suit-inlet temperature during the first 2 hours of flight w a s  
the only ECS problem during the mission. 
hour of flight and remained at an elevated level until a gradual advance of the control 
valve by the pilot permitted adequate coolant water to flow to the suit heat exchanger at 
approximately 2 hours after launch. The suit-inlet temperature then decreased to  a 
normal level and was  maintained in  this condition for the remainder of the mission. 
The temperature increased during the first 
System description. - The suit circuit w a s  a recirculatory gas-flow system which 
provided a livable environment for the pilot. Metabolic carbon dioxide was removed 
by a chemical reaction with lithium hydroxide and was replaced with gaseous oxygen 
(stored on board initially at 7500 psi)  by a demand pressure-regulating valve. 
cabin pressure was maintained at 5.1 psia. 
and maintained at a level slightly above cabin pressure.  In the event of cabin decom- 
pression, the suit pressure would have been maintained at 4.6 psia. 
The 
The suit-inlet p ressure  w a s  referenced to 
Heat was  removed from the suit and cabin circuits by forced-convection, water- 
evaporative heat exchangers. Water w a s  supplied to the heat exchangers from an on- 
board supply, and the flow w a s  regulated to the respective heat exchangers by 
comfort-control valves which w e r e  adjustable by the pilot. The water CCV was de- 
signed to pass  a minimum of 4. 5 pounds of water per  hour in the full-open position. 
The valve stem turned through an a r c  of 310' from the full-closed to the full-open posi- 
tion. The normal operating range was  approximately 100 of the stem-turning arc ,  
with each 10 increment of turn varying the flow between 0.05 to 0. 1 lb/hr. Water 
evaporated in the heat exchanger a t  approximately 35 F and exhausted into space. 
The process of evaporation required approximately 1000 Btu per pound of water evap- 
orated. The heat w a s  absorbed from the gas side of the heat exchangers and, thus, 
provided cooling in the separate suit and cabin circuits. 
respiration water w a s  condensed in the suit heat exchanger and w a s  transported by the 
gas s t ream to an absorption sponge. 
e r ,  and the condensate w a s  stored in a collection tank. 
Metabolic perspiration and 
The sponge was  periodically squeezed by a plung- 
The ECS for spacecraft 16 (MA-8 mission) w a s  essentially the same as that for 
spacecraft 18 (MA-7 mission). The following minor changes were made: 
1. The water sealing device which w a s  incorporated in the cabin-pressure relief 
valve of previous spacecraft was removed. 
2. The coolant quantity indicating and pressurization system w a s  removed. 
3. The coolant-water tank was pressurized from the cabin. 
The real-time determination of the coolant water remaining during the mission was de- 
pendent upon the preflight calibration of the comfort-control valves and pilot reports of 
CCV settings. 
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The most significant change in  the ECS was the relocation of the temperature- 
monitoring point f rom the steam exhaust to the domes of the suit and cabin heat ex- 
changers. These temperatures were sensed on the exterior surface of the heat 
exchanger between the first and second pass  of the evaporating water. An extensive 
heat- exchanger testing program indicated that temperature at this position was most 
representative of heat-exchanger operation and that the highest efficiency of the heat 
exchanger was obtained when the temperature was 55" + 5" F. Further, the conclusion 
from these tests was that a sudden drop in  dome temperature below 45" F indicated 
excessive waterflow. 
Analysis and results. - The data used in this section were obtained from the on- 
board voice transcript, onboard recorded data, and postflight testing and inspection. 
The CCV positions, heat-exchanger dome temperatures, and cabin heat- exchanger gas- 
outlet temperatures appear only in the onboard voice transcript. The suit-inlet and 
cabin-air temperatures given in the following discussion were obtained from the re- 
corded data from the low-frequency commutator. The data derived from spacecraft 
instrument read- outs, the onboard tape record, and real-time range telemetry did 
not agree concerning suit-inlet temperature. Postflight calibration of the spacecraft 
instrument read-out and the two telemetry channels for  this parameter at relatively 
low cabin temperatures indicated that the telemetry channels operated within +2. 5" F 
of the actual temperature. The spacecraft instrument read-out deviated from 
4" to 9" F below telemetry-channel values. It was concluded that the variation in 
cabin temperature affected the spacecraft instrument calibration without influencing 
the telemetry value of suit- inlet temperature. 
Prelaunch phase: Following pilot insertion, the suit-inlet environment was 
maintained at a temperature of approximately 60" F, and the cabin environment was 
maintained at 85" F. Preflight cooling was accomplished through evaporation of the 
ground- supplied refrigerant flowing through the heat exchangers and inverter cold 
plates at a rate of about 34 lb/hr. The refrigerant was turned off at T - 7 minutes in 
accordance with normal operating procedures. The metabolic oxygen consumption 
rate of the pilot during the prelaunch phase was 1.17 x lb/min (373 cc/min at  
32" F, 14.7 psia). In comparison, the metabolic rate during the launch simulation was 
0.94 x lb/min (300 cc/min at 32" F, 14.7 psia). Both rates were computed from 
the pressure decay of the oxygen storage tanks. After cabin purge, the cabin-oxygen 
partial-pressure measurement was 1 .0  psi  below cabin pressure.  This measurement 
was confirmed as inaccurate by a prelaunch chemical analysis, which indicated 98 per- 
cent oxygen. The cabin- oxygen partial-pressure measurement was errat ic  and re- 
mained lower than cabin pressure throughout the mission. 
Launch phase: During the launch phase of the mission, the cabin-pressure re- 
lief valve ceased relieving at a differential cabin pressure of 5.9 psi  above ambient. 
The pressures  were at the upper limits of design tolerances, but they. indicated proper 
functioning of the relief valve during the launch phase. 
Orbital phase: The suit-inlet temperature increased at a rate of approximately 
0. 5" F/min during a portion of the first hour of the mission, but was reasonably stable 
a t  86" F during the second hour (fig. 18). During this time, the pilot increased the 
suit CCV setting by one-half-position increments every 10 to 15 minutes from the pre- 
flight position 4 to position 8 at 01:58:20 g. e. t. The dome temperature of the suit heat 
58 
exchanger rose from 75" F at launch to  81" F and began a downward trend when the 
CCV was set to position 8. At 01:50:00 g. e. t., the suit CCV was reduced to position 3 
by the pilot, on request, and a marked increase in the dome temperature of the suit 
inlet and suit heat exchanger resulted. The increase indicated that the water flow rate 
at position 3 was inadequate for  proper cooling; consequently, the valve was reset to 
position 8. At an elapsed time of 2 hours, the dome temperature of the suit heat ex- 
changer dropped to 70" F and remained at this temperature for  most of the mission. 
The suit-inlet temperature began a downward trend at 2 hours elapsed time and indi- 
cated 70" F at 3 hours after launch. At 4 hours elapsed time, the suit heat-exchanger 
dome temperature dropped rapidly to 45" F. The CCV was reset  to position 7. 5, and 
the dome temperature rose rapidly to the control range of 55" * 5" F. This perfor- 
mance was in agreement with the heat-exchanger tests previously described, and it 
was concluded that optimum heat-exchanger operation occurred at a CCV setting be- 
tween positions 7. 5 and 8.0. 
The pilot adjusted the comfort-control valves in accordance with the preflight 
briefing and, thus, demonstrated that the suit temperature could be adequately con- 
trolled in flight. 
Preflight calibration data had indicated that the suit CCV should be set  a t  position 
4 to obtain the required flow ra te  of 0.72 lb/hr.  Postflight testing of the valve as flown 
revealed that a shift in the valve calibration had occurred so that the flow-rate average 
of four tes ts  a t  position 8 w a s  0.705 lb/hr, (fig. 19). 
A s  w a s  experienced in previous missions, the cabin temperature cycled as a r e -  
sult of the radiation in solar heating a t  sunrise and sunset. 
power-down and power-up caused the trend of the cabin temperatures to decrease and 
increase (fig. 20). The dome temperature of the cabin heat exchanger was maintained 
between 45" and 55" F during the mission, and the heat-exchanger outlet-gas temper- 
ature indicated 40" to 45" F. The cabin CCV w a s  set  a t  position 4 a t  launch, but i t  was 
reduced to position 3 a t  01: 03: 00 g. e. t. to provide assurance that freezing in the heat 
exchanger would not occur. 
Electrical equipment 
The total water expended for cooling the suit and cabin circuits and the inverter 
cold plates was  12.82 pounds, determined in postflight tests.  The quantity of conden- 
sate collected was  168 cc, which w a s  approximately the same amount fo r  the 9-hour 
flight as w a s  collected on each of the two previous 4. 5-hour orbital missions. 
The cabin-leakage ra te  determined during preflight tes ts  was  570 cc/min at  
19.7 psia. 
average pressure of 5 .3  psia, which would correspond to 630 cc/min a t  19.7 psia. The 
inflight leakage was calculated from the time interval between cabin-pressure seal-off 
(5.9 psia) and cabin-pressure regulation (4.8 psia), which began a t  approximately 
07: 20: 00 g. e.  t .  After this time, the total oxygen-usage ra te  was 1 .7  X 
Cabin leakage calculated from oxygen supply-pressure decay was equivalent to 
475 cc/min a t  19.7 psia. The pilot oxygen was  calculated to be 1.14 X lb/min 
(364 cc/min at 32" F, 14.7 psia) during the f i r s t  7 hours of flight. The oxygen-usage 
and the cabin-leakage ra tes  were within the acceptable range determined before the 
mission. 
The cabin-leakage ra te  during flight w a s  0.72 X lb/min, based on an 
lb/min: 
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Reentry phase: The performance of the ECS during reentry was normal. The 
system was changed to the postlanding mode of operation at 09:07:48 g. e. t. , when the 
pilot manually opened the suit -inflow and cabin-outflow valves. 
ra te  flow was initiated automatically at this time, which conformed to normal proce- 
dures. 
The oxygen emergency- 
Summary of system performance: The MA-8 mission was the first manned 
orbital mission during which positive control of the suit  temperature was demonstrated. 
The pilot experienced no discomfort from humidity as reported by the MA-6 and MA-7 
pilots. The coolant-water usage during the mission agreed more closely with expected 
usage rates  than those encountered in previous missions. The improved performance 
was attributed to the use of the heat-exchanger dome temperature as the control 
parameter,  rather than the temperature at the steam-exhaust port. 
Pilot comfort: Pr ior  to the MA-8 mission, a series of tes ts  was conducted using 
flight-configuration heat exchangers by NASA a t  Houston and by the contractor at 
St. Louis to develop an  effective method of monitoring the heat-exchanger performance 
and to allow the pilot to utilize the maximum cooling provided by the heat exchanger. 
The tests yielded two significant results:  (1) Monitoring of the temperature of the heat- 
exchanger dome provided a more positive and rapid response method of controlling the 
heat-exchanger performance, and (2) as water-flow ra tes  were increased beyond opti- 
mum values, the cooling effectiveness did not increase.  
hypothesis that partial freezing occurred in the heat exchanger during the MA-6 and 
MA-7 missions, where an excessive amount of cooling water was used and difficulty 
was experienced in obtaining satisfactory cooling. 
The results supported the 
As a result  of the series of tests,  a recommendation was made to the pilot that he 
insert  into orbit with the suit  CCV se t  at position 4 and increase the setting by one-half- 
position increments at 10 -minute intervals if the suit-inlet temperature warranted a 
change. The position 4 setting, using preflight calibration data for the flowrate valve, 
corresponded approximately to the theoretical flow rate needed and corresponded to the 
valve position established for adequate cooling in one of the two altitude-chamber tests 
of spacecraft 16. The setting was used by the pilot during the early par t  of the mission, 
but it was found to be too low f o r  adequate cooling. A s  discussed previously, postflight 
tests showed the valve-flow passage to be restricted by foreign material, thus requiring 
a higher -than-anticipated setting. 
Conclusions. - The initial difficulty encountered with the elevated suit-inlet tem - 
perature was indicated after the mission by a shift in the previously calibrated flow for 
the suit CCV. 
presented a significant envelope of variation for flow rates a t  a given valve setting 
(fig. 19). 
flakes of dried lubricant on the valve stem and in the valve seat. 
enough to cause restriction of the flow through the valve. The valve was cleaned by 
ultrasonic methods, and the O-rings and the male threads of the valve body were re- 
lubricated. 
had returned to almost the preflight values. 
relatively consistent and were predictable for  any setting. 
cabin CCV and inverter CCV did not reveal a significant calibration shift. 
The four postflight calibration tes ts  of the CCV in the flown condition 
The valve was disassembled, and inspection of the valve components revealed 
The flakes were large 
Three calibration tes ts  of the cleaned suit CCV showed that the calibration 
The flow ra tes  of the cleaned valve were 
Postflight testing of the 
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Evidence of the comfort of the pilot during the mission was reflected by the 
168 cc of condensate collected, which w a s  a measure of the perspiration experienced. 
During the two previous three-pass missions, which involved a duration of approxi- 
mately one-half that for the MA-8 mission, the pilots experienced high specific humid- 
ity and excessive perspiration; consequently, the same approximate magnitude of 
condensate was collected. A low specific humidity a t  the suit heat-exchanger outlet 
was indicative of a properly functioning suit-cooling system. 
A high cabin temperature was experienced on all orbital missions. The cabin 
heat exchanger for the mission was known to be efficient, as evidenced by the 40" F 
gas-outlet temperature. 
cooling circuit) relaxed the initially acceptable temperature limits, and the MA-8 
system performed within current acceptable ranges. 
However, increased heat loads (since the design of the cabin- 
Communications Systems 
Performance of the spacecraft communications systems was satisfactory for  the 
MA-8 mission. Major modifications to the systems since the previous mission in- 
cluded the removal of one of the two command receiver decoder units, the removal of 
the hf recovery transceiver, and the addition of a new hf dipole antenna. For  additional 
information relating to the performance of the communication systems, refer to the 
section on "Mercury Worldwide Network Performance. " 
The dipole antenna was installed to improve hf voice performance during the o r -  
bital phase. 
sisted of two elements, one of which is shown in figure 22. The extendable portion of 
the antenna was made of specially treated beryllium copper tape; and each side, when 
deployed by the firing of a squib, measured 14 feet  long and five-eighths inch in diam- 
eter.  A coaxial switch was added to allow the selection of either the bicone antenna o r  
the dipole antenna for orbital communications and for the selection of the whip antenna 
after landing. 
The dipole antenna w a s  mounted on the retropackage (fig. 21) and con- 
A miniaturized uhf transceiver operating at  the frequency of the low-link telem- 
etry was added to enable the pilot, when in the liferaft, to establish voice contact with 
the recovery forces. In addition, an extension cable was provided fo r  use of the space- 
craft  voice equipment from the liferaft. To reduce the helmet microphone size and to 
reduce the sensitivity of the microphone to head motion, a miniaturized microphone 
replaced the larger two -unit microphones previously used. 
Voice communications. - During powered flight, the increased background noise 
caused keying of the spacecraft transmitter when in the voice -operated switch (VOX) 
mode of communications. The keying was apparently the result  of increased sensitivity 
and fidelity of the new microphones. 
voice-communication equipment was good. 
After powered flight, the performance of the 
High-frequency reception and transmission range was improved considerably over 
that of previous missions. During the first orbital pass, good-quality hf transmissions 
from the spacecraft were continuously received by the hangar S communications station 
from the time the spacecraft was near Guaymas until the spacecraft was near Bermuda. 
However, voice reception at the Mercury Control Center was poor at t imes when 
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transmissions were patched into the Goddard conference loop. Ultrahigh-frequency 
communications were normally line of sight. 
to the spacecraft from the ground stations were exceptionally good. The ground sta- 
tions reported good-quality hf and uhf reception from the spacecraft. 
voice equipment was tested after the mission and was found to be in satisfactory condi- 
tion. 
Center could be given. 
The pilot reported that communications 
The hf and uhf 
No conclusive reason for  the inferior hf voice reception by the Mercury Control, 
Radar beacons. - Performance of the C- and S-band radar  beacons was satisfac- 
tory. As in previous missions, amplitude and slight frequency modulation was experi- 
enced on the C-band beacon. 
phase shifter (wobbulator) and, at times, by the drifting mode of the spacecraft, which 
resulted in poor antenna orientation. 
The condition was not significant and was caused by the 
Location aids. - Recovery forces reported that transmissions from all recovery 
aids, except the hf rescue beacon (SEASAVE), were received. 
munications were received, thus indicating that the spacecraft whip antenna was ex- 
tended and operating electrically. 
found to be satisfactory. 
after landing cannot be given. 
After landing, hf com- 
The SEASAVE beacon was tested after flight and 
Reasons concerning why SEASAVE signals were not received 
Command receivers.  - The command receivers operated normally during the 
launch and orbital flight’phases. However, at 09:08:21 g. e. t., shortly after antenna 
fairing separation, an all-events -channel indication with a signal strength of 3 micro- 
volts was noted. Attempts to duplicate this anomaly during rigorous postflight testing 
were not successful, and no cause for i ts  occurrence could be found. 
Electrical and Sequential Systems 
Electrical system. - .  - - The MA-8 spacecraft electrical system was essentially the 
The system operated satisfactorily throughout the mission, 
Some minor modifications made to 
same as the MA-7 system. 
and voltage and current profiles were as expected. 
the system that were not present in spacecraft 18 (MA-7 mission) were as follows: 
1. The Zener diode bus regulators and associated fuses were removed from the 
main and isolated 24 -volt dc buses. 
2. The internal battery for the flashing recovery light was removed. The unit 
was powered from the 6-volt dc standby bus. 
3. The capability to monitor standby-inverter voltage w a s  added to the ac volt- 
selector switch for the voltmeter. 
4. 
bus only. 
flight. 
The maximum-altitude sensor w a s  powered from the main 24-volt dc squib 
The special auxiliary battery and associated relays were removed pr ior  to 
5. The command receiver w a s  powered by the standby 18-volt bus. 
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There were no problems associated with inverter temperatures. The tempera- 
ture for  both inverters at lift-off was 90" F. The temperature of the 150-volt-ampere 
inverter increased to 100" F in 20 minutes and then stabilized at approximately this 
temperature until reentry. 
plate was effective. At landing, the temperature was 120" F, which was caused by the 
increased cabin temperature during reentry and by the loss  of cooling effectiveness at 
lower altitudes. The 250 -volt-ampere inverter matched its load profile by increasing 
temperature whenever the inverter was powered and by decreasing temperature when 
the inverter was not powered. 
inverter was 175" F at the end of the orbital mission, indicating that the 250-volt- 
ampere cold plate was not functioning properly. 
cold plate was providing only a small  fraction of its preflight cooling capacity. 
This observation indicated that the 150 -volt -ampere cold 
The maximum temperature for the 250-volt-ampere 
Postflight tests confirmed that the 
Sequential system. - The sequential system for  spacecraft 16 was substantially 
modified as a r e s u l t  of a study of nonredundant components and subcircuitry (single- 
point-failure analysis). 
Description. ' I  The major modifications are as follows: 
All modifications are listed in the section on "Spacecraft 
1. The orbit-attitude relay circuit w a s  revised to assure  that the launch and 
abort sequence would not be disarmed before spacecraft separation. 
2. The SECO signal w a s  locked out until tower separation. Previously, a pre-  
mature SECO could have been accepted immediately after booster -stage separation. 
3. A retrofire a r m  switch and a bypass relay were added. In conjunction with 
the retrorocket fuse switches, these additions would reduce the possibility of prema- 
ture  retrorocket ignition while retaining the automatic ignition capability. 
4. The 21 000-foot barostats w e r e  wired in ser ies  to reduce the possibility of 
premature parachute deployment. 
5. The two 10 000-foot barostats for main-parachute deployment were wired in 
series and were provided with an automatic crossover i f  either the main or  the iso- 
lated squib bus failed. 
The Pacific Command ship reported that retrofire occurred 2 seconds late. How- 
ever,  the flight data show that retrosequence started at  the proper time called for by 
the satellite clock. The s ta r t  of retrofiring occurred 30. 5 seconds la ter ,  which w a s  
within 0.1 second of the 30.4-second timeout time expected from the MA-8 retrofire 
time-delay relay. 
The flashing recovery light w a s  reported to have stopped flashing during recov- 
e r y  operations. Although the procedure specified that the wiring to the light w a s  to be 
disconnected during recovery, no confirmation of the wiring disconnection could be 
made. The reason for the failure of the light to continue operating was not known. 
Postflight tests showed the flashing light to be operating properly. 
The 18-volt isolated bus displayed a pulsating voltage on telemetry which w a s  
caused by the indications of satellite clock pulses a t  the commutator sampling rate. 
The clock caused a voltage pulse each second, and the commutator sampled the bus 
every 0.8 second; therefore, every fifth sampling at a period of 4 seconds transmitted 
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the corresponding clock pulse. 
ground. The pulses varied in amplitude because the commutator sampled different 
portions of the pulse. 
and was also observed during postflight testing of the MA-8 spacecraft. 
The transmitted data indicated a voltage drop on the 
This pulsating voltage was present during the MA-7 mission 
Instrumentation System 
The instrumentation system was used to monitor the operation of specific equip- 
ment in the spacecraft, and the associated measurement data were either displayed to 
the pilot or  transmitted to the ground, o r  both. In addition, certain aeromedical data 
were transmitted and recorded. The more critical portions of the data were t rans-  
mitted to the ground for flight-control monitoring through the operation of two telem- 
etry transmitters.  The pilot-observer camera,  mounted on the instrument panel, 
recorded the activities of the pilot at a programed exposure rate  throughout the mis-  
sion. 
System description. - The instrumentation system flown in the MA-8 mission was 
essentially the same a s t h e  instrumentation system flown in the MA-7 mission. Many 
deletions and changes were made in the MA-7 data format to accommodate new areas 
of interest. The higher exposure rate  fo r  the pilot-observer camera was deleted to 
extend the coverage of the available film. The vernier clock and mixed events were 
deleted to provide for  monitoring the operation of the automatic -control-system sole - 
noids when in the FBW mode. The modification was accomplished without a format 
change in the subcarriers.  The thermistor previously mounted on the microphone for  
recording respiration rate w a s  deleted, and an impedanc.e pneumograph was used for 
measuring respiration. The primary and secondary oxygen transducers were modified 
to read-out pressure directly in hundreds of pounds per  square inch. The BPMS was 
mounted to the spacecraft structure, since the leg restraints for  the pilot had been r e -  
moved. 
positions were deleted from the high-level commutator. B-nut temperature segments 
on the pitch-up and pitch-down 1-pound automatic solenoids were substituted for the 
outer skin-temperature segments. 
To accommodate the retrofire clock counter, the commutated control -stick 
Additional changes to the instrumentation system for spacecraft 16 included the 
following : 
1. A 5-second time-delay relay was added onto the starting circuit of the BPMS 
so  that the pilot would not have to hold the start-button depress until the system was 
properly pressurized. 
2. The dome temperatures of the suit and cabin heat exchanger were monitored 
rather  than suit and cabin steam-vent temperatures. 
3. Thin-base magnetic tape was used in the onboard recorder to provide full 
coverage of the extended mission. 
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4. The following temperatures were monitored on the instrument panel by the 
pilot: 
a. Standby inverter 
b. Cabin heat-exchanger outlet 
c. Roll, left manual B-nut, 1 pound 
d. Roll, right automatic B-nut, 1 pound 
e. Roll, left automatic B-nut, 1 pound 
f .  Right retrorocket 
g. The 150-volt-ampere main inverter 
h,. The 250 -volt -ampere main inverter 
i. Yaw, right automatic B-nut, 1 pound 
j .  Yaw, left automatic B-nut, 1 pound 
k. Pitch, down automatic B-nut, 1 pound 
1. Pitch, up automatic B-nut, 1 pound 
Only the first three parameters were not monitored on high- and low-link telemetry. 
Prelaunch. - A resistance element under thermocouple no. 6 on the low-level 
commutator, channel 17, was e r ra t ic  during the preflight launch- complex testing. Ex- 
tensive analysis showed that the associated spacecraft wiring had a varying resistance 
of from 2 to 15 ohms. Corrective measures would have required too much time; there- 
fore, the parameter was listed as unnecessary for flight and consequently invalid for  
postflight analysis. 
During the horizon- scanner calibration at the pad, a Z- calibration relay failed 
in the normally closed position. The relay was wired out of the circuit fo r  flight. The 
R- and Z-calibration relays were also removed from the respiration- rate circuit. In 
neither case was the calibration circuit necessary. 
During the launch simulation test, the 108-second automatic- stop t imer  of the 
BPMS failed to  operate to return the telemetry to the electrocardiogram (ECG). The 
system could still be operated by having the pilot push the stop button. Therefore, the 
decision was made to proceed with the mission under these conditions. A postflight 
failure analysis was conducted on the BPMS controller, and it was found that a switch- 
ing transistor had started, which removed power from the controller after the 
108-second time interval. 
transistor failure, o r  was the end result of some other malfunction. 
It could not be determined whether this was caused by a 
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On the day that the launch precount was started, the high-link body temperature 
read-out became slightly noisy. A decision was made to continue with the count because 
the equivalent low-link read-out was yielding good data. 
At T - 5 minutes during the launch countdown, body-temperature readings on 
both links became erratic.  The flight surgeon decided to go ahead with the mission be- 
cause the suit-inlet temperature reading was good. At 01:52:00 g. e. t., both links again 
indicated normal body -temperature readings and continued to do so throughout the mis-  
sion. Postflight tests indicated that body temperature on both links was still valid, and 
more extensive tests failed to determine what caused the e r ra t ic  behavior at T - 5 min- 
utes. 
During preflight static firing of the RCS, the meter for  pilot display of the 
manual-system fuel quantity read 5 percent low. Telemetry f o r  the same parameter 
indicated a correct reading. 
flight testing to have been a shift in the meter calibration. With the exception of the 
previously noted items, all instrumentation and telemetry were working correctly a t  
lift -off. 
The reason for the meter e r r o r  was determined by post- 
Launch. - At lift-off, the telemetry signals were of good quality, with signal 
strengths of 10 000 microvolts for  the high link and 2500 microvolts for the low link. 
At T - 3 minutes, the high link w a s  -3.5 kilocycles from center frequency, and the 
low link was +l. 1 kilocycles from center frequency. 
Orbit. - During the mission, a discrepancy was observed between the suit-inlet 
temperature reading by the pilot and that transmitted via telemetry to the ground. 
Postflight analysis of the onboard data verified that throughout the mission the average 
reading of both the high- and low-link telemetry on suit-inlet air temperature was 
approximately 8" F higher than the readings by the pilot. After 2:OO:OO g. e. t . ,  
however, the average for the high- and low-link telemetry reading on suit-inlet 
temperature was 6" F above the reading by the pilot. 
tes ts  of the instrument-panel read-out that the effects of cabin-temperature variation 
and improper calibration caused the panel unit to read low. 
of this discrepancy, refer  to the section on "Environmental Control System. If 
It was concluded from postflight 
For additional discussion 
The oxygen partial-pressure read-out behaved erratically during some of the 
mission. 
pressure indications were of no value. 
approximately 30 seconds. Postflight analysis of the behavior was not possible because 
the instrument sensor dried out. 
For approximately 15 minutes, starting at 1 :14:00 g. e. t . ,  the partial- 
After that, occasional e r ra t ic  readings lasted 
Summary. - With the exception of the malfunctions in body temperature and oxy- 
gen partial-pressure instrumentation, both of which operated satisfactorily before the 
mission was completed, the performance of the remainder of the instrumentation sys-  
tem was generally satisfactory. The pilot -observer camera operated as programed, 
and data for most of the mission were recorded on the onboard tape. 
Slight discrepancies were also noted between telemetry values and instrument- 
panel read-outs for  cabin temperature, main bus dc volts, and the fan bus ac volts; 
however, the discrepancies were not significant enough to cause concern. 
acceleration data appeared erroneous, which could not be explained. 
The Z-axis 
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Heat Protection System 
The spacecraft heat protection system performed satisfactorily as in past mis-  
sions. The only anomaly detected during postflight inspection was extensive cracking 
and bond-line separation of the heat-shield ablation layer. 
Heat shield. - As well as could be determined, the materials and construction of 
the heat shield were the same as for heat shields used on previous orbital missions, 
with the exception that the center plug was bolted to the structural  laminate to prevent 
loss  after reentry. The center plug was found firmly attached to the heat shield during 
postflight examination. 
As on previous orbital missions, the heat shield provided satisfactory thermal 
protection during reentry. As was expected, the stagnation point appeared to have been 
very near the center of the shield, and the usual glass  droplet s t reaks extended out 
from the center (fig. 23). 
The minor and major cracks in the ablation laminate a r e  shown in figure 23. The 
cracks and the separation at the bond line a r e  shown in a cross-sectional view in fig- 
u re  24. The separation at the bond line, where the ablation laminate was glued to the 
structurai  laminate, w a s  found to be extensive over the center portion of the shield and 
extended approximately to one-half the radius of the shield. 
were smooth. The cracks in the ablation laminate apparently occurred after reentry 
heating, as evidenced by a uniform char depth in the cracked and uncracked portions of 
the ablation laminate. 
The unbonded surfaces 
When the bond-line separation was found in the shield used for the MA-8 mission, 
a section was  cut from the MA-7 shield, and it w a s  found that substantial bond-line 
separation was also evident, but without major cracks showing at the exterior of the 
ablation laminate. It w a s  concluded, after a detailed study of heat -shield historical 
records, that proper quality control, thorough X-ray procedures, and discrete selec - 
tion of flight items would eliminate substantial bond-line separation fo r  future missions. 
A temperature measurement was made at  the bond line 27 inches from the geo- 
metric center of the shield. The maximum temperature experienced at this point was 
450" F and occurred at  about the time of main-parachute deployment. This value is in 
agreement with the maximum temperature of 460" F experienced at the same location 
on the MA-7 heat shield. During the orbital phase, the heat-shield temperature aver- 
aged 60" F. 
The heating appeared to be uniform over the shield as indicated by 12 core sam-  
ples taken at various locations in the shield. Char-depth measurements were  normal, 
varying from 0.3 to 0.35 inch as in previous missions. 
The measured weight loss  of 17.43 pounds was  more than that experienced during 
previous missions. The MA-7 heat shield lost 13. 1 pounds, and the calculated loss  
was approximately 11 pounds. The measured weight loss fo r  previous missions had 
been as low as 6.1 pounds. However, the heat-shield drying procedure, used after 
flight to remove water, was not the same fo r  all missions, thus leading to some uncer- 
tainty as to the significance of the apparent differences in weight loss. A summary of 
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. . ._ 
the Mercury heat-shield performance for all missions, including the MA-8 mission, is 
contained in reference 5. 
Afterbody. - Temperatures experienced by the conical-cylindrical shingles during 
the launch phase were normal, and postflight inspection revealed no adverse heating 
effects. The maximum temperature that occurred on the conical section during launch 
was a normal value of 1184 " F near the heat-shield attachment point, 
During the orbital phase, the temperatures on the afterbody shingles agreed with 
the temperatures experienced on previous missions. The temperatures approached 
repetitive cycles with the outside skin reaching a maximum of 250" F and a minimum 
Of -50" F. 
Spacecraft reentry temperatures were typical of those experienced on previous 
orbital missions. The maximum measured temperature during reentry on the conical 
section was 975" F. On the cylindrical section, temperatures were measured at three 
longitudinal stations spaced at 5 -inch intervals. The maximum measured temperatures 
on the center line of the shingle were 631", 580°, and 481" F, with the lowest temper- 
a ture  being nearest  the conical sections. 
A total of four inner skin temperatures were measured during all phases of the 
mission. 
orbital phase of the mission, and the maximum temperature experienced during reentry 
was 145" F. 
The average of the measured inner skin temperatures was 100" F during the 
White-paint patch. - During the launch phase, the temperature of the oxidized 
shingle was a maximum of 410" F higher than the adjacent shingle a rea  with white 
paint. During the orbital phase, the oxidized shingle was approximately 130" F hotter 
in the sunlight just before darkness. 
dized shingle was approximately 70" F hotter. 
While the spacecraft was in darkness, the oxi- 
During the early (low-temperature portion) par t  of reentry, the temperature of 
the oxidized shingle was approximately 300" F hotter, but later in reentry (high- 
temperature portion) , the oxidized shingle became 110" F cooler than the white-painted 
area.  A similar test  was made in the MA-7 mission, but the data were questionable as 
to magnitude; however, a similar trend w a s  noted. The higher temperature of the oxi- 
dized shingle during exit and at the start of reentry was apparently caused by the lower 
emissivity of the oxidized shingle at lower temperatures. The lower emissivity re- 
sulted in less radiation of aerodynamically induced thermal energy with an accompa- 
nying higher temperature of the shingle. At the higher temperatures during reentry, 
where the oxidized shingle emissivity was higher, the oxidized shingle radiated more 
energy and thus became cooler than the white-painted area. The results of the calcu- 
lations were in reasonable agreement with the measured temperature differences. 
Green-glow effect. - The MA-8 pilot observed a green glow in the area of the 
beryllium shingles during reentry. 
the a rea  during reentry. 
experimental ablation materials attached, and the materials could have contributed to 
the green glow. 
during assembly, the beryllium shingles were lubricated with a compound which con- 
tained copper. 
The MA-7 pilot also reported a greenish glow in 
Nine of the 12 beryllium shingles on the MA-8 spacecraft had 
However, a possible explanation for the green-glow effect was that 
Copper compounds, when heated in a flame, cause the flame to exhibit 
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a green color. Because of the high temperatures experienced by the cylindrical after- 
body, the heating of the copper compound was believed to have been a major contribu- 
tory cause of the observed green glow. 
Mechanical and Pyrotechnic Systems 
The only known anomaly which occurred in the mechanical system during the 
MA-8 mission was  a slight tearing of the main-parachute deployment bag. 
and pyrotechnic systems performed satisfactorily throughout the mission. 
The rocket 
Recovery sequence. - The recovery sequence system differed from that used in 
the MA-7 mission in two respects:  (1) The cabin-mounted control barostat was de- 
leted, and (2) the barostats in the recovery section were wired in ser ies  rather than in 
parallel. 
Parachutes. - The performance of the drogue and main parachutes upon deploy- 
ment w a s  satisfactory. Only the drogue parachute was recovered for postflight inspec- 
tion, but the pilot reported that both parachutes were deployed cleanly and were 
undamaged during descent. 
three small  tears in the main-parachute deployment bag. 
in length and approximately 6 inches below the top of the bag (fig. 25). 
parachute was deployed manually at a pressure altitude of 39 400 feet  (standard con- 
ditions) with the planned altitude intended for approximately 40 000 feet. 
parachute was deployed automatically at a pressure altitude of 10 600 feet  (standard 
day conditions). 
there were no known instances of broken shroud lines in previous missions or test 
programs under normal deployment conditions, it w a s  concluded that the dangling line 
reported by the pilot during descent on the main parachute was probably the reefing- 
cutter line. 
A single variant encountered in the parachute system w a s  
The tears  were about 1 inch 
The drogue 
The main 
This altitude is coincident with the nominal specification value. Since 
Rockets and pyrotechnics. - A postflight examination of the spacecraft and an 
analysis of the pertinent data indicated that all rockets and pyrotechnics functioned nor- 
mally. It cannot be determined whether or  not certain pyrotechnics (such as redundant 
clamp-ring bolts and the tower-jettison igniter) actually ignited since the available in- 
formation shows only that the resulting function w a s  satisfactory. 
Explosive -actuated hatch. - The explosive -actuated side hatch was opened after 
The hatch actuated normally, the spacecraft was placed on board the recovery ship. 
although the pilot injured his hand slightly during the procedure. 
Landing-shock attenuation system. - The landing -shock attenuation system was 
unaltered from the MA-7 configuration. 
tude of 9800 feet, and the system performed normally, according to statements by the 
pilot and from postflight examinations. 
some small  tears and r ips  of a minor nature. 
beyond that normally experienced in previous missions. 
The landing bag deployed at a pressure alti- 
The postflight examination of the bag showed 
The s t raps  and cables were not damaged 
The ablation shield appeared intact, although the circumferential cracks appeared 
larger  and more numerous than usual. The fiber-glass protective shield w a s  pene- 
trated by the heat-shield lugs, indicating that recontact occurred. The automatic roll  
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shutoff valve on the RCS showed evidence of contact with the heat shield, and a primary 
hydrogen peroxide line had been dented. 
any visible damage. The indications of recontact were slightly more noticeable than in 
the MA-? mission. 
The main pressure bulkhead did not exhibit 
Flotation. - Reports and photographs f rom the recovery forces indicated that the 
spacecraft righted itself quickly and floated at the proper attitude. 
Postflight Inspection and Meteoroid Analysis 
Spacecraft 16 underwent the normal posff light inspection and conditioning proce- 
dure. A thorough visual inspection w a s  made of the external and internal a reas  of the 
spacecraft in the as-received condition. The immediate postflight inspection procedure 
included removal of the heat shield, landing bag, and conical and beryllium shingles for 
inspection of the pressure -bulkhead and internal skin areas. 
was made of the inspection process. 
A photographic record 
A desalting washdown, tank drainage, and a flushing procedure, as applicable, 
were accomplished, and safeguards against deterioration were taken. The detailed 
inspection results of individual spacecraft structural  systems a r e  discussed in the fol- 
lowing paragraphs. 
Structure. - The conical-section shingles showed the usual bluish and orange 
tinge, and the cylindrical -section shingles which had no ablative material attached 
showed the usual dark yellow -grey appearance. 
aerodynamic heating. Nine of the cylindrical -section shingles had samples of ablative 
material bonded to their surfaces. The temperature-sensitive paints showed that tem- 
perature had varied with location around the periphery of the cylindrical section during 
reentry. The hatch-seal area on the conical section was  warped and distorted as a r e -  
sult of explosive hatch actuation. 
Both discolorations were caused by 
Ablation shield. - Two of the heat-shield retaining lugs were found to be sheared 
off and one was  bent. One of the sheared-off lugs was found imbedded in the fiber- 
glass  protective shield. Refer to the section on "Heat Protection System" for addi- 
tional discussion. 
Landing bag. - The landing bag had a few small  t ears  and several  punctures that 
probably occurred when the heat shield recontacted with the bottom of the spacecraft on 
landing. All the landing-bag s t raps  were intact, although they were buckled and 
twisted. One of the landing-bag cables had a few broken strands near the ablation- 
shield attachment fitting. 
Recovery compartment. - The interior of the compartment was undamaged, and 
The butterfly antenna atop the spacecraft was  corroded, the appearance was  normal. 
and both extension a r m s  were broken. 
since standard recovery practice was to sever the antenna. 
The whip antenna was missing from its housing, 
Antenna canister. - The destabilizing flap on the antenna canister showed normal 
heating effects, but the fiber-glass scanner cover attached to the flap was  burned off. 
The flap still rotated easily about its hinge, and the flap spring was in working order. 
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The face of the pitch scanner was discolored. The parachute hold-down foot shaft was 
bent, and one rivet head had pulled through the fiber-glass disk. 
heads, which attach the fairing to the center post, had pulled through the lower conical 
section of the antenna fairing. 
All 10 of the rivet 
Main pressure bulkhead. - The fiber -glass protective shield was gouged in seven 
places, and some of the RCS lines were damaged as a result of recontact by the heat 
shield on landing. Landing damage also included bending of the mounting brackets for 
the heat-shield release valve and the roll  manual push-pull valve. Two corrosion pits 
of approximately 0.018 inch were noted on the hydrogen peroxide tank for  the automatic 
system. 
Spacecraft interior. - The interior of the spacecraft was in good condition, as 
was  expected, A quantity of from 20 to 25 cc of liquid was found under the pilot couch. 
A postflight chemical analysis showed the liquid to be a mixture of salt water  and 
recovery-dye marker. As a result  of the explosive hatch actuation, the hatch springs 
were completely straightened. 
as a result  of being latched open when the hatch was actuated. A considerable number 
of paint chips was  discovered throughout the spacecraft interior. 
The right-hand f i l ter  on the viewing window was  broken 
Micrometeoroid analysis. - The investigation of spacecraft 16 for evidence of 
meteoroid impingement consisted of both preflight and postflight microscopic exami- 
nation of the Rene’ 41 afterbody shingles. 
tions by the spacecraft exterior finish. 
with a measured surface finish of 25 to 30 microns root mean square. 
ence of minute impingements on the order  of 10 microns could be masked by these 
surface finishes. A detailed examination of the Rene’ shingles of spacecraft 13 (MA-6 
mission) , which employed optical and electron microscopes and X-ray diffraction, in- 
dicated the existence of an oxidation change to the surface. 
occurred during the aerodynamic heating phases and made the search for evidence of 
meteoroid impacts difficult. 
Limitations were imposed on the examina- 
The shingles had an oxidized exterior surface 
Thus, the pres -  
The effect undoubtedly 
The number of impacts on the spacecraft conical section could be predicted from 
theory, since the particle flux at a given surface could be related to a statistically 
derived flux-mass distribution. 
particle with a velocity of 30 km/sec would penetrate a conical-section shingle (ref. 6). 
-7 Using a modified penetration equation, a 10 gram 
Preflight examination: Pr ior  to the MA-8 mission, the entire exterior surface 
of the spacecraft was examined under 5X magnification, and some small  surface a reas  
were examined under 12X magnification. The examinations revealed many flecks of 
paint, minute surface scratches,  and small  metal particles. Because of the high den- 
sity of the imperfections, no attempt was made to microscopically map the surfaces 
of the spacecraft. The examinations also revealed no hemispherical dents. 
Postflight examination: Following the MA-8 mission, the surface of the space- 
The impacts were then viewed by using 40X magnification, 
craft  was examined under 12X magnification. A preliminary examination revealed 
seven possible impacts. 
and they were larger  but s imilar  to impacts found on shingles not exposed to flight 
conditions. The posff light examination revealed that the number of points of brilliance 
resulting from oblique particle impingement had increased considerably over that noted 
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in the preflight examination. A more detailed microscopic investigation, however, 
failed to reveal any surface imperfections which could conclusively be attributed to 
in-flight meteoroid impingement. 
Scientific Experiments 
Four research experiments planned for the MA-8 mission utilized equipment and 
materials extraneous to the normal spacecraft operation. The experiments were con- 
cerned with (1) a light-visibility exercise, (2) general interest  photography, (3) an 
experiment involving reentry -heating effects on various ablation materials, and (4) an 
investigation of nuclear -radiation phenomena in space. 
are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The results of the experiments 
Light -visibility experiment. - Visual sightings of high-intensity ground lights 
were attempted on the MA-8 mission on the first orbital pass  a t  Woomera, Australia, 
and on the sixth orbital pass  at Durban, South Africa. The objectives of the sightings 
were to measure the ability of the pilot to acquire a ground light and to determine his 
level of dark adaptation at the time of the light-visibility experiment. The pilot was 
provided with a standard light source of approximately 10 candlepower (fig. 26) and 
an extinction photometer (fig. 27). 
photometer carr ied for  the MA-7 mission, but a photographic process  instead of the 
aluminum vapor was used for the variable-density wheel. Four flares,  each with an 
intensity of 10 The first two were ignited at 
00:58:40 g. e. t., and the remaining two were ignited when the f i r s t  flares burned out. 
The reported weather conditions at  flare ignition were an 8/10 broken-cloud cover with 
light rain. The pilot reported the 
lightning but was unable to identify the flares. Under clear atmospheric conditions and 
a t  the point of closest approach, the flares should have appeared as bright to the pilot 
as a s t a r  of the first magnitude. 
6 
The photometer was identical physically to the 
6 candlepower, were ignited at Woomera. 
Extensive lightning was also reported in the area. 
A high-intensity xenon light was illuminated a t  Durban at 08:23:00 g. e. t. for  a 
period of 3 minutes on the sixth orbital pass. 
generally specified conversion efficiency of this type of xenon lamp, it was estimated 
that the light produced a maximum luminous intensity of 2. 2 X 10 equivalent candle- 
power. Under clear atmospheric conditions, a light with this luminous intensity a t  the 
point of closest approach should have appeared to the pilot at least as bright as a first- 
magnitude star. Again, the pilot was unable to see any light source that he could iden- 
tify as coming from this source, although he did report  observing what appeared to be 
a city in the general area. Weather conditions at Durban were reported as heavy cloud 
cover with rain. 
were unfavorable for  observation of the high -intensity ground lights; therefore, posi - 
tive results could not be obtained. 
Based on the power consumption and the 
6 
Weather conditions at both sites, as in the two previous missions, 
General photographic study. - The general photography included two areas.  
Weather bureau photographs: Photographs for  the weather bureau were intended 
to measure the spectral-reflectance characterist ics of cloud, land, and water features 
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on the surface of the Earth by photographs taken from the spacecraft using wide band- 
pass color filters. The measurements were intended to show the following: 
1. The variation of photographic contrast with the wavelength of visible light 
2. The radiance values of clouds, land, and water as a function of wavelength 
when viewed from outside the atmosphere 
3. The relative variation of the light scattering in the atmosphere with wave- 
length 
The measurements were used to select a filter for television cameras in the 
Nimbus Weather Satellite which was under construction. The information also assisted 
in the design of equipment for  future weather satellites and in the investigations of 
atmospheric physical properties. 
The photographs for the experiment were taken with a Hasselblad camera, 
model 500-C, with a film aperture of 2-1/4 by 2-1/4 inches and an f/2.8, 80-mm7 six- 
element lens with a UV-17 lens cover (fig. 28). Kodak experimental Plus-X serial 
film, type SO-102, coated on Estar  thin base (0.025 inch) was a panchromatic film 
with red sensitivity extending to about 720 millimicrons and had a daylight exposure 
index of 64. The film, used generally for high-altitude photographs, was  contained in 
the detachable magazine shown in figure 29, The magazine held film for 45 exposures. 
Six gelatin f i l ters  were mounted in vertical s t r ips  (fig. 30). 
installed in the film-magazine slide opening just ahead of thc "ilm plane. 
were assembled from left to right as follows: 
This assembly w a s  
The f i l ters  
- 
Number 
- 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
_- 
Color 
Blue 
Green 
Neutral 
Yellow 
Red 
Far red 
Wratten number 
W-475 and W-96 
W-61 and W-96 
W-96 
W-15 and W-96 
W-25 and W-96 
W-70 and W-25 
Neutral density 
0 .1  
. 1  
. 2  and 0.9 
. 9  
. 6  
Neutral density was added to each color fi l ter  to produce nearly equal film den- 
The photographs were taken at a shutter speed sit ies when exposed to a grey target. 
of 0.008 second with a lens opening of f/5.6. 
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To determine the radiance of objects in the picture, the spectral  transmittance 
of all optical materials in the light path must be known. Spectrophotometric curves of 
the spacecraft window, the camera lens, and the color filters were obtained. 
During the MA-8 mission, a total of 15 frames were exposed for the experiment. 
The first four pictures were taken over the South Atlantic (between 06:35:00 and 
06:38:00 g. e. t.) near  the twilight line on the Earth. In the photographs, long cloud 
streaks and patches of thin c i r rus  were visible. Two photographs of the Moon were 
taken with the filter mosaic removed. The last nine pictures were taken in sequence 
over an area of very extensive cloud cover near  Brazil (between 08:OO:OO and 
08:02:00 g. e. t. ). Because the reflected light was greater  than anticipated, the nega- 
tives were overexposed; however, some excellent photographs of well-developed 
thunderstorms were obtained in the latter sequence. 
Analyses of the photographs indicated that contrast was higher through the yellow 
and red f i l ters  than through the blue, green, and neutral filters (fig. 31). The blue 
and neutral filters showed the lowest contrast, which confirmed that aerosols in the 
atmosphere scatter predominantly blue light, The scattering is evident at the line of 
the horizon, which becomes more diffuse in the neutral and yellow fil ters than in the 
blue or  green filters. 
The pilot reported a residue, experienced in previous missions, on the outside 
of the spacecraft window after the escape tower was jettisoned. 
duced an unknown variable into the experiment, which necessitated reporting radiance 
measurements of minimum values, since the spectral  transmittance characterist ics of 
the window at the t ime the pictures were taken could not be determined precisely. 
The residue intro- 
Terrestrial photographs: A series of color te r res t r ia l  photographs were taken 
on the MA-8 mission for two purposes: (1) to aid in building up a catalog of space 
photographs of various terrestr ia l  physiographic features,  such as folded mountains, 
fault zones, and volcanic fields and (2) to obtain cloud photographs for comparison with 
Tiros  results. 
second film magazine containing a color reversal  f i lm having an American Standards 
Association number of 160. The film magazine contained about 11 feet of film with a 
45-exposure capability. To aid in setting the camera,  the pilot was provided with the 
automatic wide-angle-view exposure meter shown in figure 32. A total of 14 photo- 
graphs were taken during the third orbital pass  over the western par t  of the United 
States and Mexico and during the sixth orbital pass  over South America. 
of physiographic features was made of the pictures because of overexposure of several  
photographs and the extensive cloud cover over much of the terrain. 
The photographs were also taken using the Hasselblad camera with a 
No analysis 
Nuclear-radiation - - . __ experiment. - - - -. - - The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center nuclear - 
radiation experiment was intended to provide a detailed study of the flux and composi- 
tion of the galactic-cosmic radiation outside the atmosphere of the Earth and to obtain 
a measurement of the intensity and the energy spectrum of artificially induced elec- 
t rons at orbital altitudes. 
The nuclear emulsion plates were found to be in good condition following the 
mission. There was a slight tendency for the emulsion to stick together, possibly as 
a result  of the removal of the heat-reflectant aluminum foil during installation. Results 
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from analysis of the plates agreed with the results of previous missions and indicated 
a very low level of radiation inside the spacecraft. 
Ablation-material investigation. - An experiment was conducted during the MA-8 
mission which involved a study of the reentry heating effects on various advanced abla- 
tion materials; the materials were considered for  possible use in the design of future 
reentry vehicles. 
effects of an orbital reentry, the mission was intended to yield heating data applicable 
to that expected on the leeward side of a vehicle reentering at parabolic velocities. 
Through the experiment, much larger  material  samples could be tested than was pos- 
sible with laboratory facilities. A discussion and the preliminary results of the abla- 
tion experiment follow. 
Since ground testing in the laboratory could only approximate the 
Materials: Six organizations supplied a total of eight advanced ablation materials 
for the experiment. 
Test configuration: Each ablation panel, which was bonded to a beryllium shingle 
of the cylindrical section of the spacecraft, was 15 inches long and 5 inches wide. The 
panel was  centered on the shingle and was applied, starting at the juncture of the coni- 
cal  and cylindrical sections of the spacecraft. 
bonded to nine shingles and one blank shingle are presented in figure 33. 
Preflight photographs of the materials 
Instrumentation: The backface of two oppositely mounted bare  shingles were 
instrumented with iron-constantan thermocouples. In addition to the thermocouples. 
temperature-sensitive paints were applied to the inside skin of the shingles to which 
ablation material  was bonded. 
sample to offer some comparison. 
149" to 644" F. 
The paints were also applied to a shingle without a 
The temperature -sensitivity range for paints w a s  
Preflight qualifications: Tests  were conducted to qualify the material  samples 
for the nominal Mercury mission. Included were acoustic, arc- je t ,  and hydrogen 
peroxide compatibility tests. None of the tests presented any evidence that the safety 
of the mission and the protection of the cylindrical section would be compromised in 
any way. 
Test  objectives: The objectives of the experiments w e r e  to obtain data which 
could be correlated with supporting laboratory results and which could be applied to 
future advanced reentry vehicles. The results of the flight experiment, after a thor- 
ough and detailed analysis, provided information for selection of the type of material  
to be used on advanced design concepts for  manned spacecraft. 
Analysis of flight data: The main sources of information came from postflight 
observation, from weight and depth measurement of the ablation material ,  and from the 
results of the thermocouples and the temperature -sensitive paint. All materials satis- 
factorily survived the space and entry environments experienced during the MA-8 mis- 
sion. The section on "Trajectory and Mission Events" shows time histories of the 
important trajectory parameters  for the mission. A close inspection of the panels 
following the mission revealed evidence of char and cracking, but there was no evidence 
of delamination. 
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A probable longitudinal distribution of peak heating rate was determined. Max- 
imum calculated heating rates  on the hotter of the two instrumented shingles varied 
from a low of 4 .4  Btu/ft -sec at the end of the shingle nearest  the conical section to 
2 2 6.4  Btu/ft -sec at the center of the shingle and to 10. 7 Btu/ft -sec at the aft end of the 
shingle. The difference in heating rate, higher at the aft end of the shingle, was 
assumed to apply to all the shingles. 
2 
A probable circumferential variation of peak heating ra te  around the cylindrical 
section (at the time of maximum heating) was estimated. Heating rates  versus time 
were calculated from temperature -time histories available from four thermocouples 
on the two instrumented shingles which had ablation material. A third shingle without 
ablation material  showed a maximum temperature at its center of at least 644" F, as 
derived from temperature-indicating paints. Heating rates versus time were calcu- 
lated from this case, and assumed a similarly shaped temperature-time curve as for  
the other thermocouples, with a maximum temperature of 644" F. From an analysis 
of the instrumented shingles, the highest and lowest heating rates around the cylin- 
drical  section were estimated. 
around the cylindrical section, the approximate heating rates for the other shingles 
could, therefore, be approximated. An estimation of spacecraft angle of attack was 
made from limited aerodynamic data, and probably there was no more than a 2" angle 
of attack a t  maximum heating. An estimation of angle of attack was also made from 
wind-tunnel data, using the effect of angle of attack on the midcylinder circumferential 
distribution of the heat-transfer coefficient. On this basis, it was determined that the 
capsule angle of attack at maximum heating w a s  below 5" and probably close to 0". The 
circumferential variation of heating around the cylindrical section precluded the oppor - 
tunity to compare each material panel with all others to assess superior thermal pro- 
tection and restricted the shingles which could be compared. 
For an assumed sinusoidal distribution of heating rate 
All materials showed evidence of ablation in the form of cracking, a reas  of spal- 
lation, areas of discoloration, and char. 
ra tes  showed these symptoms in more severe form. However, no shingle material on 
the hot side showed superior surface reaction over any material  on the cool side. 
The materials in the a rea  of higher heating 
I 
Detailed observations were made of the intentional and purposeful repairs  made 
by most suppliers. A s  a group, the elastomeric materials were superior in restricting 
the gaps in the filled and unfilled cutouts. The appearance of most filled cutouts showed 
no major dimensional changes from the original. However, severe delaminations, 
chipping, pitting, cracking, and dimensional changes were present in most unfilled cut- 
outs. 
vent any cracking or erosion. 
Two suppliers reinforced the holes in their  material with an epoxy fi l ler  to pre-  
A comparison of X-ray photographs and posff light surface inspection was  made. 
The purpose of the comparison was  to determine if a correlation existed between voids 
in the bond shown by the X-rays and failing of the material in that area. Only in the 
case of large voids in the bond did the void, shown by an X-ray photograph, appear to 
manifest itself in a spallation of the material, and then only in a noncharring material. 
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Conclusions: The major conclusions that were drawn from the:analyses of data 
on ablation materials tested during the MA-8 mission were as follows: 
1. Each material  panel could not be compared with all other panels because of 
an estimated circumferential variation of heating around the cylindrical section. 
variation was probably caused by a 2" angle of attack at maximum heating. 
The 
2. There was an increase of temperature and char depth and an increase of 
thickness loss  as the aft end of each material  panel was approached. The increase was 
caused by an observed longitudinal variation of heating rate along each cylindrical - 
section shingle. 
3. No serious delamination of any material w a s  found on the MA-8 mission test. 
All materials held the backface temperature to a level which achieved an acceptable 
bond strength. 
4. No material experiencing a higher heating rate performed better than any 
material  experiencing a lower heating rate; that is, no material performance had over- 
ridden the normal-heating distribution. Therefore, as a group, the materials on the 
hot side showed the poorest surface characteristics and the highest backface temper- 
atures, as determined by the temperature -sensitive paints. 
5. The elastomeric materials proved superior to the hard ablation materials in 
limiting the growth o r  delamination of the intentional cutouts. 
6 .  The filled cutouts proved superior to the unfilled cutouts in limiting their own 
growth and delamination. 
7. No general correlation was found between voids shown in the X-ray photo- 
However, in the case of graphs and ultimate spallation of the material in the area.  
large voids in the bond, shown by the X-ray photograph for  a noncharring ablator, the 
voids showed up as spallations in the material. 
8. 
flight analysis, but to a lesser  extent. The use of relatively large specimens to ex- 
perience the actual space and entry environment could not be duplicated in a ground 
facility a t  the time of the investigation. 
Surface effects previously shown during ground testing appeared in the post- 
Preliminary results: A close inspection of the panels following the mission re- 
It was observed from the temperature-sensitive paints and the thermocouple 
vealed evidence of char and some minor cracking, but there was no evidence of delam- 
ination. 
measurements that the backface temperatures varied around the cylindrical section and 
indicated an asymmetrical thermal load. The heat f l u x  also appeared to have increased 
longitudinally from the conical section towards the antenna section. 
It appeared that the cylindrical- section shingles received little damage from post- 
flight handling by the recovery crews. On some of the samples, intentional cutouts 
were included to test  the effectiveness of field repairs. 
that all purposeful repairs  were no more affected by the reentry than the unimpaired 
areas .  The repairs  did not compromise the protection qualities of the remainder of 
the sample o r  the beryllium shingle. 
Preliminary results indicated 
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AEROMEDICAL ANALYSIS 
The aeromedical studies for the MA-8 mission amplified and extended the pro- 
gram outlined in previous manned space-flight reports. Before the mission, the 
pilot's state of health and medical f i tness for the mission were evaluated continuously. 
The accumulation of these preflight data familiarized the aeromedical monitors with 
the normal physiological responses of the pilot and provided a base line with which to 
compare the in-flight and postflight aeromedical data so  that changes resulting from 
the space flight could be determined. 
fications: clinical examinations, physiological observations, and special studies. 
These studies a r e  presented in three classi-  
Clinical Examinations 
The clinical examinations consisted of repeated aeromedical histories, physical 
examinations of the pilot by physicians, clinical laboratory tests,  X-rays, and other 
routine medical procedures, such as an ECG and an electroencephalogram (EEG). The 
immediate preflight and postflight clinical examinations were accomplished as close 
together as time permitted in order  to detect any physical changes induced by the mis-  
sion. The postflight physical examination and medical debriefing differed from pre-  
vious missions in several  important aspects. Since recovery was planned for the 
Pacific Ocean, the decision was made to car ry  out the entire debriefing on board the 
recovery aircraft  car r ie r .  This procedure permitted a much ear l ier  opportunity to 
complete some phases of the medical examination, which on previous missions had been 
postponed for several hours. The actual landing of the spacecraft in the immediate 
vicinity of the car r ie r  allowed early recovery and, thus, early postflight medical exam- 
ination of the pilot by a NASA flight surgeon. 
location for the clinical examination in t e rms  of space and equipment. 
The aircraft  ca r r i e r  was a satisfactory 
Physiological Observations 
The physiological observations were based on a comparison of data collected on 
the ground during preflight activities and during the mission. Physiological data on the 
MA-8 pilot, Walter M. Schirra, Jr. , were obtained from the following sources: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Biosensor monitoring during preflight activities 
Onboard recorded continuous biosensor records 
Reports from the range medical monitors 
Voice transmissions 
Pilot-observer camera film 
Results of special in-flight tes ts  
Postflight debriefing 
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Special Studies 
Special studies for  the MA-8 mission consisted of nonroutine medical procedures 
designed to provide information about selected body functions and sensations in the 
spacecraft environment during flight. 
Biosensor System 
The Mercury biosensor system for the mission consisted of two sets  of ECG 
leads, a rectal  temperature thermistor, an impedance pneumograph, and the BPMS. 
Previous postflight reports (refs. 1 to 3) contain most of the details of this system, and 
only major changes are noted in the following paragraphs. 
Electrocardiographic monitoring system. - The continuous ECG monitoring sys  - 
tem used during the  MA-8 mission was basically the same as the system used for 
previous missions. Alterations were introduced in the electrode location and the 
composition of the electrode attachment. The electrode positions were unchanged 
except for the right-side electrode, which was moved slightly below the right axilla, 
but remained in the midaxillary line to minimize any muscle artifact. The biosensor 
harness  was modified by the addition of two electrodes for  the pneumograph. 
w a s  of the same design as those leads used for the ECG, but i t  was located to produce 
the greatest  possible thoracic volume change associated with normal respiration. 
This lead 
The ECG electrodes were attached with double-backed adhesive tape which w a s  
cut to f i t  the rubber ring of the sensor. The sensor paste was  changed f rom the previ- 
ous bentonite -calcium -chloride material  to a combination of carboxypolymethylene and 
hypertonic Ringer's solution. 
carr ier  for the ions needed to provide electrical continuity. 
soluble and easier to manage than the bentonite paste. 
Ringer's solution provided the necessary amount of conductivity and low impedance and 
had the added feature of decreased skin irritation after prolonged contact. 
Carboxypolymethylene is a hygroscopic polymerized 
This car r ie r  is more 
The use of a 10-times-isotonic 
Blood-pressure measuring system. - As a result of previous experience with the 
BPMS, new preflight testing procedures were introduced. A comprehensive engineering 
evaluation which followed the MA-" mission suggested a need for improvement in the 
cr i ter ia  for adjusting the amplification of the sounds picked up by the microphone lo- 
cated over the brachial artery.  The sounds corresponded to those sounds heard with a 
stethoscope during cuff -pressure decay. Extensive comparisons between standard 
clinical blood-pressure readings and readings obtained using the BPMS allowed deter - 
mination of a more nearly optimum controller-gain setting for the MA-8 pilot. As a 
result, the read-out during the MA-8 mission improved noticeably over the read-out 
for  the MA-7 mission. 
The BPMS cuff thickness was decreased without change in bladder size fo r  in- 
creased comfort, and the caliber of the hose from the cuff to the suit connection w a s  
decreased. The changes did not affect the cuff -filling or  bleed-down times, and the 
basic system was unchanged. 
79 
During preflight launch-pad testing, the BPMS automatic t imer failed. The fail- 
u r e  made it necessary for the pilot to push the manual stop button at cycle completion, 
which resulted in a return of the telemetry read-out from BPMS to ECG lead II. This 
manual technique was used throughout the mission. 
Body -temperature measurement. - The body -temperature measurement system 
was u n m - t h e  previous mission, but the read-out failed 6 minutes before 
launch with the signal going full scale. At about the middle of the second orbital pass,  
a nominal reading reappeared, but was intermittent thereafter. 
Pneumograph. - The pneumograph produced a signal f rom impedance across  the 
chest, which was directly proportional to thoracic volume. 
variation correlated well with spirometer data, although the correlation was not linear. 
The impedance -pneumograph system consisted of a 50 -kilocycle oscillator, a 
50-kilocycle amplifier, a detector, and a low-frequency amplifier. The output of the 
oscillaiior was applied across  the chest through an electrode in each midaxillary line at 
about the level of the sixth rib. These electrodes, the conductive paste, and methods 
of attachment were identical to the ECG electrode system described previously. The 
oscillator output was made variable by means of a potentiometer so  that, for all but 
exceptionally deep breathing, the inspiratory peaks remained on scale on the direct-  
wiring recorder. Even for cases in which the range was exceeded, the respiratory rate 
could still be determined unless excessive body movement masked the thoracic -volume 
changes of respiration. The unit did not indicate instantaneous tidal volume, but it did 
provide respiration rate and a general indication of chest-volume changes. Inspiration 
signals were distinguishable even during the thoracic -volume changes which occurred 
with speaking (fig. 34). 
The thoracic-impedance 
Body movements of the pilot during the mission made the respiratory t race diffi- 
cult to interpret, but the restrictions imposed by the spacecraft design on pilot move- 
ment kept motion artifact to a minimum. 
affected the physiological responses of the pilot; therefore, the information presented 
in the section on "Environmental Control System" complements the discussion of phys- 
iological observations. 
The spacecraft environment materially 
Preflight Aeromedical History 
The pilot spent most of the time between June 1962 and the launch date at Cape 
Canaveral in preparation for the MA-8 mission. During this period, he chose swim- 
ming and waterskiing as his modes of physical conditioning. In the several  days imme- 
diately prior to flight, he did not participate in direct  physical conditioning. The 
controlled diet, begun September 21,1962, provided a well-balanced menu. A low- 
residue diet was consumed for  the 3 days before flight. A list of the i tems for  each 
meal of the low-residue diet appears in table M. The pilot reported minimal difficulty 
in becoming accustomed to the diet. As in previous manned missions, breakfast on the 
morning of the mission consisted of eggs, steak, buttered toast, jelly, orange juice, 
and coffee. Also, a small  amount of the bluefish, which was caught by the pilot on the 
evening before the mission, was eaten. All of the 325-cc fluid intake on launch morning 
from awakening to lift-off was at breakfast and consisted largely of orange juice. The 
pilot reported that shortly before lift-off he was aware of an emptiness in his stomach. 
This sensation is attributed to the fact that he had not eaten for  5 hours. He voided 
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three t imes into the urine collection device between the time of insertion into the 
spacecraft and the launch (a total period of 155 minutes). 
The MA-8 aeromedical countdown (table X) differed from the countdowns of pre-  
vious missions only in the periods allotted fo r  each activity and the time at which the 
pilot was awakened. Such changes reflected not only the operational requirements to 
complete certain tasks, but also represented an effort  to provide the pilot with a maxi- 
mum amount of sleep pr ior  to the mission. Without medication, the pilot obtained 
5 hours of sound sleep immediately before the mission. The new direct-writing bioin- 
strumentation package in the hangar S aeromedical laboratory permitted simultaneous 
biosensor and pressure -suit check-out. Therefore, a separate time allotment was no 
longer required for each of these activities. All events of the aeromedical countdown 
preceded the launch-pad countdown insertion time. A comparison of the activities with 
the activities of previous orbital missions is shown below. 
Mission 
MA- 6 
MA- 7 
MA- 8 
Pilot 
a .m.  e. s. t. 
~ awakened, 
2: 20 
1: 15 
1: 40 
Nominal 
launch, 
a .m.  e. s. t. 
8: 00 
7: 00 
7: 00 
Time to 
nominal launch, 
hr:  min 
5: 40 
5: 45 
5: 20 
~ 
Actual 
launch, 
a .m.  e. s. t. 
9: 47 
~ 
7: 45 
7: 15 
actual launch, 
hr: min 
I 
7: 27 
6: 30 
5: 35 
Preflight Physical Examination 
Abbreviated physical examinations were conducted by the flight surgeon pr ior  to 
each of the preflight activities listed in table XI. A more extensive examination w a s  
conducted 15 days pr ior  to the mission. Also, a comprehensive medical evaluation, 
performed by specialists in internal medicine, neuropsychiatry, opthalmology, radiol- 
ogy, and clinical laboratory and by the flight surgeon, was  completed 2 days before the 
mission. The evaluation included an audiogram, chest X-ray, and ECG. For purposes 
of postflight comparison, the EEG taken May 17, 1962, was deemed adequate and w a s  
not repeated before the mission. Al l  of the medical evaluations revealed a healthy and 
alert pilot, appropriately prepared for his flight assignment. 
Preflight Physiological Data 
Base-line physiological data were obtained from the following preflight activities 
(total observation time, 23  hours 27 minutes): 
1. Dynamic tests (treadmill, tilt table, and cold pressor )  conducted at the 
Lovelace Clinic March 1959 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
The Mercury -Atlas three -orbital-pass simulation conducted at the Johnsville 
Aeromedical Acceleration Laboratory (AMAL) September 22, 1961 
A simulated flight May 4, 1962, conducted at the launch complex as a par t  of 
the MA -7 prelaunch preparation 
Simulated flights in the hangar altitude chamber conducted with the MA-7 
spacecraft at altitude April 17, 1962, and with the MA-8 spacecraft at sea 
level August 14, 1962 
Simulated flights at the launch complex September 10 and 14, 1962 
Records from the hangar preparation a rea ,  transfer van, and blockhouse 
obtained during the countdown October 3,  1962 
The base-line data in table XII summarize all available heart-  and respiration- 
ra te  data. 
for  each minute from T - 90 seconds to T + 66 minutes. Other heart  and respiration 
minute ra tes  were obtained by counting 30 seconds every 3 minutes. 
10 minutes of the MA-8 launch countdown were determined by counting for 30 seconds 
every minute. All values were within physiologically acceptable limits. 
prelaunch heart and respiration rates  were similar to ra tes  obtained during other ac- 
tivities prior to the mission. 
98.6" F. Body temperatures varied f rom 97.1" to 97.9" F during countdown until 
T - 6 minutes when the reading went full scale. 
Rates from the dynamic simulation at  the Johnsville AMAL were determined 
Rates for the final 
The mean 
The preflight body temperatures ranged from 97.0" to 
Examination of the ECG waveform during all prelaunch activities showed only 
normal sinus arrhythmia, infrequent premature at r ia l  contractions, and rare prema- 
ture  ventricular contractions. 
contraction was detected. 
During launch countdown, a single premature atrial 
Blood-pressure data a r e  summarized in table XIII. The values in the "Special 
BPMS test" category were obtained from a ser ies  of comparisons between the clinical 
and the BPMS readings which were derived prior to launch in an effort to determine 
the best BPMS amplifier gain adjustment. 
tained from routine annual physical examinations and from examinations associated 
with the various preflight activities. 
and clinical sources pr ior  to the mission were similar and represented normal physio- 
logical responses. 
Random clinical determinations were ob- 
The blood-pressure values derived from BPMS 
Flight Physiological Data 
Figure 35 illustrates the in-flight physiological responses, which a r e  summa- 
rized in table XII. Minute ra tes  were obtained by counting 30 seconds of each minute 
from lift-off to 10 minutes g. e. t. , and from 08:48 to 09:12 g. e. t. , which was  approx- 
imately the time of biosensor disconnect. Values for the intermediate segment of the 
mission were obtained by counting for  30 seconds every 3 minutes. 
hear t  and respiration rates  were not significantly different from the mean preflight 
values. The maximum heart  sate during the launch phase was 112 beats/min, with a 
minimum of 102 beats/min. 
The mean in-flight 
The maximum rate during the mission w a s  121  beats/min 
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at T + 6 minutes. Thereafter, the heart  rate gradually declined (fig. 35) until the 
slowest rate was 56 beats/min. During reentry, the maximum rate  w a s  104 beats/min. 
These responses were within the expected physiological ranges. A careful evaluation 
of individual heart  cycles revealed a frequent increase and slowing of heart  rate which 
appeared to be unrelated to activity of the pilot and was  of a greater magnitude than 
his normal sinus arrhythmia. 
The maximum respiration rate during launch was  37 breaths/min at T + 5 min- 
utes, when maximum acceleration occurred immediately pr ior  to SECO. During 
weightless flight, respiration rates  were close to the mean value. During reentry at 
09:05 g. e. t . ,  the respiration rate reached a maximum of 43 breaths/min associated 
with maximum reentry acceleration. 
at biosensor disconnect. 
Thereafter, the rate declined to 20 breaths/min 
These values were also within accepted physiological ranges. 
From 00:08:00 to 09:02:00 g. e. t., 20 BPMS cycles were obtained periodically 
Premature manual cutoff of the BPMS operation made four of the diastolic 
(fig. 35) throughout the mission. The systolic levels were clearly evident on all 
20 cycles. 
points questionable, and these values were not included in the data. All of the values 
shown in table XIII were similar to the values obtained during preflight and postflight 
observations. 
from the other values. The in-flight bidinstrumentation record, which included a 
blood-pressure cycle, is shown in figure 3"6:* 
The mean pulse pressure o,f 57 mm Hg w a s  not significantly elevated 
Examination of the ECG waveform of the pilot during the mission showed no 
change from preflight waveforms. 
ture beat, and one fusion beat were noted in the more than 9 hours of continuous ECG 
monitoring. The fusion beat is illustrated in figure 37, and the ECG artifacts typical 
of this mission are shown in figure 38. 
One atrial premature beat, one ventricular prema- 
During the initial period of the mission, the body-temperature values were un- 
readable. This parameter suddenly returned to readable levels at 01 :52 :00 g. e .  t. 
(table XIV). During the remainder of the mission, the read-out varied from 97. 7" to 
98.5" F with occasional sudden small  changes as noted in table XIV. 
normal, but their accuracy w a s  questionable, since proper operation of the system 
could not be verified. 
The values were 
Special Studies 
The modified caloric test  and retinal photography were two special tes ts  per -  
Both the retinal 
formed for the MA-8 mission. 
fore the mission and 2 hours after landing by the same physician. 
photography and the modified caloric test, performed after the mission, revealed no 
significant change from preflight values. The technique for the modified caloric test 
is discussed in detail in reference 6. In addition to the radiation packs normally in- 
stalled in the spacecraft, three self -indicating dosimeters were carried on board and 
placed on the inside of the hatch by the pilot after launch. 
fluoride dosimeters were placed in the helmet liner at eye level, and three were 
placed on the inside of the underwear over the chest. The self -indicating dosimeters 
The modified caloric test  was  accomplished 6 days be- 
Two solid-state lithium 
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revealed only a minimal amount of radiation exposure (a dose of radiation of approxi- 
mately 0.06). Refer to the section on "Scientific Experiment" for  a discussion and 
resul ts  of the radiation detection devices carr ied in the MA-8 spacecraft. 
In-flight Aeromedical History 
Despite the 3.5 -hour increase. in the duration of weightlessness over the previous 
two manned orbital space flights, no untoward sensations were reported by the pilot. 
Specifically, he was not nauseated nor did he vomit. Although he was never hungry 
during the mission, the pilot consumed without difficulty peaches and beef with vege- 
tables, which were contained in collapsible tubes. Solid-food cubes were not evaluated 
since the pilot could not reach them during the mission. He experienced no urge to 
defecate during the mission. He reported a moderate amount of in-flight flatulence 
but no eructation. Vision and hearing were normal. The pilot moved his head as re- 
quired by his assigned tasks during weightlessness, including periods in which the 
spacecraft was  slowly turning in drifting flight, yet he reported neither vestibular dis- 
turbance nor disorientation. 
cury missions, were reported as normal. 
caused no particular problems. 
Bladder sensation and function, as in all previous Mer - 
The noise and vibration of powered flight 
Weightlessness was described as "very pleasant, but there was no e-xhilaration, 
euphoria, breakoff phenomenon, o r  other unusual psychological reactions. Reaching 
f o r  spacecraft controls was no different from pr ior  experience in the Mercury proce- 
dures trainer.  A s  a test, at three specific times during.the flight, the pilot closed his 
eyes and attempted to touch three specific controls o r  instruments. H e  recorded his 
e r ro r ,  if any, on the onboard tape. The e r r o r s  were few (three on nine trials) and the 
maximum e r r o r  was 2 inches in  a lateral  direction from one of the three targets on the 
second attempt. There was no tendency to overshoot or  undershoot, and his final test  
was the most accurate. 
A few minor problems were encountered in flight. During the fourth o r  fifth 
orbital pass,  some fluid was deposited onto the inner surface of the helmet faceplate. 
The vision of the pilot was obscured to some degree by the fluid, and he was forced to 
turn his head more than usual to look through a clear a rea  of the visor. The fluid was 
analyzed and conclusively determined to have been perspiration. 
The pilot stated that he was warm and perspired moderately during the f i r s t  or- 
bital pass when the suit-inlet temperature was elevated. However, he said he was not 
uncomfortably hot during this period. The evaluation by the flight surgeon in the Mer- 
cury Control Center concluded that the pilot was physiologically capable of continuing 
the mission, assuming that the suit-inlet temperature could be brought under control 
during the next orbital pass. This control was achieved, and during the fifth and sixth 
passes,  the pilot even became Ira little cool. Otherwise, he said he was comfortable 
throughout the mission. 
The pilot developed slight nasal congestion during the final two orbital passes. 
The congestion caused the pilot no difficulty in clearing his ears, and it did not affect 
his respiration. About 4 hours after recovery, he developed a mild rhinorrhea (nasal 
discharge). By the next day, the symptoms had almost disappeared. 
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Postflight Physical Examination 
Initial observation of the pilot by a physician occurred about 40 minutes after 
landing and immediately following the opening of the spacecraft hatch. He appeared 
active, cheerful, and well coordinated and exited from the spacecraft without assist- 
ance. There was no evidence of dizziness o r  deterioration of gait or  station at any 
time following the mission. He expressed great pleasure at the way the mission had 
gone with such expressions as: ''I fee l  fine; It w a s  a textbook flight; The flight went 
just the way I wanted it to. '' He did not appear unusually fatigued, he was eager to talk, 
and he took an active par t  in the postflight physical examination. 
Less  than 1 hour after landing, the aeromedical examination of the pilot was  well  
underway. Oral temperature was 9 9 . 4 "  F, rectal temperature was 100.1" F, sitting 
blood pressure was 118/78, and the pilot's pulse was 92 beats/min and regular. The 
skin of the pilot was warm and dry, and he showed little other evidence of dehydration. 
The pilot's weight loss was 4 . 5  * 0 . 5  pounds, in spite of the fact that he ate and drank 
very little during the mission. 
ined carefully. There were slightly reddened areas  due to pressure,  but there was no 
evidence of irritation from either the tape or' the electrolyte paste. 
sions were noted over the proximal knuckle of the fifth finger of his right hand. 
injury w a s  received when the plunger of the explosive actuator fo r  the egress  hatch 
recoiled against his  gloved hand. 
by the pilot of the MA-6 mission during egress  f rom the spacecraft when he also was 
struck by this plunger. There was  a reddened area  over each acromial process due to 
pressure from the couch. 
tensing exercises in which the pilot braced his feet on the foot board and his shoulders 
against the upper portion of the couch and tensed his back and leg puscles .  
The a reas  of sensor placement on his chest w e r e  exam- 
Two small  abra- 
The 
The injury was almost identical to the one received 
Apparently, the reddened a reas  resulted from muscle- 
The modified caloric tes t  of labyrinthine function was performed about 2 hours 
after landing and showed no significant change from the examination September 27, 
1962. 
no significant changes from the EEG done May 17, 1962. 
The EEG, which was  taken about 3 hours after landing, was normal and showed 
A complete physical examination revealed only one finding which was considered 
significant; the pilot demonstrated orthostatic hypotension and increased lability of 
blood pressure and pulse with changes in body position. 
table XV. When supine, his hear t  ra te  averaged about 70 beats/min, but the rate im- 
mediately increased to 100 beats/min or  more when the pilot stood up. Hi s  blood 
pressure showed a l e s s  dramatic, but still significant, drop in systolic pressure when 
he changed from the supine to the upright position. The reverse  was t rue when the 
pilot changed his position from standing to supine. Pulse and blood-pressure values 
recorded when the pilot w a s  seated consistently fe l l  between the standing and supine 
values. In addition, it was noted that all his dependent veins were engorged. His feet 
and legs rapidly took on a dusky, reddish-purple color following standing. 
commented that the color changes were more noticeable than any he had observed 
previously. 
These values a r e  shown in 
The pilot 
All of these findings persisted for the 6 hours following recovery and pr ior  to the 
retirement of the pilot for the night. The next morning, about 21  hours after landing, 
examination revealed that the orthostatic changes in pulse and blood pressure were  
much less marked. Also, the engorgement of the depended veins was much less 
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apparent. 
symptoms of orthostatic hypotension. He did, however, offer the information that he 
had felt lightheaded upon egress  f rom the procedures trainer after he had been supine 
on the couch for 4 hours in a Mercury suit at normal gravity. 
At no time did the pilot complain of dizziness, lightheadedness, o r  other 
These findings were the result of several  factors. Prolonged periods in the su- 
pine position can be followed by changes in hemodynamics. The pilot was slightly 
fatigued and dehydrated, and there was a possibility of individual variation that further 
complicated the picture. Similar hemodynamic reactions were observed in experimen- 
tal work with individuals submerged in water o r  kept in  bed for  prolonged periods in 
attempts to simulate weightlessness. The pilot smoked several  cigarettes during the 
postflight examination phase. Cigarette smoking is known to cause peripheral vasocon- 
striction and thereby affect blood pressure.  In view of these factors, it was impossible 
to isolate the t rue contribution of 9 hours of weightlessness to the problem. 
During the mission, the pilot drank about 473 cc of water. He urinated three 
times before lift-off and three t imes during flight, the last time just before retrofire. 
Unfortunately, the urine collection device failed at its attachment to the body and 
allowed the loss of most of the urine. Approximately 300 cc of urine was recovered 
and showed a specific gravity of 1.010. The specific gravity of the pilot's urine rose 
to 1.018 within a few hours after recovery, and the highest value of 1.021 occurred 
approximately 1 2  hours after recovery. The 24-hour period following the mission 
showed a fluid intake of 2580 cc and a measurable fluid loss of 775 cc. The pilot's 
hematocrit rose  from a value of 44 percent before the mission to 47 percent immedi- 
ately after the mission; 28 hours later, the hematocrit was 46 percent and dropped to 
43 percent in another 24 hours. 
examinations, indicated that dehydration of the pilot was minimal during the mission. 
These values, coupled with the findings on physical 
Following the initial medical examination after recovery, the pilot was taken to 
his cabin where he ate a hearty meal. 
usual cheerful sense of humor. He retired for  the night after a busy period of 21 hours 
40 minutes. After 10 hours of sound sleep, he awoke, urinated, talked, read, and 
smoked for  about an hour. He then returned to bed and slept for  3 more hours. 
appeared well rested and had no apparent residual fatigue from the mission. 
He was still eager to talk and maintained his 
He 
The aeromedical debriefing team, composed of the same individuals who con- 
ducted the preflight comprehensive medical evaluation, examined the pilot 30 hours 
after landing. 
the physical examination by physicians, an ECG, an EEG 3. 5 hours after landing, . 
chest X-rays, and clinical laboratory studies. The preflight and postflight medical 
examination results are presented in tables XVI, XVII, and XVIII. Aside from the 
abrasion noted on the pilot's right hand, all findings were normal. 
The physical and mental evaluation of the pilot included, in addition to 
The following conclusions were made from the aeromedical results of the MA-8 
mission : 
1. There was no evidence of disorientation o r  related untoward symptoms of the 
pilot during the 9. 5-hour period of weightlessness. 
during the mission demonstrated no impairment of his motor performance during the 
weightless period. 
The orientation test  conducted 
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2. Orthostatic hypotension of the pilot w a s  noted during the 24-hour period fol- 
lowing landing. A decrease in his  blood pressure and an associated increase in his 
hear t  rate upon standing may have more serious implications for  longer duration mis-  
sions. 
3. Lability of instantaneous hear t  rate was  noted, but it did not appear associ-  
ated with respiration or  activity of the pilot. 
4. The radiation exposure was far less than the predicted level and posed no 
biological hazard to the pilot. 
5. There appeared to be no medical contraindications to embarking on longer 
duration missions. 
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PILOT FLIGHT ACTIVITIES 
The primary responsibility of the pilot during the MA-8 mission, as in the pre- 
vious orbital missions, was to monitor and manage systems operations and, if,neces- 
sary,  to take corrective action in order  to achieve the prescribed mission objectives. 
The secondary responsibility of the pilot during the mission was  to accomplish various 
inflight activities that would further evaluate the spacecraft systems and provide a basis 
for evaluating the performance of man in space. Experimental scientific activities 
were reduced for  the mission in view of the greater emphasis placed on operational ob- 
jectives. The effectiveness of the pilot in achieving the primary mission objectives are 
described in the following paragraphs. The performance of the pilot in conducting cer -  
tain scientific experiments, secondary objectives for the mission, a r e  not described 
since they were discussed previously in the section on "Spacecraft Performance. ? '  
Flight- Plan Description 
A flight plan w a s  designed for  the MA-8 mission to guide the pilot in carrying out 
the mission objectives with particular emphasis upon management of the systems and 
conservation of the control fuel. A few scientific activities were scheduled late in the 
mission on a flexible basis to avoid interfering with operational mission requirements. 
Control systems were  evaluated prior to extending the mission duration beyond three 
orbital passes.  
Pilot adherence to the flight plan was excellent, and all major activities were ac- 
complished within the time periods scheduled. The spacecraft control systems were 
checked out completely during the f i r s t  three orbital passes;  and the drifting flight 
phase, as well as the automatic-control-system evaluation scheduled during the final 
three passes, was completed as planned. Observations of the ground f lares  at 
Woomera, Australia, and of the high-intensity lights at Durban, South Africa, were 
attempted at the proper times, but poor weather conditions prevented the observation 
by the pilot of both light sources. 
Operational Equipment 
A s  in previous manned Mercury missions, the MA-8 pilot had equipment avail- 
able which was designed to provide quantitative operational data. The equipment was  
located in a special equipment-storage kit at the right-hand side of the pilot, in a com- 
partment on the instrument panel, and in the chart case. The scientific equipment 
(described in the section on "Scientific Experiments") was also stowed in two of these 
places. 
The following equipment was  located in the special equipment-storage kit (pilot 
reference, ditty bag): 
1. Hand-held camera 
2. Terres t r ia l  film magazine 
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3. Weather bureau film magazine 
4. Camera shoulder s t rap  
5. Three radiation dosimeters 
6. Extinction photometer 
7. Two food tubes and food cube holder 
8. Food tube nozzle 
9. Motion sickness container 
The following equipment was contained in a compartment on the instrument panel 
(pilot reference, glove compartment): 
1.  Weather bureau filter mosaic slide 
2. Yaw -attitude instrument cover 
3. Standard light source 
4. Automatic exposure meter  
5. Magnetic compass 
6. Flight-plan and checklist card holders 
The following equipment was contained in the chart case:  
1. Chart booklet 
2. Star navigation charts 
3.  Time-conversion computer 
The pilot experienced difficulty in reaching i tems located in the special 
equipment-storage kit and also i tems located in the compartment on the instrument 
panel. It was also difficult for the pilot to remove some of the i tems stowed in these 
two locations because they were excessively covered with Velcro (plastic fibrous dry- 
adhesive material). 
The orbital chart  booklet of operational aids contained map giving the orbital 
ground t race  and indicating the ground elapsed time with position; the primary and 
contingency recovery-area locations; locations of the primary and emergency commu- 
nication and tracking stations; the oxygen-rate rule curves; automatic- and manual- 
control fuel-usage curves; the emergency continuous-wave code; a nominal re t rose-  
quence chart; and an additional orbital map with forecasted weather information. 
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The star navigation charts (fig. 39) gave five separate plots of star positions 
near the orbital plane. 
period; therefore, the charts provided approximate star locations for a lift-off t ime 
within the period between 6:46 a.m. and 9:16 a.m. e.s. t. The charts were designed 
so that a slide could be positioned to  display the star field equivalent to the window 
field of view of 30" at any point in the orbit. The star field presented by the chart  was 
approximately 40" on either side of the flight path. 
Each chart was valid for a launch occurring within a half-hour 
A time-conversion device (fig. 40) was used to  refer elapsed t imes in the first 
orbital pass  to  the elapsed t imes  of subsequent passes  to  determine the position on the 
star chart  which corresponded to any spacecraft elapsed time. The two items pre- 
sented a handling problem, since two hands were required for the conversion operation. 
For the MA-8 mission, the flight-plan cards,  one of which is shown in figure 41, 
were placed on pullout panels that were located just beneath the instrument-panel 
equipment container. The reverse  side of the flight-plan cards  contained checklists 
€or cri t ical  orbital operations. An example of the checklists is shown in figure 42. 
Equipment stowage within the spacecraft was distributed between the three locations 
previously mentioned. 
Control Tasks 
Several inflight maneuvers and control tasks  were programed for the MA-8 mis- 
sion to  obtain additional information about possible orientation problems in space and 
about the ability of the pilot to perform various attitude-control tasks using accuracy 
and fuel expenditure as the primary criteria of performance. The tasks a r e  discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
Turnaround maneuver. - The primary purpose in accomplishing a manual turn- 
around manuever (using th% FBW control mode, low thrusters  only) was to conserve 
control-system fuel. Therefore, it was planned that, if  the mission was proceeding 
normally, the turnaround would be executed at a leisurely pace using a 4-deg/sec rate 
about the yaw axis. 
The pilot performed the maneuver identically as it was practiced on the proce- 
dures  t ra iner  prior to the mission. Figure 43 shows the spacecraft attitudes as 
indicated by the gyros and a background envelope of five turnaround maneuvers 
accomplished on the procedures trainer for comparison. The pilot performed the 
manuever smoothly and with precision. Only 0 . 3  pound, or less than 1 percent, of 
the automatic-control-system fuel supply was used. The quantity amount to  approx- 
imately 10 percent of the total control fuel required by the automatic control system 
to accomplish the same maneuver. 
The pilot reported that the turnaround maneuver proceeded just as it had on the 
procedures trainer.  In accordance with practice in the trainer,  the pilot used only 
the rate and attitude indicators for reference, and he resisted the temptation to look 
out the window when the horizon first came into view. 
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Yaw maneuvers. - Yaw maneuvers were planned for the mission to  obtain quan- 
titative information on the use of the window and periscope as independent references 
fo r  determining and acquiring the proper spacecraft attitude about the yaw axis. The 
yaw indicator was to be covered and the spacecraft displaced in yaw. However, the 
maneuver was planned so that the yaw attitude would be retained within gyro- and 
repeater-stop limits. The maneuvers were performed during both daytime and night- 
t ime phases of the orbit in which the views through the window and the periscope were 
used independently as external references. 
The pilot stated early in the mission that he could accurately estimate yaw atti- 
tude during periods when either the ASCS mode was operating, o r  was in a drifting 
flight mode. 
The first yaw maneuver on the dayside of the Earth, in which the view through 
the window was used as a reference, was performed over Bermuda at 01:41 g. e. t. 
during the second orbital pass. The maneuver was followed at 01:50 g. e. t. by a s im- 
ilar exercise using the view through the periscope as a reference. Pn addition, yaw 
maneuvers on the nightside of the Earth, in which the view through the window was 
again used as a reference, were performed in sequence over Muchea, Australia, 
during the second orbital pass  at 02:26 and 02:28 g. e. t. The resul ts  of the yaw maneu- 
ve r s  are presented in figure 44, which gives the variation in spacecraft roll, pitch, and 
and yaw attitudes. Table X M  lists the fuel usage, t ime required, control mode, and 
visual reference used for the yaw maneuvers, which are discussed in the order  tabu- 
lat ed . 
The first yaw maneuver on the dayside of the Earth consisted of three separate 
yaw displacement and realinement maneuvers accomplished in rapid sequence. The 
pilot did not, however, record an attitude mark on the voice tape until the end of the 
final maneuver of the sequence. The pilot yawed the spacecraft approximately 8 O  to 
10" from 0" in each case, holding pitch and roll  attitudes reasonably close to retro- 
attitude as intended. At the termination of the maneuver, yaw misalinement was +4", 
with roll  and pitch attitudes at a nominal 0" and -34", respectively. As a result  of the 
maneuver, the pilot reported that yaw e r r o r s  were readily recognized and corrected 
by using the terrain features o r  any available type of cloud formation through the win- 
dow. The pilot reported, and the resul ts  of the maneuver verified, that yaw realine- 
ment could be accomplished while holding the nominal retroattitude of -34" in pitch. 
The attitude in pitch made the horizon available for  maintaining proper attitudes in 
pitch and rol l  while the spacecraft was being oriented in yaw. 
In the second yaw maneuver on the dayside of the Earth, the pilot yawed 23" to 
the right while holding pitch and roll  within +5" of the desired attitudes. At the termi-  
nation of the maneuver, the spacecraft was in e r r o r  by +2" in yaw, with pitch and rol l  
at -33" and O", respectively. 
The pilot reported that yaw misalinements were readily apparent and that realine- 
ment to 0" was effected rapidly by using only the periscope reference. However, as a 
result  of the two daytime yaw maneuvers, the pilot reported that the window provided 
an  adequate yaw reference and that the periscope constituted a redundant external 
reference system. 
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In the third and fourth yaw maneuvers accomplished on the nightside of the orbit, 
the pilot used the window as a reference because he found the periscope to be ineffec- 
tive at night. In performing each of the maneuvers, the pilot yawed approximately 
20" left, and then he was able fo realine in yaw very close to  9". At the termination of 
the third maneuver, the yaw e r r o r  was +3"; and at the end of the fourth maneuver, the 
yaw e r r o r  was - 1 " . In the course of completing both of these maneuvers, pitch at- 
titude was decreased from the nominal -34" to  approximately -22"; however, pitch 
attitude was returned to about -34" by the end of each maneuver. Excursions in roll 
were somewhat la rger  for  the maneuvers than they were during the daylight yaw ma- 
neuvers; however, the e r r o r s  were reduced to  nearly zero  at the completion of the ma- 
neuver. The pilot used the Moon and Venus as visual references to perform both of 
the maneuvers. 
The pilot reported that yaw determination on the nightside was more difficult 
than during the daylight phase because of the small  field of view available for the ac- 
quisition of s t a r  patterns. He reported that through concentrated effort, he was able to 
acquire attitude alinement about all axes by using the airglow layer as his reference in 
pitch and roll and a known celestial body as his reference in yaw. 
The results of the four maneuvers indicated that for  yaw misalinements of the 
order  obtained during the mission, the spacecraft could be realined in yaw during the 
day o r  during moonlit night conditions by using the window view as the only visual ref- 
erence. The maneuvers were accomplished in a 2- to 3-minute time period with an 
average expenditure of between 0. 2 and 0.3 pound of control fuel, and realinement of 
spacecraft attitudes was readily achieved to within rt5" of the nominal retroattitude. 
Yaw alinement on the dayside, in which the periscope was used, required approxi- 
mately the same amount of both control fuel and t ime as was required when the window 
reference was used, with little o r  no improvement in accuracy. 
Drifting Flight. - The spacecraft was permitted to drift completely free in at- 
titude on two different occasions to conserve control fuel. 
to as limited drifting flight. During this time, power to the ASCS was switched off 
(powered down) to conserve electrical power. On three additional occasions, the pilot 
maintained the spacecraft attitudes within the l imits of the horizon scanners with a 
minimum amount of control inputs. A total of 2 hours 29 minutes was spent in both 
types of drifting flight during the mission, with the longest continuous period extending 
f o r  1 hour 42 minutes. Most of the drifting period was devoted to flight in the attitude- 
free state. 
phases, was approximately 1 pound, and the fuel was alm'ost entirely consumed in re- 
establishing attitudes at the termination of each period of drifting flight. Drifting 
flight was not disturbing to the pilot, and the flight results verified that this opera- 
tional technique provided the means of conserving fuel and electrical power. 
This flight mode is referred 
The total control fuel usage, directly associated with the drifting-flight 
Gyro realinement maneuvers. - The gyros were realined to an Earth reference ________ -
through the window by using FBW on two different occasions. At the completion of both 
maneuvers, the gyros and horizon scanners were alined quite closely, and torquing of 
the gyros to the horizon scanners quickly corrected any remaining disparities. The 
first gyro realinement required 1 .71  pounds, but the second maneuver required only 
0. 66 pound of automatic control fuel, 
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The first maneuver was accomplished during the night period of the orbit and 
required two separate gyro caging and uncaging operations to obtain the correct  aline- 
ment. The procedure used was to determine attitude by observing available star pat- 
terns and to acquire and t rack the horizon by using 2-deg/sec rates o r  less until the 
proper position was indicated in the window. The gyros were then caged and uncaged. 
At this point, roll and pitch were quite well alined; however, an  e r r o r  of approximately 
35" in yaw attitude existed at this time. 
reference, the pilot quickly recognized the yaw e r r o r  and maneuvered to the proper 
heading. 
Using the constellation Cassiopeia as a visual 
The procedure used by the pilot in performing the second gyro realinement was 
(1) to cage and uncage the gyros ab-34" in pitch and 0" in roll and yaw and (2) to pitch 
up to an indicated attitude of +34", while simultaneously holding roll and yaw attitudes 
at 0", and again cage and uncage the gyros. The maneuver was performed during the 
daylight phase of the orbit, and again the Earth horizon reference through the window 
was used. The e r r o r s  in slaving the gyros to the horizon scanners were within ~ 7 "  for  
all axes at  the completion of the maneuver, and the scanners required less than a 
minute to correct the remaining gyro e r ro r s .  
Pitch maneuvers. - On four occasions during the mission, the pilot maneuvered 
Typical fuel usage for  the pitch-,attitude change was 0. 20 pound 
During the final pitch maneuver to reentry attitude, the 
from retroattitude to reentry attitude in pitch, pr ior  to selecting the automatic reentry- 
select control mode. 
of the automatic fuel supply. 
pilot simultaneously checked the FBW high thrusters,  and this action resulted in a 
much higher fuel usage than the previous pitch maneuvers. The pilot performed these 
maneuvers with precision, and a t  the completion of each maneuver, he engaged the 
auto.matic control system without actuating the high reaction control thrusters.  
Retrofire. - The pilot completed stowage of the items on the preretrof i re  check- 
list,  and he was thus prepared well in advance of the retrosequence event. Just  be- 
fore the last sunrise and pr ior  to the retrosequence event, the pilot used Jupiter, 
Fomalhaut, and the constellation Grus to verify that the gyro indicators functioned 
properly. A s  planned, the automatic control system was used to control the space- 
craft attitude during retrofire, with the MP control mode selected as a backup. During 
retrofire, the pilot cross-checked his window reference and reported that the space- 
craft attitude was  constant within less than 1" about all axes. Just  p r ior  to retrose- 
quence, the pilot reported that the glare of the sun through the periscope was blinding, 
and he therefore placed the dark fi l ter  over the lens. 
Reentry. - As planned, the pilot used the RSCS mode for  controlling the reentry 
phase of the mission. Although the system consumed large quantities of control- 
system fuel a t  a rate  which was expected (for example, 50 percent of the manual supply 
was expended from 0.05g to drogue-parachute deployment), this fact almost led the 
pilot to select the auxiliary damping control mode of the ASCS. 
Systems Management and Operational Procedures 
Throughout the mission, the pilot exhibited an excellent monitoring technique and 
operational procedure in managing the spacecraft systems. During the mission, the 
pilot reported clearly and accurately on the status of systems and maintained a 
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commentary on in-flight activities, such as yaw maneuvers, control-mode usage, 
spacecraft elapsed time, and visual observations. The pilot exercised sound judgment 
and procedure in resolving the suit- circuit- temperature control problem. The proce- 
dure fo r  switching off (powering down) and switching on (powering up) the ASCS inverter 
was performed exactly as planned. The pilot maintained an  effective'surveillance for  
possible discrepancies between t rue  vehicle and gyro attitudes, as well as the overall 
operation of spacecraft electrical systems. The proper fuse- control switch positions 
were selected throughout the mission, and the drogue parachute and snorkle- inlet valves 
were manually activated at the proper time. 
Control-mode switching. - The use of control systems and control-mode switching 
operations by thepilot  was excellent. He was able to accomplish the switching opera- 
tions with a minimum amount of fuel usage. Table XX is a tabulation of the operation 
of the control systems by the pilot and includes a correlation with major flight activi- 
ties. 
Table XXI lists the control modes and combinations of control-mode configur- 
ations and the total t ime and frequency that each control system was used during the 
mission. The pilot used a total of 14 single- o r  dual-control combinations, and he 
switched control modes 54 t imes during the mission. The automatic control system 
controlled the spacecraft 60 percent of the total orbital mission time; the pilot manually 
controlled the spacecraft 16 percent of the total mission time; and the spacecraft was  
permitted to drift in an attitude-free mode the remaining 24 percent of the mission 
time. 
The pilot selected the automatic control system on 23 different occasions. 
case, he inadvertently activated the automatic- control- system high thrusters because 
he had engaged the automatic control system while the spacecraft was in proper retro- 
attitude, but with the attitude-select switch in the reentry-attitude position. The only 
other t ime that automatic- control- system high- thruster operation occurred, other than 
during the retrofire period, was just p r ior  to 0.05g. This activation resulted when the 
ASCS in orbit mode failed to keep the spacecraft attitude within the attitude limits. 
In one 
The pilot selected double-authority control on four occasions during the mission. 
The f i r s t  case was inadvertent and occurred when the pilot changed from the M P  con- 
trol  mode to the FBW, low thrusters only (FBW low) control mode. The pilot noticed 
the greater  than normal response for  the FBW-low control mode, and immediately re- 
turned to a single-authority control configuration. 
The second case of double-authority control occurred just before the single in- 
stance in which the pilot inadvertently actuated the automatic- control-system high 
thrusters.  
system, and he selected rate command in conjunction with the FBW-low control mode 
to counteract the effect of the automatic-mode high thrusters.  
The pilot analyzed the situation as a stuck thruster in the automatic control 
In the third case, the MP system was utilized to override the automatic system 
in order  to correct  for  an e r r o r  of approximately 10" in roll a t  the end of the horizon- 
scanner test. 
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The final case of double-authority control occurred during the ignition period fo r  
the retrorockets. The pilot selected MP control, as planned, to back up the automatic 
control system in case it failed to control the spacecraft attitude properly during the 
event. 
Fuel usage. - The amount of fuel used during the maneuvering flight phase and 
control-mode switching exercises was much less than the amount predicted from cal- 
culations based on the prescribed flight plan. A fuel-usage history is presented in 
figure 45. The fuel reserve at retrofire was approximately 80 percent of initial levels 
for  both the manual and automatic fuel supplies, which represented a total fuel con- 
sumption of only 1 2  pounds for  almost 9 hours of flight. The automatic control system 
controlled the spacecraft attitudes during 60 percent of the mission, and all the sched- 
uled maneuvers and control system operations were accomplished. The fuel economy 
exhibited on the mission can be attributed to the following: - 
1. The pilot performed the turnaround maneuver using only the FBW-low control 
mode. 
the automatic control system to accomplish the same task. 
Fuel usage fo r  the maneuver was approximately 10 percent of that required by 
2. The high thrusters of the automatic control system were activated on two 
brief occasions pr ior  to retrofire, one of which resulted from an oversight on the part  
of the pilot and for  which he quickly corrected. 
3. The FBW-low control mode was used for  most of the manual maneuvers. 
4. The pilot executed each maneuver smoothly and with minimal control inputs. 
5. The pilot used a systematic procedure for  fuel conservation, particularly 
during control-system checks. 
Conclusions 
Throughout the mission the pilot exhibited good monitoring and operational pro- 
cedures in managing the spacecraft systems. During the entire mission, the pilot 
reported clearly and accurately on the status of systems, * and he maintained a good 
verbal commentary on his in-flight activities, such as the yaw maneuvers, control- 
mode usage, spacecraft elapsed time, and visual observations. The pilot exercised 
good judgment and procedure in resolving the suit-circuit -temperature control prob - 
lem. The procedure for powering down and powering up the ASCS inverter was per-  
formed exactly as planned. 
discrepancies between t rue vehicle and gyro attitudes, as well as the overall opera- 
tion of the electrical systems. 
throughout the mission, and the drogue and snorkle were manually activated as 
planned. 
mission a t  all times. 
The pilot maintained a good surveillance for  possible 
The proper fuse-control switch positions were selected 
Results of the mission indicate that the pilot was able to think ahead of the 
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PILOT'S FLIGHT REPORT 
[Editor's note: A personal narrative is presented of the MA-8 pilot's flight expe- 
riences during the mission. This candid evaluation of the performance of the space- 
craft throughout the mission was derived from the pilot's self-debriefing conducted on 
board the recovery aircraft  car r ie r  immediately following the flight. The transcript  
of that recorded debriefing was lightly edited to appear in the format which follows, 
The pilot's system-oriented opinions a r e  a reflection of the greater emphasis placed on 
the engineering aspects of the Mercury program and were extremely valuable in making 
the postlaunch investigation of the flight resul ts  a comprehensive one. ] 
One of the main objectives of this flight w a s  an engineering evaluation of the 
spacecraft systems to determine their capabilities for an extended mission. In line 
with this objective, we wanted to demonstrate that the consumable supplies could be 
conserved sufficiently to permit longer duration flights in the future using the Mercury 
spacecraft. Of course, most of the consumables, such as water, electrical power, and 
contaminant fi l ters,  will have to be increased, but it is still important to determine 
the long-term consumption rates. 
Since this was to be an engineering evaluation, the name chosen for my space- 
craft was  that of the mathematical symbol for summation, sigma, with the number 7 
added to it for the seven-member Mercury astronaut team. 
and symbol that was painted on the spacecraft, Sigma 7. 
Thus was derived the name 
The camaraderie of everyone concerned with the flight preparations and equip- 
ment meant a great deal to me. For example, it w a s  certainly a thrill while entering 
the spacecraft on launch day to see a dummy "ignition key" on the control stick safety 
pin. 
many other people who were interested in what I was doing. We know this inherently, 
but these visible examples of it mean quite a bit. 
summation of the great efforts exerted by each and every man in the vast Mercury 
team. 
This and other small  gestures really helped to make me realize that there a r e  
Here again, sigma symbolizes the 
The following comments a r e  my observations and impressions of the flight from 
In a previous section the flight plan was described and my the countdown to recovery. 
performance in completing the assigned tasks was discussed. 
amplify that discussion, as well as describe my own flight sensations. In many 
instances, I will submit comparisons of my observations with those of astronauts who 
preceded me into space. 
my flight a success. 
In this section, I will 
It was their pioneering efforts which helped so  much to make 
Countdown and Powered Flight 
The countdown was  conducted very successfully; there were absolutely no prob- 
lems. 
Canary Islands' radar system, but waiting for what proved to be a rapid repair was 
The only delay was that resulting from a temporary loss of signal from the 
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worthwhile since they had good radar acquisition during the first orbital pass. 
tracking task is critical at this time, because it provides early definition of the space- 
craft tra j e c tory. 
The 
The boosted flight itself was disappointingly short. Considerable training was 
conducted to prepare me for emergencies which might occur during powered flight. 
We so often practiced system failures and aborts, either in the procedures trainer o r  
by coordinating the trainer with the Mercury Control Center and Bermuda stations, 
that this practice made a very pronounced impression upon me. 
This launch, in contrast, was a successful, normal flight where I encountered 
many new experiences. 
pr ior  to insertion is important, in that here the pilot must be prepared for reaction to 
an emergency, rather than thinking one out. 
I still believe that the amount of practice we had for the period 
There is no doubt about when lift-off occurred. If anything, I was somewhat 
During 
surprised because it occurred ear l ier  than I had anticipated. 
engines start, felt them thrusting, and then heard the main engines start. 
ascent, the communications with the Cape Capsule Communicator were perfect except 
for the few seconds when the noise of maximum dynamic pressure triggered the voice- 
operated relay and prevented the ground transmissions f rom reaching me. 
felt rushed, and all the events during launch were in order. 
I heard the vernier 
I never 
I had more than the anticipated time available to me to make my system checks. 
My scan pattern of the instrumentation panel was  developed to where it was  instinctive. 
I thought from my training that I might have missed on making a good electrical check 
prior to 3 minutes but subsequent to tower jettison; however, I found that I had com- 
pleted that in time. There was  absolutely no question as to when booster engine cutoff 
(BECO) occurred. 
trainer,  I could only wait for the accelerometer indication to decrease. 
doubt, whatsoever, when these forces decrease in actual flight. 
mission, I had become familiar with checkoff points for various emergencies; for 
example, a no-BECO abort, a no-staging abort, and an abort at 3 minutes and 50 sec-  
onds after lift-off. 
them behind me. 
The change in acceleration was  quite obvious; whereas in the 
There is no 
Since beginning this 
It w a s  a very pleasant feeling to check each of these off and put 
I knew that the launch vehicle staged without having to wait for confirmation from 
the Cape Cap Com, which, by the way, did come in rapid order. 
back of smoke from the booster engines as they par t  from the sustainer stage, and you 
can see the escape rocket when it is jettisoned. Unfortunately, the escape rocket blast 
left a light film on the window. 
You can see  the flash- 
It did seem that the buildup of acceleration during the sustainer period was rather 
slow. As I look back, the forces I experienced while being accelerated in boosted 
flight seemed to be much less  than the later forces of reentry. This comparison, I 
a m  sure, is best  explained by the fact that you have a breathing point at BECO, in  
between the accelerations, while at reentry there is a long continuous buildup of accel- 
erations which a r e  equally as exciting as those during boosted flight. 
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Orbital Flight 
At sustainer engine cutoff (SECO), the sequence panel light did not seem to help 
very much. All the lights were somewhat dim, and I was made aware of these events 
better by the feel and sound than by the sequence light itself drawing my eye to it. 
After SECO, I immediately selected the auxiliary damping mode knowing from my 
previous training that there was no rush, selected fly-by-wire, low, on the thrust 
select switch, and commenced turnaround. I resisted every impulse to look out of 
the window at this point, as I wanted to make this a fuel-minimum turnaround by 
strictly monitoring the gyro instruments. I was pleased to note that I got exactly the 
turnaround I wanted in the fly -by-wire low control mode, including approximately 
4 degrees per second left yaw. I had no trouble with any of the low thrusters at this 
time or  at subsequent t imes during the flight. I attained retroattitude at about 6 min- 
utes and 50 seconds after lift-off and then selected ASCS, dropping into this automatic- 
pilot mode without any high thruster action. 
After turnaround, I observed the sustainer stage right where it had been predicted 
to be, and I was very intrigued. I was somewhat surprised to see  the sustainer engine 
pointing toward me. By this, I mean that it was  basically in an attitude where it must 
have turned lengthwise 180". It was moving very, very slowly in relation to its inser- 
tion attitude, although it had managed to make a 180" turnaround during the time I had 
made mine. I was also impressed with the fact that it was almost black in appearance, 
rather than the shiny silvery vehicle that Astronauts Glenn and Carpenter had seen a t  
this time and that I had observed on the launching pad. The white bellyband of con- 
densed moisture, the f ros t  itself, was apparent to me. The sustainer followed the 
path that was predicted, and this knowledge helped to satisfy me that the attitude gryos 
and horizon scanners were operating properly. I did not see  any crystalline material 
exhausting from the sustainer engine which Scott Carpenter had described. The sus-  
tainer, in retrospect, appeared slightly to the right of the predicted position which 
indicated a slight e r r o r  to the left in my indicated attitude about the yaw axis. 
It was  a very real satisfaction to receive the statement from the. Cape Cap Com 
that I had at least a seven-orbit capability. As I proceeded on to the Canary Islands, 
the flight was textbook already. I never did feel rushed; in fact I could send a blood 
pressure,  for example, and have little else to do. I got a good 10-minute check when 
the tower jettison and cap sep lights indicating spacecraft separation went out. I had 
loss of voice transmission with the Cape Cap Com just prior to 10 minutes. Although 
I had everything under control, I did store away all events and switch positions to 
transmit to the Canary Islands Station, since their relaying of these data would, in 
turn, update the flight director and the flight controllers back at the Cape. 
At about 10 minutes 30 seconds, I went back to fly-by-wire, low, and tracked the 
sustainer as it traversed down through the window, and it w a s  a thrill to realize the 
delicate touch that it is possible to have with fly-by-wire, low, This touch is an art 
that a pilot hopes to acquire in air-to-air gunnery for getting hits. In this case the 
control system was so effective that i t  just amounted to a light touch and maybe a few 
pulses in either axis to get the response I wanted. I could point the spacecraft at any- 
thing I wanted to. I could see the sustainer and track it, but I do not believe the rela-  
tive motion problem would be so  easy to solve that I would be able to steam along and 
join up with it. Although the relative velocity was on the order of 20 to 30 feet per  
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second, it was enough to cause a problem, particularly at a time when one is becoming 
acclimated to a new environment. These problems would be difficult to solve by one's 
own inherent trajectory analysis, since there were  no systems aboard to aid the pilot 
in solving the problem. I think that when we build up to the rendezvous technique, one 
will need more time than that just at the point of insertion to effect this rendezvous, 
even with proper training. The use  of time while orbiting in space is only earth re la-  
tive, therefore if a rendezvous is not hurried, the task should be relatively simple. 
At the Canaries, the flight itself had settled into a very normal pattern, I was 
content with the autopilot function, although I was convinced by this time that I had 
a small  discrepancy between indicated and actual yaw attitude. During the sustainer 
tracking exercise, I had disabled the yaw reference system, and I knew that I had to 
wait for  it to precess  out the e r r o r s  before I misjudged it. 
manual proportional control, I was content that the system was exactly as I felt it 
would be. The greatest  effect I did notice in manual proportional control was the tail- 
off in thrust, rather than the response to control input. As a result, you have a tend- 
ency to overshoot, and you cannot park the spacecraft in the attitude you want without 
having to counteract and then recounteract a tail-off. As a result  of this effect, almost 
every time I went f rom manual proportional back to automatic mode, I switched to fly- 
by-wire, low, to reduce these small ra tes  to a level at which I could effect this tran- 
sition without using high thrusters. 
Having pitched up with 
I did not have much chance to assess Africa as a viewing sight; I was much more 
engrossed in what was  happening within the spacecraft. 
color of Africa's desert  terrain;  it was difficult not to notice it. 
was exactly as I had anticipated from the orbital charts. At this time, I w a s  well 
aware of the fact that we were working up to a slight suit-system cooling problem. I 
decided then to devote my primary attention to solving to solving this situation before 
it became necessary to end the flight prematurely. 
people on the ground were probably quite concerned and were thinking in te rms  of 
previous missions when cooling problems had persisted. 
better solve this one. 
I did, of course, notice the 
The country itself 
I was well aware of the fact that 
Therefore, I decided I had 
I did not want to increase the valve setting for the suit circuit too rapidly. I had 
I had 
said before the flight that I wanted to increase the flow settings about half a mark every 
10 minutes, and this technique had been agreed upon by the system specialists. 
to go from a setting of 4 to 8, which represents about eight half marks. 
dure would therefore take about 80 minutes. 
the increase in the suit and dome temperatures, and I needed about another 10 or 
15 minutes to get the cooling I wanted. 
and freeze the system. I had everything monitored closely, and while I saw the tem- 
perature was  still going up as I increased flow, the rate  of change of the temperature 
was decreasing. 
This proce- 
At a setting of about 7, I had ar res ted  
I did not want to increase the setting too rapidly 
Even though it seemed to me that the Mercury Control Center did not have as 
much information as I did on this temperature problem, their request that I decrease 
the suit setting back to 3 was valid. I later decided that they might have made an 
analysis that I had not and subsequently backed down to the number 3 position as 
requested. I gave the system about 10 minutes to respond and saw that both the dome 
temperature and the suit inlet temperature were increasing again, so I immediately 
went from there up to about 7.5, which again a r res ted  the temperature increases. 
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Once the suit circuit temperature was under control, no other problems demanded 
such careful attention. Continually, I metered the attitude control fuel and attempted 
to conserve its use. Electrical power, which is stored in six batteries, is another 
consumable that I wanted to conserve. There were scheduled periods during the flight 
where I powered down electrical systems. In addition, I conserved electrical power 
by recording my observations with a voice -operated relay "record-only" mode, rather 
than transmitting out of range of the Mercury tracking stations. Although we don't 
have a system for measuring the actual power remaining, battery voltage readings are 
a good indication, and I was very impressed that the voltage readings did not drop 
during the flight. 
I do not believe I need to discuss the weather, the sun, o r  the stars. It seems 
Each network station more appropriate to discuss the events within the spacecraft. 
got as much information as I had available to give them. Once we had solved the suit 
circuit problem and I had begun to feel cool, I knew we were in a "go" status and I had 
achieved my goal of using minimum fuel up to this point. I had stated long ago that I 
wanted to do some control manuevers other than in fully automatic mode. I also had 
stated that I wanted to use the automatic mode when I did not need to employ manual 
modes or  when I was too busy to fly the spacecraft, since this is why we have an auto- 
pilot. Admittedly, we have taken a system that was designed to be completely auto- 
matic and then tried to build some versatility into it and give the pilot the capability of 
controlling the vehicle as he desires. I had become satisfied with my capability of 
controlling the spacecraft before I got to the Canaries, a fact which I reported to the 
ground. From that time on, I merely wanted to make observations that seemed to 
have merit  and to use the control system only during those periods when I had to rees- 
tablish the attitude within the limits required to drop back into the automatic mode. 
I w a s  discouraged by the tremendous quantity of cloud coverage around the earth 
and realized that it may always be a problem for certain space flight requirements. 
Africa, on the first and second passes, was ceiling and visibility unlimited (CAVU). 
The southwestern United States was also CAVU after I crossed over the ridge along the 
Baja California peninsula. I had a very good view, and I could easily determine yaw 
attitude by reference to the ground. 
When I reestablish orbital attitude as I came over Muchea on the third pass, I 
was very pleased when I talked to the Muchea Cap Com, and he and I agreed on yaw 
attitude exactly except for a possible 4" e r r o r  in left yaw, which was also indicated 
by my instruments. The telemetered scanner readings were coincident with the space- 
craft attitudes, and I had just acquired these attitudes shortly prior to Muchea by using 
the moon and the planet Venus adjacent to it for visual references. They actually 
showed up over the Indian Ocean Ship and were very easy to work with. They both 
lined up to give me a roll, pitch, and yaw reference. 
A smog-appearing layer w a s  evident during the fourth pass  while I was in 
drifting flight on the night side, almost at 32" South latitude. I would say that this 
layer represented about a quarter of the field of view out of the window, and this su r -  
prised me. I thought I was looking at clouds all the time until I saw stars down at the 
bottom or  underneath the glowing layer. 
100 
Seeing the stars below the glowing layer was  probably the biggest surpr ise  I had 
during the flight. 
of light, which appeared to be thicker than that reported by Scott Carpenter. 
I expect that future flights may help to clarify the nature of this band 
It was  a real  t rea t  to pass over each station and realize that they were as excited 
as I w a s  and as envious as anyone could ever be. 
reported, and I also saw what Scott Carpenter reported as having seen. I believe that 
both phenomena are varied in appearance because of lighting conditions at sunrise and 
during bright daylight. 
I saw the particles that John Glenn 
Retrosequence 
I checked the high thrusters in fly-by-wire prior to retrosequence, and on the 
first demand for each high thruster in all three axes, they worked and reacted beauti- 
fully. 
becoming cool. 
a perfect count. Sequence and attitude lights actuated on time. I was sitting there 
ready to punch the retrosequence button. 
put it back on again. 
firing the first rocket seemed agonizingly long. 
ical of the flight, at least  subsequent to insertion; and you know that these rockets have 
to work. Again, I was  poised to punch off the retrofire button to back up the automatic 
system. I had its safety cover off, and I guess I put it back on again sometime later. 
The rocket ignition was crisp,  clean, and each one actuated with a definite sound. 
There was no doubt as to when each rocket was firing. The spacecraft did not seem to 
vary as much as half a degree in attitude during the period of retrofire. I was  also 
cross-checking out the window and had plenty of visual cues in case things did go wrong 
with the automatic mode. Because of these 
cross-checks, I w a s  aware that the ASCS was  working well throughout this period and 
did not require any manual control inputs. 
It was a tremendous feeling to know that I had no problem with the high thrusters  
At the nominal retrosequence, the Pacific Ocean Ship Cap Com gave 
I did have the safety cover off the button and 
At the time of retrofire,  the delay by a fraction of a second in 
This time is probably the most cr i t -  
I could see  stars that did not even quiver. 
Subsequent to the retrofire maneuver, I controlled the spacecraft with fly-by- 
wire. 
jettisoned. 
fact that the retrorockets did ignite and did not have the cool head that I should have 
had. 
probably the same amount yaw and pitch. The flying was not really of poor quality, 
but it was not up to my usual standards. I then brought Sigma 7 up to reentry attitude 
on fly-by-wire and intentionally actuated some of the high thrusters  to see  what it felt 
like. 
mode and use a large quantity of fuel needlessly. I have always believed, with regard 
to full consumption, that the rate stabilization control system (RSCS) was the most 
expensive mode of the spacecraft. I came into retrosequence with 80 percent of fuel 
in each tank, which was higher than my mark, and I was  quite pleased that I had that 
much. After retrofire,  the automatic fuel w a s  somewhere around 52 o r  53 percent. 
I easily got into reentry attitude and felt very comfortable with it. 
retracted on time. 
tightened it up and then went into ACSC orbit mode. I wanted to see  i f  the logic had 
I had the retrojettison switch armed in time, and the retropackage subsequently 
I guess I was probably excited about the Control seemed somewhat loose. 
Therefore, I allowed the attitudes to drift off by perhaps 10" or 15" in roll  and 
They reacted very well. At this time, I did not want to stay in the rate command 
The periscope 
I noticed that my control of the spacecraft was still loose, so I 
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picked up for reentry, and it dropped right in and held beautifully. Then, I set up rate  
command to give it a small  check. It responded very well, and I was satisfied that 
the system was working. 
Reentry 
The beginning of the actual entry into the sensible atmosphere, with the attendant 
cues, was a very thrilling experience. Because my vision was somewhat obscured by 
perspiration on the inside surface of the visor, the cue fo r  occurrence of the important 
event, O.O5g, was my visual sensing of the roll  rate that was automatically induced by 
the control system rather than by the 0.05g event light on the panel. The spacecraft 
with a roll  ra te  is something you just cannot effectively visualize in your mind. It is 
a very nice series of slow rolls, and you really feel as if you are back in the old 
fighter seat, just playing games. 
which was starting to brighten up, I observed that the roll  pattern was  very slow and 
deliberate. You could integrate your attitude out of this very easily, and I knew that 
the spacecraft was as stable as an airplane. 
Looking out at the sky and at the surface of the earth 
The accelerations during reentry were not severe in the sense of bothering me, 
but it seemed to take much longer than I had anticipated. This was predictable, but it 
is just one of those things that you cannot seem to approximate in real  time, even on 
the centrifuge which I had trained in just before the flight. It is difficult to s tore  all 
these cues and inputs into your mind and just pull them out quickly. Physiologically, 
I never felt any strain as far as the reentry went. 
closely as I could have wished. 
Each event came into place as 
As the acceleration buildup began, I could see  external cues which were of great 
interest. I missed the hissing that John Glenn and Scott Carpenter described, possibly 
because I was concentrating so much on how the RSCS system was performing, I was 
prepared at any time to throw it into the auxiliary damping mode. As expected, an 
enormous amount of fuel was consumed during reentry before the drogue parachute 
was deployed. After drogue parachute deployment, of course, the fuel was jettisoned 
normally. But before the drogue parachute was deployed, that system must have been 
down to approximately the 20-percent level. This level corresponds to a total fuel 
consumption from the manual tank during reentry of some 60 percent, o r  approximately 
14 pounds. 
There were two occasions when I nearly switched from RSCS to the auxiliary 
dampingmode. One was while I was monitoring the fuel gage; it looked just like a 
flowmeter. The indicator for the manual tank w a s  visibly dropping. Yet, I continued 
with RSCS because I wanted to give it every chance to complete the reentry control 
task in order to evaluate it sufficiently. The second time that I thought about going to 
the auxiliary damping mode was when the yaw rate  left the nominal 2.5 to 3 degrees 
per  second and went off -scale (6 deg/sec) to the left. Soon after this occurrence, it 
held to about 5 degrees per  second and then did the typical needle fanning that we have 
seen in the reentry training at Langley. Since it had started to hold again, I did not 
switch to auxiliary damping because I still wanted to allow the RSCS a full demonstra- 
tion. 
good to know I had this powerful system ready to be switched on if needed. 
However, I was perfectly content that the ASCS was working properly and it was 
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I did see the green glow from the cylindrical section. It was a very pretty color, 
probably best  described as a shade similar to limeade (a little green and chartreuse 
mixed together). This shade included a slightly stronger yellow cast  than I had antic- 
ipated from earlier descriptions. One opinion which was ventured that might explain 
the green-yellow color is the copper treatment on the beryllium shingles. In fact, 
burning copper in a Bunsen burner flame is a good approximation to the effect that I 
saw. I did not see any distinctive color differences resulting from the different abla- 
tion panels that had been bonded to the beryllium shingles. There were no variances 
in  color, such as a chromatic or a rainbow effect. 
The altimeter came off the peg very nicely. I manually deployed the drogue 
parachute at 40 000 feet. There was a definite, strong thrumming accompanied by 
the drogue deployment, somewhat like being on a bumpy road. Although it is of no 
consequence, I was probably about 10 or 15 seconds slow in turning the hydrogen 
peroxide jettison fuse switch on, and this I can only blame on the intrigue and interest 
in looking at the drogue parachute up there straining and pulsating. The window defi- 
nitely was  further occluded during reentry. 
I armed the recovery a r m  switch at about 15 000 feet. 
It so r t  of puts the cap on the whole thing. 
The main parachute 
I prepared for landing 
opened at about 10 500 feet, and it was just as pretty as astronauts of previous flights 
had described it. 
but did not hook up the survival raft to the suit. 
Landing and Recovery 
On landing, Sigma 7 seemed to sink way down in the water. It also seemed as if 
I were horizontal for a while. 
in the main-parachute disconnect fuse. 
the manual position. The spacecraft seemed to take a long time to right itself, but 
again time is merely relative, and in actuality, the spacecraft righted itself in less 
than 1 minute. When Sigma 7 had finally started to right itself, it was  a very, very 
pleasant feeling, and at this point I knew I could stay in there forever,  if necessary. 
The suit temperature w a s  75" F o r  76" F, and the highest point reached prior to egress  
was  78" F. 
I allowed the main parachute to be jettisoned by punching 
Then, I actuated the recovery aids switch to 
I had very good communications with the Cap Com at Hawaii. 
carr ier ,  which was probably the nearest  thing other than the recovery helicopter, w a s  
really "down in the mud'' as far as communications a r e  concerned. 
from the car r ie r  were very weak, but legible, as evidenced by the fact that my request 
for permission to come aboard was immediately granted. 
The recovery 
Communications 
Sigma 7 deserves some nonengineering closing remarks. Aviators are known 
to acquire an affection for their a i rcraf t  when it performs well, and now, in the space 
age, an astronaut should convey his personal thoughts about his spacecraft. I defi- 
nitely fell in love with Sigma 7, and it is the first vehicle in my history of flight, that 
finally replaced the F8F, a Navy propeller-type fighter, as the one on the top of the 
list. 
to make the MA-8 experience the high point in my life. 
This spacecraft, the crew that prepared her,  and the flight itself, truly combine 
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LAUNCH-VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
All launch-vehicle systems performed satisfactorily. The following i tems are 
noted for  information. 
Airframe 
The structural  integrity of the a i r f rame was maintained throughout powered flight, 
and maximum activity in a i r f rame measurements occurred in the vicinity of a Mach 
number of 1 a t  maximum dynamic pressure as was expected and noted in previous 
Mercury- Atlas missions. Discrepancies previously attributed to a detected faulty 
fuel-tank seam weld, which was accepted pr ior  to flight, were noted in the flight data. 
Pneumatics 
The unfiltered bulkhead differential pressure reached a value of 4.8 psi  1.5 sec-  
onds after lift-off, while the filtered bulkhead differential pressure was 8.9 psi. The 
oscillations were 5 cps with an amplitude of 7. 4 ps i  for  the unfiltered pressure and 
3 .0  psi  for  the filtered pressure.  
out 25 seconds after lift-off. The MA-8 mission was the f i r s t  Mercury mission with- 
out a launch hold-down, and there was a question concerning the possibility of lift-off 
transients under this condition. 
reach the abort threshold, which had a lower limit of 2. 5 psi. 
The oscillations in both measurements were damped 
However, the bulkhead differential pressure did not 
Abort Sensing and Implementation System 
Operation of the ASIS proved to be satisfactory throughout powered flight. The 
ASIS went to the ready state a t  T - 0.8  second when fuel pressures  of the engines came 
up to flight level. 
normal. No system parameters  reached the abort  level, and no abort command was 
generated. 
abort condition as a normal par t  of the orbital-insertion procedure. 
Telemetry records indicated that pressure-  switch operation was 
After SECO, when engine fuel pressure decayed, the system indicated an 
Propellant Tanking and Utilization 
Propellant utilization (PU) matched set 393 was installed in the MA-8 launch 
vehicle. Data indicated that the P U  valve responded to and followed the e r ro r -  
demodulation output command signal. Approximately 215 seconds after lift-off, the 
P U  valve reached the closed limit and remained there until SECO. The lox port  un- 
covered at  7.8 seconds pr ior  to SECO, and the fuel port  uncovered a t  10.4 seconds 
prior to SECO. The calculated residuals at SECO were 520 pounds of lox and 
115 pounds of fuel. 
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Fuel tanking to the 100-percent probe was  accomplished on X - 1 day. During 
the countdown, 112 gallons were off-loaded according to the operation plan. The tank- 
ing of lox was accomplished without incident. 
weight according to the Gilmore weighing system was 151 900 pounds. Predicted ver-  
sus  actual weights were the following: 
Pr ior  to lox tanking, overall vehicle 
95 percent 
Low level 
High level 
Overfill 
Predicted fuel, 
lb  
317 400 
324 700 
325 250 
327 200 
Actual fuel, 
lb  
317 050 
324 600 
325 300 
327 100 
The 
327 
was 
securing weight of 324 600 pounds was derived by subtracting 2500 pounds from 
100 pounds. 
324 650 pounds. 
The weight read-out a t  T - 2 minutes 10 seconds (lox tank securing) 
Flight- Control and Guidance Systems 
A clockwise roll transient occurred immediately after lift-off. The data indi- 
cated a maximum displacement of 2.52" and a peak rate of 7 . 8 3  deg/sec. 
tive rate of the roll-control rate gyro, as monitored by the ASIS, was 4. 53 deg/sec, 
which was below the abort level of 6 . 4  deg/sec for  the roll-control rate gyro. As- 
suming an identical roll-control rate gyro indication, since the signal was not moni- 
tored by telemetry, the effective rate of the gyro as seen by the ASIS w a s  approximately 
7 . 7 2  deg/sec, which was below the abort threshold of 9 . 4  deg/sec. 
resulted from the dissimilar attenuation characteristics of the channel f i l ters involved 
at  the 1.32-cps  frequency of the roll transient. 
caused by booster-engine misalinement and gas- generator exhaust thrust, which were 
in a direction to cause clockwise roll. The booster-engine differential in yaw, as 
measured 9 days pr ior  to launch, was 0. 23" in the direction which caused clockwise 
roll. Telemetered engine-position data indicated this differential to be 0. 14" in the 
same sense. 
The effec- 
The difference 
The high roll transient was probably 
The launch- vehicle radio- guidance system performed well and guided the Atlas 
sustainer stage to  cutoff conditions which were within acceptable limits; however, the 
radar  data were quite noisy near SECO. The e r r o r s  at insertion were 15 ft/sec high 
in velocity, 49 feet high in altitude, and 0.0084" low in flight-path angle. 
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The guidance configuration was the same as that for  the MA-7 mission except 
that the duration of the second-stage pitch program was reduced by 2.5 seconds (5" 
less pitch-down maneuver). The purpose of the change was to  reduce the steering 
transients after guidance initiation. Also, for  a near nominal trajectory without launch 
guidance steering, the change would permit acceptable orbital- insertion conditions. 
A somewhat lofted trajectory was flown pr ior  to staging, and this maneuver re- 
sulted in a 2-second-early discrete signal at BECO; consequently SECO was about 
10 seconds later than nominal. The radar  elevation angle at SECO was 7 . 2 " ,  compared 
with a nominal angle of 7.4", as a result of an increase of 17 nautical miles in the 
down-range distance at SECO. 
The guidance system acquired the tracking beacon of the launch vehicle in the 
first radar cube, and lock was continuous from 00:01:04.3 to 00:05:35. 7 g. e. t. (20 sec- 
onds after SECO). The rate lock was continuous in all functions from 00:00:56. 5 to 
00:05:31.8 g. e. t. (16.9 seconds after SECO). Cyclic lateral-rate noise became ap- 
parent a t  00:04:54 g. e. t. (22 seconds pr ior  to SECO) and continued to 16.9 seconds 
after SECO, when it reached maximum amplitude. 
Guidance steering started at 00:02:30. 8 g. e. t. with a 40-percent positive pitch 
rate and a 15-percent positive yaw rate. The commanded steering rates were smooth, 
and almost zero until 22 seconds before SECO. The commanded pitch rates appeared 
to respond to the radar  lateral  rate noise with a rate fluctuation of about ,t35 percent 
a t  16 seconds pr ior  to SECO. The noise level was about twice that experienced during 
the MA- 4 and MA- 5 launches and about five t imes that experienced during the MA- 6 
and MA- 7 missions. Despite the large noise level, acceptable insertion conditions 
were achieved. Yaw steering performed with a low noise level and guided the launch 
vehicle to the proper heading, and the actual orbital inclination was 0.03" higher than 
nominal. The roll transient at lift-off had little effect on the launch trajectory. 
Figures 46 to 48 show the velocity and flight-path angle in the region of SECO. 
The launch-vehicle guidance data a r e  shown in figure 46, and the range-safety impact- 
predictor (IP) 7090 computer data a r e  shown in figure 47 to illustrate the noise level 
during the time of the go-no-go computations. 
considered noisy, the average agreed with actual flight conditions. Maximum peak- 
to-peak deviations in the launch-vehicle guidance data after SECO were of the magni- 
tude experienced on the MA- 4 mission and about twice that of the MA- 5, MA- 6, and 
MA-7 missions. The IP 7090 computer noise level was about 1 . 2 5  times the magni- 
tude experienced on MA-4 and about two to three t imes greater than the noise level on 
the MA-5, MA-6, and MA-" missions. 
Although both sources of data were 
Figure 48 shows the variation of flight-path angle with velocity ratio and is the 
type of display used by the flight-dynamics officer in the Mercury Control Center for  
the orbital go-no-go decision. Both the launch-vehicle guidance and the IP 7090 data 
indicated a go condition. 
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TRAJECTORY AND MISSION EVENTS 
Sequence of Flight Events 
The times at which the major events of the MA-8 mission occurred are given in 
table nII. In the table, the parameters  shown for  the planned launch trajectory were 
computed using the 1959 Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) model at- 
mosphere to maintain consistency with other published preflight trajectory documents. 
The density of the atmosphere at Cape Canaveral was approximately 10 percent higher 
than that of the ARDC model atmosphere in the region of maximum dynamic pressure,  
which occurred at an altitude of approximately 37 000 feet. As a result, the maximum 
dynamic pressure expected was 10 percent higher than that shown as planned. 
Flight Trajectory 
The trajectory for the MA-8 mission is discussed in the performance phases 
The 
of launch, orbit, and reentry. The altitude-longitude profile is presented in figure 49. 
Table XXIII is a comparison of the planned and actual trajectory parameters.  
differences between the planned and actual flight trajectory parameters  resulted from 
a higher actual cutoff velocity and a slightly lower actual flight-path angle a t  orbital 
insertion. 
Launch trajectory data. - The launch trajectory data (fig. 50) a r e  based on the 
real-time output of the range safety IP 7090 computer, which used Azusa MK I1 and 
Cape Canaveral FPS- 16 radar, and the General Electric- Burroughs launch-vehicle 
guidance computer. The data from these tracking facilities were used during the fol- 
lowing time periods: 
- 
Facility 
Cape Canaveral FPS- 16 
Azusa MK I1 
General Electric- Burroughs 
Time, min:sec 
0 to 00:42 
00:42 to 01:04 
01:04 to 05:16 
Orbital phase. - The orbital phase of the trajectory (fig. 51) was derived by 
starting with the spacecraft position and velocity vector obtained during the first or- 
bital pass  over Muchea, as dete-rmined by the Goddard computer using Mercury 
Worldwide Network tracking data. The calculated orbital trajectory was the result of 
integrating backward along the flight trajectory to orbital insertion and forward to the 
s ta r t  of retrorocket ignition in the sixth orbital pass.  
good agreement with the values measured by the launch-vehicle guidance system at 
orbital insertion. 
The integrated values were in 
The values were also in good agreement with the position and 
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velocity vectors determined by the Goddard computer fo r  passes  near Eglin Air Force 
Base, Florida (end of the first pass), and Point Arguello, California (end of the third 
pass). Thus, the validity of the integrated orbital portion of the flight trajectory was 
established. 
Reentry phase. - The reentry phase of the trajectory (fig. 52) was derived by 
starting with the spacecraft position and velocity vector obtained at the end of the third 
orbital pass  near Point Arguello, California, as determined by the Goddard computer. 
Integrating forward along the flight path to retrorocket ignition and, after introducing 
nominal retrofire conditions, continuing the integration through spacecraft landing 
yielded the reentry trajectory. 
total impulse of 38 975 lb/sec at  spacecraft attitudes of -34" in pitch and 0" in roll and 
yaw. 
using data obtained from the Mercury Worldwide Network command stations. 
times of drogue- and main-parachute deployment from the integrated reentry trajectory 
and f rom the spacecraft onboard measurements were in good agreement. 
Nominal retrofire conditions included a retrorocket 
The actual spacecraft weight at retrofire was estimated to be 2994 pounds by 
The 
In addition, the landing point from the integrated reentry trajectory agreed with- 
in 1 mile of the retrieval point reported by the recovery ship. The agreement con- 
firmed the validity of the integrated reentry phase of the trajectory. 
The aerodynamic parameters  f o r  the planned and integrated reentry trajectories 
were computed using the MSC model atmosphere. This atmosphere was based on the 
Discoverer satellite data for  altitudes above 50 nautical miles and the Patrick Air 
Force Base, Florida, atmosphere at altitudes below 25 nautical miles. In the trajec- 
tory figures, the values integrated by this method a r e  labeled actual. 
MERCURY WORLDWIDE NETWORK PERFORMANCE 
General 
The Mercury Worldwide Network for MA-8 consisted of the Mercury Control 
Center at  Cape Canaveral; stations at the AMR, Bermuda, and 14 other locations along 
the orbital ground track; and a computing and communications center a t  the NASA 
Goddard Space Flight Center. 
the Watertown, and the C-band radar-equipped ship American Mariner were positioned 
up range from the pr ime landing areas  for  the fifth and sixth orbital passes. Relay 
aircraft  with uhf to hf/single-sideband capability were available in the prime recovery 
a reas  off Puerto Rico and Midway Island. Additional aircraft  were positioned in the 
pr ime recovery a reas  for  telemetry coverage during reentry. Note that ground- to- 
ground voice communications were provided to each station, including the ships 
Huntsville and Watertown. Also, special data circuits were required for routing in- 
formation from the ships. 
Two S-band radar-equipped ships, the Huntsville and 
The overall performance of the Mercury Worldwide Network was good. Some 
network anomalies were experienced, but these did not affect the monitoring or con- 
t rol  of the mission. 
cations problems, both in voice and teletype, throughout the mission. In particular, 
voice and teletype communications to the ships, Australia, and the African stations 
For the MA-8 mission, there were some intermittent communi- 
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were not as good as those fo r  the MA-6 and MA-7 missions. 
communications received on the Goddard Conference Loop during the mission varied 
between poor and good. However, communications were adequate to maintain proper 
ground surveillance of the mission. The Canary Islands VERLORT radar  was tempo- 
rar i ly  inoperative prior to lift-off, and the countdown was delayed 15 minutes for  re- 
pairs .  . Communications to both the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean ships were 
marginal a t  times; however, adequate communications with these stations were avail- 
able when required. 
Islands for  reentry command coverage, and two S-band and one C-band radar-equipped 
ships were positioned west of Midway Island for  coverage during reentry. 
The quality of A/G voice 
The Pacific Command ship was located east of the Philippine 
Overall, telemetry coverage was excellent. Radar coverage was excellent from 
the land stations with the spacecraft beacons on and unusable with the beacons off; 
radar  data from the ships were unusable by the Goddard computers; command coverage 
was available, but not required fo r  spacecraft control; communications between. the 
stations and Mercury Control Center were good in most instances; spacecraft-to- 
ground communications were good. The response of the network to the needs of the 
MA-8 mission was comparable to the support given the MA-6 and the MA-7 missions. 
Trajectory 
The computer program used at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center for  the 
MA-8 mission was checked out and verified more than a month pr ior  to launch. 
program included a paper- tape input feature to compute retrosequence information for  
landing at  any desired longitude along any orbital ground track. 
The 
Confidence checks during the countdown indicated that the launch monitor system 
was in a go condition. 
cation problem on the Bermuda low-speed data, but the problem was quickly resolved. 
Earl ier  checks were successful; therefore, the malfunction (a sticky relay) apparently 
occurred after those checks. 
time for the flight director to approve resumption of the launch countdown a t  T - 135 min- 
utes. 
The trajectory check a t  T - 145 minutes revealed a communi- 
The high-speed portion of the test was completed in 
Tracking. - A failure in the Canary Islands radar  caused a hold at  T - 45 min- 
utes. The hold lasted 15 minutes and was sufficient to make the radar  system opera- 
tional. After the countdown was resumed, a short  burst of data was transmitted to 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center to verify continuity of the system. At lift-off, the 
selected tracking source was the Cape Canaveral FPS-16 radar  as planned. The 
source selection history is shown in the table on the following page. 
Fo r  the first 42 seconds of flight, the IP 7090 computer selected the Azusa sys- 
tem several  times, but the quality of Azusa data was not satisfactory until 42.2 sec- 
onds. General Electric- Burroughs radar  acquisition, reported by the guidance test  
conductor, occurred as planned in the f i r s t  cube. The General Electric- Burroughs 
source was used for  the remainder of powered flight and was excellent until the last 
10 seconds. At that time, the data became noisy at a level which was comparable to 
the level experienced on the MA-4 mission. However, the data gave a clear go indi- 
cation, and the condition was confirmed by Bermuda. 
in table XXIV. 
The cutoff conditions are shown 
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Facility 
Cape Canaveral FPS- 16 
Azusa MK I1 
Cape Canaveral FPS- 16 
Azusa MK I1 
Cape Canaveral FPS- 16 
Azusa MK I1 
General E le ct ric- Burroughs 
Time from lift-off, s ec  
0 to 12. 6 
12.6 to 15 
15 to 16. 2 
16.2 to 21 
21 to 42. 2 
42. 2 to 69.4 
69.4 to end of powered flight 
The programed autopilot phase of powered flight showed minor deviations in 
pitch and flight direction. At BECO, the flight-path angle was 1. 5" high, which re- 
sulted in an early BECO command at  00:02:07. 6 g. e. t. A deviation was also noticed 
in the flight azimuth, since the position and landing-point track were slightly north of 
the nominal path. When ground steering was initiated after tower jettison, both of the 
deviations were corrected. 
Low-speed tracking data from all the ground-based remote stations were excel- 
lent, and the orbit was well established after the correction was made which used the 
Canary Islands data. During the periods when the beacons were turned off, attempts 
at skin tracking by various stations were unsuccessful, as was expected. Table X X V  
is a summary of MA-8 tracking-system operation. 
Three ships were used in the Pacific area to  provide reentry tracking for  the 
fifth and sixth orbital passes.  None of the data were usable. The data were garbled 
to such an extent that it was not possible to determine reliably where the e r r o r s  were 
introduced. Further analysis of the shipboard tape recording was required to deter- 
mine accurately the performance of the ship tracking system. Backup teletype com- 
munications were planned through Midway, but they were unsuccessful and no 
explanation was found for  the failure. 
Computation. - The nominal retrograde firing time for  the six-pass mission 
(necessary to land the spacecraft in planned recovery area 6-1 a t  longitude 174"33' W) 
was 08:50:51 g. e. t . ,  which corresponded to a retrosequence time of 08:50:21 g. e. t. 
After effects of the overspeed insertion conditions and weight losses were considered, 
the calculated retrosequence t imes for  the pr imary sixth-pass recovery area (area 6- 1) 
varied from 08:51:21 to 08:51:28 g. e. t. As instructed, the pilot increased the 
spacecraft-elapsed-time clock setting by 1 minute over Cape Canaveral on the third 
orbital pass. 
On the fifth pass,  Hawaii was instructed to relay a calculated retrosequence time 
for area 6- 1 of 08:51:28 g. e. t. , obtained from the latest  orbital ephemeris and final 
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estimated weight changes. However, the time did not include the extrapolated +5-second 
spacecraft-elapsed- time clock difference, compared to ground elapsed time. The 
California station reported that the latest  retrosequence time calculation did not include 
this correction, and the California Cap Com instructed the pilot to increase his clock 
setting by 5 seconds if he concurred. 
fornia station and confirmed by the Guaymas station, a t  which time the final spacecraft 
clock setting of 08:51:33 g. e. t. was observed. During the mission, all clock changes 
were made with no apparent difficulty. 
The clock change was initiated over the Cali- 
Following retrograde, two computations, using the observed retrofire times and 
spacecraft attitudes, indicated a nominal landing point within 4 miles of the center of 
the primary landing area. During reentry, the reported blackout time served to con- 
f i rm the predicted landing point, as did all mission events after that. A report of a 
visual sighting of the spacecraft before landing from the recovery ship provided final 
confirmation of the computed predictions (table XXVI). 
Command system. - The command system for  the MA-8 mission operated in a 
There were no malfunctions during the mission, and only one satisfactory manner. 
recorded decoder event occurred that was unplanned. An operator e r r o r  caused a 
delayed indication from Bermuda to Cape Canaveral on the f i r s t  pass, but it had no 
effect on the mission. Table XXVII is a summary of command handover exercises. 
Table XXVIII is a summary of command transmissions. 
Ground system: A preliminary evaluation of the data showed that all command 
stations appeared to have slightly less  command coverage than was noted on previous 
missions. The 10- kilowatt command stations using the quadhelix antenna averaged 
45 percent better coverage above the 7.5-microvolt level than those of the 600-watt 
command stations. Coverage became reliable at slant ranges varying from 250 to 
650 nautical miles. The large variance was believed to be caused by,the change in 
spacecraft antenna-pattern aspect angle while the spacecraft was in attitude-f ree 
drifting flight. 
Five messages were transmitted to the command stations during the mission to 
change the command handover exercise. The changes compensated for  the insertion- 
overspeed trajectory, which altered the best function times slightly more than 1 min- 
ute by the time of the last pass  over the Pacific Command ship. 
A total of 11 functions were transmitted from the command stations. All  of the 
functions were received successfully, although the telemetry R- and Z -  calibrations 
from Guaymas on the fourth pass  were received intermittently because of low signal 
strengths. 
Spacecraft system: The MA-8 spacecraft 16 had a single command receiver on 
board, as planned. The threshold value was between 2. 5 and 3.0 microvolts, and the 
saturation value was between 35 and 45 microvolts. The system appeared to operate 
normally with the exception of one unexplained command function recorded at 
09:08:21 g. e. t. The command function, which appeared as a single indication of de- 
coder operation and was unidentified, did not affect the mission. The time at which 
the function was recorded was the time of antenna-fairing release and main-parachute 
deployment, and was coincident with a recorded signal strength of approximately 
3 microvolts. 
111 
.. . . . .~ 
Radar system. - Both C- and S-band radar beacons operated satisfactorily 
throughout the mission. Some beacon countdown (absence of beacon response to inter- 
rogation) was noted, but no stations lost t rack because of the effect. Some amplitude 
modulation of the beacon reply was also noted, which was rather  severe in two in- 
stances and was probably caused by the wobbulator. 
The tracking of all Cape Canaveral FPS-16 radars was good, although some 
radio-frequency (13) interference was noted by the Hawaii and California stations. 
tracking of the S- band radars  was a l so  good, although there was some interference as 
a result of phasing problems. 
erages, respectively. 
pass  because the beacons were turned off. All stations attempted to skin- track the 
spacecraft, but the attempts were unsuccessful. 
The 
Figures 53 and 54 show the C- and S-band radar  cov- 
No radar  tracking data were obtained during the fourth orbital 
Telemetry and voice systems. - The telemetry coverage was excellent (fig. 55). 
Significant difficulties in telemetry reception included the operation below specification 
of the hf receivers at Woomera, Australia; a prime-receiver power failure at the 
California station during the fifth pass,  with the low-frequency signal successfully re- 
moted to the California station from St. Nicholas Island; and a serious decommutator 
problem at  Guaymas. 
The uhf A/G communications were good, although slightly inferior to s imilar  
communications fo r  the MA-6 and MA-? missions. 
launch until the spacecraft changed from VOX to push-to-talk were errat ic ;  VOX was 
affected by launch-vehicle background noise. 
MA-8 A/G voice communications, refer to reference 4. 
The uhf A/G communications from 
For  a complete transcription of the 
ginall 
AMR 
The uhf-to-hf relay through the AMR and Pacific Missile Range (PMR) was mar-  
.y effective. Only one transmission was received from the spacecraft through the 
aircraft .  The PMR aircraft  made a brief attempt during the fifth orbital pass  to 
relay communications, but a two-way automatic relay was never established. 
problem appeared to  be one of aircraft  reception of the spacecraft transmission. If 
the antenna gain of the aircraft  (whose antenna gain was zero) was improved, the prob- 
lem might have been eliminated. Also, on the AMR aircraft ,  equipment was shared 
f o r  both aircraft  and relay communications. 
during a segment of reentry. 
The 
The PMR relay worked satisfactorily 
The hf A/G communications coverage was not very extensive, although more hf 
was used on this mission than was used on the MA-? mission. Some stations did not 
receive any hf on the hf test; other stations received signals far beyond their normal 
range. The problems experienced during hf transmission included atmospheric prop- 
agation; rf interference, which was more of a problem than had been anticipated; 
inadvertent shifting of the antenna- selector switch position; spacecraft attitude in re- 
lation to the ground station during transmissions; and the nonoptimum selection of 
transmission frequency. 
Few equipment failures were noted. The greatest difficulty encountered in com- 
munication was related to adverse atmospheric propagation and rf interference, 
most critical equipment failures were the losses of power on board the Watertown 
tracking ship and a t  the California station. Another malfunction which underwent 
The 
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a comprehensive investigation was the distortion of spacecraft transmission caused 
by the Cape Canaveral voice transfer circuit on Bermuda. Table XXM presents the 
A/G signal strength measurements, and figure 56 shows the hf and uhf voice- 
communications coverage. 
113 
TABLE VI. - REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTOMATIC MODE SWITCHING 
automatic switching from - . _ _ _  ~ Model A-11 
<*5.5 
>*15 
_ .  - 
Attitude, deg 
Model A-9 Model A-11 
Pulse 
1 *3.0 *5.5 
2 *4.25 +7.0 
3 *5. 5 k8.5 
4 rt7.75 *lo. 0 
5 -+8. 5 4 1 . 5  
Pulse duration, sec  
Model A-9 Model A-11 
_ .  - 
0.20 
. 1 5  .075 
.25  .25  
. 4 4  .44 
.75  .75  
- _ -  
Orientation mode to orbit mode [ <*3.0 ~ 
- 
Orbit mode to pitch orientation mode 
__ _ _  
aAlso dictated retroattitude -permission limits. 
bFrom -34". 
TABLE VII. - ORBIT-MODE OPERATION 
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TABLE VIII. - REACTION-CONTROL-SYSTEM FUEL CONSUMPTION 
E laps e d 
time, 
hr  :min 
00 :oo 
00 :05 
01 :37 
03: l l  
04 :44 
06:20 
07:55 
08:51 
09 :02 
09 :07 
09 :08 
Mission phase 
Launch 
Turnaround and damping 
First pass 
Second pass 
Third pass 
Fourth pass 
Fifth pass 
Fifth pass to retrofire 
Retrofire to 0 . 0 5 g  
0.05g to drogue-parachute 
deployment 
Drogue -parachute deploy - 
ment to main-parachute 
deploymenta 
Automatic supply 
Fuel 
used, 
lb 
0 
. 3  
. 8  
1. 8 
2.5 
0 
3. 6 
1.1 
4.2 
.1 
0 
Fuel 
remaining : 
lb 
34.2 
33.9 
33.1 
31. 3 
28. 8 
28.8 
25.2 
24.1 
19.9 
19.8 
19.8 
Manual supply 
Fuel 
used, 
lb 
0 
0 
.6 
. 9  
0 
0 
0 
3.8 
.5 
9.3 
9.6 
Fuel 
remaining 
lb 
24. 7 
24. 7 
24.1 
23.2 
23.2 
23.2 
23. 2 
19.4 
18.9 
9. 6 
0 
aDepletion occurred during this period. 
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TABLE E. - LOW-RESIDUE DIET 
Meal 
Breakfast 
LUnCh 
~~ 
Dinner 
-~ ~~~ 
Sept. 30, 1962 
9:00 a.m. 
Grapefruit juice 
Cream of r ice  
Scrambled eggs 
Canadian bacon 
Toast and butter 
Jelly 
Coffee 
~~ 
4:OO p. m. 
Shrimp cocktail 
Cracke r s  
Baked chicken 
Rice and peas 
Hard ro l l s  and butter 
Sherbet and cookies 
Coffee and tea 
Oct. 1, 1962 
6:15 a.m. 
Orange juice 
Baked egg and bacon 
Toast and butter 
Jelly 
Coffee 
12:OO noon 
Tomato juice 
Noodles and veal 
Cottage cheese 
Melba toast 
Butter 
Pound cake and apricots  
Coffee and tea 
5 : O O  p. m. 
Consomme and crackers  
Steak 
Potato and green peas 
Hard rolls and butter 
Jello 
Coffee and tea  
Oct. 2 ,  1962 
5:30 a. m. 
Orange -grapefruit juice 
Cream of rice 
Soft-cooked egg 
Canadian bacon 
Toast and butter 
Jelly 
Coffee 
11:30 a.m.  
Chicken-noodle soup 
Meat loaf on toast 
P e a s  
Sherbet 
Coffee and tea 
5:30 p. m. 
Pineapple juice 
Roast beef 
Baked potato 
Wax beans 
Angel food cake 
Peaches 
Coffee and tea 
Oct. 3, 1962 
~- 
2:lO a.m. 
Orange juice 
Scrambled eggs 
Steak and fish 
Toast and butter 
Jelly 
Coffee 
TABLE X. - AEROMEDICAL COUNTDOWN 
Duration, min 
Planned Actual 
Pad count, Aeromedical count, Actual time, 
T -t ime, min A - time, min a.m. e.s.t. Activity 
I Awaken T - 220 A - 180 
Breakfast T - 190 A - 150 
Physical examination T - 170 A - 130 
Psychomotor studies T - 154 A - 114 
Partial dressing 
Sensor placement 
Suiting 
Suit and sensor checkout 
Suit accessories 
Hangar S to transfer van 
Transfer van to pad 
Ascend gantry 
Insertion 
Launch 
I T - 140 A - 100 
I 
A - 9 5  
A - 80 
A - 60 I 
A - 4 5  
I 
T - 140 
T - 0  
A - 40 
A - 30 
A - 10 
A - 0  
1:40 30 
2:lO 20 
2:46 16 
2:56 14 
3:lO 
3:lO 
3:26 
3 :49 
4:Ol 
4:02 
4:07 
4:37 
I 
4:41 
7:15 
5 
15 
20 
15 
5 
10 
20 
10 
140 
30 
30 
9 
14 
16 
23 
12 
2 
5 
21 
4 
4 
TABLE XI. - PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS CONDUCTED FOR MA-8 OPERATIONS 
Date, 1962 
Sept. 10 
Sept. 13 
Sept. 15 
Sept. 18 
Sept. 20 
Sept. 21 
Sept. 28 
Sept. 29 
Oct. 1 
Oct. 3 
Oct. 4 and 5 
Oct. 6 
Oct. 9 
Preflight activities prior to which medical 
examinations were conducted 
Simulated flight, suited and with sensors  
Simulated flight (flight acceptance composite test), suited 
and with sensors 
Procedures trainer,  Mercury Control Center, suited 
X - 15 medical evaluation 
Procedures trainer,  Mercury Control Center, suited 
Controlled diet begun 
Launch simulation, suited with sensors 
Simulated flight, unsuited 
Comprehensive medical evaluation 
Aeromedical countdown, flight, and postrecovery examina - 
tion 
Aeromedical debriefing 
Departure from debriefing site 
Return to Cape 
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TABLE XU. - SUMMARY OF HEART RATE AND RESPIRATION DATA FROM PHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORING 
Heart rate, beats/min 
Number Standard 
of deter- devia- Range Mean 
minations tions, 2u 
Date 
Respiration rate, breaths/min 
Number Standard 
of deter- devia- Range Mean 
minations tions, 2u 
Procedure 
14 to 26 
14 to 26 
14 to 30 
12 to 28 
17 to 23 
Duration 
of obser- 
vation, 
hr  :min 
14 to 24 20 
10 to 28 20 
12 to 28 22 
9 to 26 20 
16 to 26 20 
Oct. 3, 1962 In-flight 
March 1959 
Sept. 22, 1961 
May 4, 1962 
Apr. 17 and 
Aug. 14, 
1962 
Sept. 10, 1962 
Sept. 14, 1962 
Sept. 28, 1962 
Oct. 3, 1962 
9:13 220 50 to 102 56 to  121 76 220 11 to 27 10 to 43 19 
Lovelace Clinic dynamic Variable 
Mercury-Atlas centri- 1:07. 5 
tes ts  
fuge dynamic simula- 
tion 
lated flight 
MA-7 launch-pad simu- 1:09 
Hangar simulated flights 9:47 , 
- -  -- Oct. 3 and 4, Debriefing on board re- Variable 22 52 to 112 56 to 104 82 
1962 covery ship 
Launch-pad simulated . 3:09 
Launch-pad simulated 2:35 
Launch-pad simulated 3:07 
flight 1A 
flight 2A 
launch 
-- -- 
39 ' (a) 
75 
24 
87 
69 
68 
72 
61 
50 to 78 
53 to 91 
52 to 78 
45 to 65 
54 to 82 
49 to 73 
64 to 80 
68 to 160 
48 to 78 
58 to 88 
51 to 76 
43 to 72 
52 to 86 
46 to 74 
58 to 88 
96 ' 
64 
72 
65 
55 
68 
61 
72 - 
-- 
25 
19 
19 
68 
68 
71 
61 
-- -- -- 
9 to 15 7 to 18 12 
aThese data are included for  completeness, but the conditions were very different from the other procedures. 
TABLE Xm. - SUMMARY OF BLOOD-PRESSURE DATA 
Systole 
Number Standard Range, 
of deter-  deviation, mm Hg Mean, 
" Hg minations 2 0  
I 1 Mean Mean 
Pulse 
Diastole 
Mean, pressure ,  Number Standard Range, of deter-  deviation, mm Hg mm Hg mm Hg 
minations 2 u  
blood 
Procedure pressure ,  
Date I 
39 (a) 
27 62 to 88 
13 62 to 9 0  
Mar. 1959 52 to 84 67 
64 to 94 75 
64 to 84 76 
July 25, 1962 
Lovelace Clinic 119/67 
dynamic tes t s  
tes t  
Special BPMS 104/75 
Random clinical 115/76 
determinations 
1960 to 
Oct. 3, 196: 
39 
27  
13 
Sept. 22, 
1961  
I Oct. 3, 1962 
July 25, 1962 
May to 
Oct. 1962 
Oct. 3, 1962 
In-flight 126/69 20  116 to 136  111 to 158 126 16 64 to 74 59 to 75 69 57 
Oct. 3 and 4, 
1962 
Debriefing on 112/78 12 92 to 132 94 to 120 112 12 70 to 86 70 to 84 78 37 
board c a r r i e r  
Mercury -Atlas 
dynamic s imu- 
lation on cen- 
trifuge 
test  
Special BPMS 
Hangar and 
launch-complex 
Prelaunch (hang- 
a r ,  t ransfer  
van, and block- 
house) 
133/96 
108/67 
107/70 
11 
28 
3 1  
111 to 155 115 to 150 
92 to 1221 9 4  to 123 
133 
108 
107 
117 
11 
28 
29 
14 
68 to 124 
(a) 
58 to 82 
66 to 9 4  
'7 
7 1  to  34 , 80 
In-flight BPMS 
52 
29 
39 
4 1  
37 
37 
a These data a r e  included for  completeness but the conditions were very different from the other procedures. 
TABLE XIV. - IN-FLIGHT BODY-TEMPERATURE VALUES 
- 
Ground elapsed time, 
hr :min 
0O:OO to 01:52 
__ - .- 
01:52 to 02:16 
02:16 to 04:05 
04:05 to 05:24 
05:24 to 09:12 
Value, "F 
Off scale 
98. 5 
98.3 to 98. 5 
97.7 
98 
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TABLE XV. - POSTFLIGHT BLOOD-PRESSURE VALUES AND HEART RATES 
Time' 
p. m. 
e. s. t. 
I I I -  
Blood pressure,  Preflight heart  
mm Hg rate, beats/min 
. -  - 
Standing, 122/28 
- 
Supine, 120/78 
-_ 
5:28 
5:47 
6:15 
7:lO 
7:18 
7:20 
7:24 
7:26 
7:32 
7:42 
9:41 
10: 00 
I 10:10 
- _-__I_ 
~~ 
Sitting, ,118/78 
Supine, 108/70 
Standing, 104/78 
Supine, 120/76 
Standing, 94/74 
Sitting, 94/74 
Sitting, 120/78 
Standing, 104/78 
Supine, 124/80 
Oct. 3, 1962 
- 
Sitting, 92 
Supine, 72 
Standing, 92 
Supine, 72 
Supine, 64 
Standing, 92 to  100 
Standing, 92 to 100 
Supine, 64 
Standing, 104 
Sitting, 88 
Sitting, 80 
Sitting, 80 
Standing, 104 
Supine, 68 
Sitting, 84 
Standing, 104 
Supine, 80 
Sitting, 96 
Supine, 76 
- - -___ 
1:35 Sitting, 118/84 Sitting, 68 
Standing, 114/84 Standing, 72 
Supine, 120/80 Supine, 56 %- - _ _  - 
Comments 
(a> 
-~-I - 
Temperature: oral, 99.4" F; 
rectal, 100. 1" F 
Blood drawn: 40 cc 
Orange juice: 180 cc 
Ate first meal and drank 
690 cc of liquids 
Temperature: oral, 99" F 
Blood drawn: 25 cc 
Urine voided: 245 cc 
.~ . -  
_ _  - 
Superficial dependent veins 
not unduly distended 
aThe pilot smoked about 1 2  cigarettes between 5:30 p. m. and 1O:OO p. m. 
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TABLE XVI. - CLINICAL  EVALUATION^ 
___ 
Condition 
- _  
I'emperature (oral), F 
Heart rate, beats/min 
Blood pressure (left arm),  
mm Hg 
Respiratory rate, 
breaths /min 
Neight (nude, bladder 
empty), 1b 
Additional 
Preflight, 
Cape Canaveral, 
2: 46 a. m. 
(b) 
97.6 
64 (supine) 
120/78 (supine 
122/85 (standing) 
14 
176.75 
Hematoma, rig..t ingu,.ia 
region; otherwise, no 
abnormalities including 
ECG, audiogram, and 
chest X-rays performed 
Oct. 1, 1962 
. 
~~ 
Postflight, 
U. S. S. Kearsarge 
(c 1 
99.4 
92 (sitting) 
118/78 (sitting) 
See section on "Postflight 
Physical Examination'' 
172.25 
Abrasion of r t knuck- 
les, pressure points 
over both acromial 
processes, orthostasis 
otherwise normal 
October 3, 1962; all t imes e. s. t. a 
bunchanged from the several  other preflight examinations. 
'Repeated examination the next day did not reveal orthostasis; .abrasions and 
pressure points were resolving. 
ber  4 and 5; no significant change was detected. 
Complete examination October 1 was repeated Octo- 
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: 
47 
51 
1 i  
TABLE XVII. - PERJPHERAL BLOOD VALUES 
I I 1 Preflight I 
Determination 1 -15 .5h r  I + l . 5 h r  
Hemoglobin, Cyanmethemoglobin method, 
grams/100 ml  
Hematocrit, percent 
Red blood cells, millions/" 
White blood cells/" 
Differential blood count: 
3 
3 
Lymphocytes , percent 
Neut rophiles, per cent 
Monocytes, percent 
E osinophiles, per  cent 
Basophiles, percent 
3 Platelets/mm 
Sodium, mEq/l 
Potassium, mEq/l 
Chloride, mEq/l 
Calcium, mEq/l 
Protein (total), g/100 ml 
15. 0 
44 
5.0 
9800 
34 
62 
3 
1 
0 
Adequate 
152 
3 . 9  
102 
5. 2 
8 .0  
I 
~~~ 
Post landing 
+5 h r  
14. 5 
45 
4.7 
10 350 
31 
63 
4 
2 
0 
147 
3.9 
107 
5. 6 
7 .0  
Adequate 
+14.5 h r  I +51 h r  1 
4.8 
8 400 
49 
46 
3 
2 
0 
274 000 
145 
3.8 
103 
5. 2 
8 . 1  
294 000 
145 
4. 3 
104 
5.1 
7 .0  
TABLE XVIII. - URINE SUMMARY 
Preflight In-flight Postlanding 
-1 day +6 hr  +17.5 hr  +23 hr  +50 hr  +53hr +56.5hr +61 h r  +63 h r  +69 h r  
Determination _ _ _ ~  
Volume, cc 
Specific gravity 
Osmolarity, 
milliosmoles 
PH 
Albumin, glucose, 
ketones, bile 
Sodium, mEq/l 
Potassium, mEq/l 
Chloride, mEq/l 
Calcium, mEq/l 
Microsconic 
-- 
1.010 
593 
6.0 
0 
103 
47 
127 
8. 5 
Occasional 
examination white 
(high-power blood 
field) cells; 
few 
squa- 
m ous 
cells 
(a) 
1.010 
595 
Acid 
0 
86 
49 
106 
6.1 
_ _  
233 
1.018 
848 
Acid 
0 
107 
58 
103 
4.8 
4 to 5 
white 
blood 
cells; 
occa- 
sional 
red 
blood 
cells; 
323 
1.021 
995 
Acid 
0 
47 
46 
47 
8.4 
Occasional 
white 
blood 
cells; 
occa- 
sional 
epithe- 
lial 
cell, no 
150 
1.021 
951 
Acid 
0 
54 
69 
93 
8.4 
Occasional 
white 
blood 
cells; 
amor- 
phous 
sedi- 
ment 
440 
1.013 
442 
6.0 
0 
69 
34 
62 
7.0 
3 to 6 
white 
blood 
cells; 
minimal 
mucus 
460 410 
1.010 1.014 
266 609 
7.0 6. 0 
0 0 
62 112 
18 38 
32 70 
2.9 4.0 
Occasional Occasional 
white 
blood 
cells 
white 
blood 
cells 
8.50 
1.020 
262 
0 
35 
14 
24 
2.2 -- 
125 
301 
0 
19 
19 
24 
1. 6 
-- 
mucous red 
threads blood 
r a r e  cells 
granular 
cast, 
some 
epithe- 
lial 
threads 
375 
568 
0 
66 
59 
91 
3.1 
-- 
aMost of the in-flight specimen was lost into the Mercury pressure suit. A total of 292 cc was recovered. 
TABLE XIX. - YAW MANEUVERS 
Maneuver 
1 
2 
3 
4 
r 
r - I 
Visual reference 
Window 
Periscope 
Window 
Window 
0.39 
. 3 2  
. 2 3  
Control mode 
FBW low 
FBW low 
FBW low 
FBW low 
Normal 
Free 
Free 
.30 1 Free J 
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TABLE XX. - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTMTIES 
Retro 
Retro 
Gyro switch position Control Attitude-select Time from launch 
From - TO - From - TO - Position mode switch position 
01: 10: 58 
01: 33: 26 
I 
Flight activities 
Auxiliary Retro 00: 05: 17 00: 05: 21 Normal Prelaunch 00: 17: 12 5-sec rate damping at spacecraft separation 
damping 
FBW low 00: 05: 21 00: 07: 11 Turnaround maneuver 
ASCS orbit 00: 07: 11 00: 10: 51 Sustainer observation, orbit checklist 
FBW low 00: 10: 51 00: 12: 08 Sustainer tracking 
MP 00: 12: 08 00: 12: 51 MP control-mode check 
ASCS orbit 00: 12: 51 00: 56: 04 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
FBW low 
00: 56: 04 
01: 02: 41 
01: 05: 05 
Reentry 01: 06: 21 
01: 02: 41 
01: 05: 05 
01: 06: 21 
01: 09: 07 
01: 10: 58 
01: 33: 26 
01: 34: 27 1 
Free 00: 17: 12 
00: 18: 48 Normal 
Free 00: 56: 31 
Normal 01: 02: 18 
TS + 5 check 
Suit-circuit temperature control problem 
Yaw reticle used 
00: 18: 48 
00: 56: 31 
Maneuver to observe flares 
Pitch held at -50" for 2 min 
01: 02: 18 
01: 50: 44 
Orientation low 
Pitch rate 1.6" when ASCS selected (one 
1-space blip in pitch) 
Stars observed 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in all axes) 
Dosimeter check 
Particles observed 
Yaw check using yaw reticle 
TABLE XX. - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTIVITIES - Continued 
ASCS orbit 
Time from launch 1 Gyro switch position Attitude-select 
01: 34: 27 
01: 50: 44 
1 i ! ASCSorbit 
i 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
01: 53: 46 
i I 
01: 53: 46 
I 
I MP 
RSCS and 1 
FBW low 
FBW low 
I Orientation low (one 1-space blip in yaw) 
02: 03: 14 Suit-temperature problem concentrated on 
i ~ 
! 1 FBW low I Yaw check using Moon as reference 
ASCS orbit ' 
01: 41: 43 
01: 44: 41  
01: 50:'46 
01: 53: 37 
! 02:03: 15 
02: 06: 09 
I ,  
I 
1 02:06:26 
I 
Position 
01:41:43 
01: 44: 4 1  
01: 50: 46 
~ 
I Free 
01: 53: 37 
02:03:15 ~ 
I Normal 
Free 
02:06:09 , 
02:06:26 ' 
02: 09: 25 
' Normal 
02: 09: 25 02: 26: 05 
I 
' Free  
02: 26: 05 02: 31: 00 
Normal 
I 
02: 31: 00 03: 09: 27 
From - 7 
02: 03: 14 
Flight activities 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in roll 
and pitch) 
Yaw check (window) 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in pitch 
Dosimeter check 
and yaw) 
Yaw check (periscope) 
j Pilot aware of double authority 
1 
TABLE XX. - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTIVITIES - Continued 
Gyro switch position 2 
Flight activities Control Attitude-select Time from launch mode switch position From - TO - From - TO - Position 
FBW low Reentry 03: 09: 27 03: 51: 47 Preparation for power-down 
Free 03: 09: 38 03: 09: 40 
ASCS orbit 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
FEW low 
ASCS orbit 
FEW low 
ASCS 
Retro 
Reentry 
03: 51: 47 03: 54: 44 
03: 54: 44 04: 00: 07 
04: 00: 07 04: 19: 20 
04: 19: 20 
04: 20: 54 
04: 35: 05 
04: 36: 00 
04: 20: 54 
04: 35: 05 
04: 36: 00 
06: 05: 30 
Caged 03: 09: 40 03: 49: 52 Powered down at 03: 09: 50 
Drifting started at 03: 10: 00 
Free 03: 49: 52 03: 55: 15 Orientation test 
Dosimeter check 
Drifting flight stopped at 03: 40: 00 
Power-up at 03: 44: 09 
Orientation low (low thrust in pitch and yaw 
for 6 sec) 
Caged 
Free 
Normal 
Caged 
03: 55: 15 
03: 59: 10 
03: 59: 10 
04: 00: 18 
04: 00: 18 04: 35: 09 
04: 35: 09 06: 20: 04 
Gyros realined 
Yaw to observe Moon and s tars  
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in each 
axis) 
Magnetic compass used 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in roll 
and pitch) 
Six-orbit go 
Power-down at 04: 35: 18 
Drifting started at 04: 36: 00 
Powering down rate gyros 
Photographs 
Dosimeter check 
Particles observed 
Orientation test at 05: 19: 00 
Star observations 
Extinct Aldebaran 05: 27: 27 
Observed sunrise inverted 
CI 
w 
0 
Position 
TABLE XX. - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTMTIES - Continued 
Flight activities From - I TO - Control Attitude-select I mode switch position 
ASCS orbit 
MP 
ASCS 
orientation 
FBW low 
FBW low 
and RSCS 
FBW low Retro 
ASCS orbit 
ASCS and 
MP in roll 
Time from launch 
From - 
06: 05: 30 
06: 22: 44 
06: 27: 11 
06: 28: 13 
06: 28: 16 
06: 28: 22 
06: 28: 52 
06: 29: 43 
TO - 
06: 22: 44 
06: 27: 11 
06: 28: 13 
06: 28: 16 
06: 28: 22 
06: 28: 52 
06: 29: 43 
07: 45: 14 
Free 
Caged 
Free  
Normal 
I ~ 
06: 20: 04 06: 21: 26 
I 06:21:26 06:21:30 
06: 21: 39 
07: 20: 09 
06: 21: 30 
06: 21: 39 
Power-up at 06: 06: 40 
Dosimeter check 
Limited drifting flight started at 06: 15: 30 
Drifting flight stopped a t  06: 20: 00 
Gyro realinement 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in roll) 
MP control-mode check 
Orientation high. Pilot gone to ASCS with 
proper retroattitude but attitude-select 
switch in reentry position 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in roll 
Weather photographs. Sunset, star, and 
Port Elizabeth observed at 06: 49: 00 
Venus extincted at 06: 54: 29 
Moon photographed 
Lights observed over Philippines (07: 10: 00) 
and yaw) 
Moon observations 
Free 07: 20:09 07:46: 36 Scanner test 
07: 45: 14 07: 46: 07 Correcting a -IO" roll 
TABLE XX. - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTIVITIES - Continued 
Gyro switch position 
Flight activities Control Attitude-select Time from launch I mode switch position From - TO - Position From - TO - 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
MP 
FBW low 
ASCS orbit 
07: 46: 07 07: 47: 37 
Normal 07: 46: 36 08: 22: 23 
07: 47: 37 08: 12:40 
08: 12: 40 
08: 14: 11 
08: 14: 11 
08: 22: 33 
Free 
08: 22: 33 08: 24: 56 
FBW normal 
ASCS orbit 
ASCS orbit 
and MP 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in each 
axis) 
08: 22: 33 08: 25: 06 Orientation test 
Moon used as yaw reference 
MP control-mode check 
Pitch-down to observe lights of Durban 
08: 24: 56 08: 26: 36 
Normal 08: 25: 06 08: 51: 34 
08: 26: 36 08: 31: 34 
08: 31: 34 
08: 32: 43 
08: 50: 30 
08: 32: 43 
08: 50: 30 
08: 51: 34 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in each 
Terrestrial photographs of South America 
Equipment stowed at 08: 10: 00 
axis) 
Orientation low (4 sec of 1-pound thrusting 
Preretrosequence checklist at 08: 27: 00 
Rate gyro-select switch to TR - 10 bypass 
in each axis) 
at 08: 28: 00. FBW-select switch to NORM 
at 08: 31: 00 
Checked FBW high thrusters 
Orientation low (one 1-space blip in roll 
Stars and planets used to cross-check yaw 
and yaw) 
accuracy 
i MP selected as backup to ASCS for retrofire Squibs armed at 08: 51: 29 
Control Attitude-select I switch position mode 
ASCS orienta- 
tion and MP 
FBW normal 
ASCS orbit 
ASCS orienta- 
tion 
ASCS orbit 
RSCS 
. .  
Reentry 
Reentry 
TABLE XX. - SUMMARY OF MAJOR FLIGHT ACTIVITIES - Concluded 
Time from launch 
From - 
08: 51: 34 
08: 52: 43 
TO - 
08: 52: 43 
08: 54: 00 
08: 54: 00 08: 59: 31 
08: 59: 31 08: 59: 41 
08: 59: 41 
09: 00: 27 Landing 
09: 00: 27 
Gyro switch position 
Position 
Free  
Normal 
From - 
08: 51: 34 
08: 53: 03 
TO - 
08: 53: 03 
Landing 
Flight activities 
Retrosequence 
Retrofire at 08: 52: 05 
Retrojettison switch armed at 08: 52: 35 
Pitch to reentry attitude 
FBW high thrusters checked 
Retropackage jettisoned at 08: 53: 05 
ASCS reentry logic check 
Orientation low (6 sec of 1-pound thrusting) 
Orbit mode did not hold pitch <15" from 
reentry pitch attitude 
Controlling reentry-rate damping 
Communications blackout a t  09: 01: 00 
0.05g at 09: 01: 45 
RSCS inserted 6 deg/sec roll 
Drogue pilot-deployed at 09: 06: 55 (40" K) 
, Manual fuel depletion at 09: 07: 30 
Snorkle pulled at 20" K 
; Recovery a rm at 15" K 
Main parachute deploy and automatic fuel 
jettison on at 09: 08: 16 (10.5" K) 
Automatic fuel jettison off at 09: 09: 16 
TABLE XXI. - CONTROL-MODE UTILIZATION 
[Does not include gyro switch position] 
. .~ __--- 
Control -mode configuration 
ASCS retroattitude select 
Free  drift 
FBW low 
ASCS reentry select  
Drift and FBW low 
M P  
RSCS 
FBW normal 
ASCS orientation low 
M P  and ASCS 
FBW low and RSCS 
ASCS orientation high 
M P  and FBW low 
ASCS auxiliary damping 
__ 
Total time used 
in rank order, 
hr: min: sec 
04 :5 7 :34 
02:11:56 
00:40:59 
00:35 :09 
00 : 17 :00 
00 :07 :05 
00:06:28 
00:02:17 
00:01:06 
00:00:53 
00:00:31 
00:00:36 
00 :00 :07 
00:00:04 
_ _  
(appro4 
. .  . -.  . -  
Maximum time 
used at any 
time, h r  :min:sec 
01 :15:29 
01 :41:56 
00:06:36 
00:19 :11 
00:09:22 
~- ___ .~ 
00 :02 :54 
00:06:28 
00:01:2 1 
00: 00 : 10 
00:00:53 
00:00:31 
00 : 00 : 2 3 
0O:OO :07 
00:00:04 
-- 
Frequency 
used 
16 
2 
20 
6 
3 
4 
1 
2 
17 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
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TABLE XXIt .  - SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
0.05 g relay 
Drogue -parachute deployment 
Main-parachute deployment 
Event 
09:00:20. 8 09 :O 1 :4 0 
09:05:36. 8 09':06 :50 
09:07:02. 8 09 :08 :12 
Planned time, 
h r  :min :s ec 
( 4  
BECO 
Tower release 
Escape-rocket ignition 
SECO discrete 
Tail - off complete 
Spacecraft separation 
Launch phase 
00:02:10. 8 
00:02:33.8 
00:02:33.8 
00:05:05. 8 
00:05:06. 8 
(c) 
Actual time, 
h r  :min :sec 
- 
00:02:08.6 
00:02 :33 
00:02:33 
00:05:15. 7 
00:05:15.9 
00:05:17. 9 
Orbital phase 
Retrofire-sequence initiation 
Retrorocket No. 1 (left) 
Retrorocket No. 2 (bottom) 
Retrorocket No. 3 (right) 
Retrorocket assembly jettison 
08:50:21. 8 
08:50:51.8 
08:50:56. 8 
08:51:01. 8 
08:51:51.8 
Reentry phase 
08:51:30 
08:52 :00 
08:52 :05 
0 8 5 2  :10 
08:53 :00 
Main -parachute jettison 
(water landing) 09:11:33. 8 
~ 
09 :13 :11 
Difference 
sec 
04 
-2.2 
-0. 8 
-0. 8 
IO. I 
11.1 
-- 
68. 2 
68. 2 
68. 2 
68. 2 
68,. 2 
d79.2 (7) 
d73. 2 
d97. 2 (7) 
d69. 2 (-1) 
aPreflight calculated, based on nominal Atlas performance. 
bThe relatively large difference between the planned and actual t imes from 
retrofire to landing resulted from the slight overspeed condition which gave a longer 
orbital period. 
than on SECO conditions. 
times, shown in parentheses, were based on actual insertion parameters.  
C Planned trajectory t imes were based on tail -off -complete conditions, rather 
dThe differences between the actual and the postflight -calculated reentry event 
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I 
Actual Condition and quantity I Planned 
TABLE Xwr. - COMPAF3SON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS 
Difference 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Range time, s e c  305.8 Range time, min:sec 05:05. 8 
Longitude, deg W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72.5071 
Altitude, f t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  528 418 
Altitude, n. m i . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86.97 
Range, n. mi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  437 
Space-fixed velocity, f t /sec . . . . . . . . . .  25 915 
Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N . . . .  77.4874 
Geodetic latitude, deg N . . . . . . . . . . . .  30.4309 
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg . . . . . . .  .0022 
aBased on atmosphere at Cape Canaveral .  
bBased on 1959 Air Resea rch  and Development Command model atmosphere.  
'Actual landing coordinates shown were those which resul ted f rom the t ra jectory integration. The 
re t r ieva l  point after landing was reported as 32"06' N and 174"29' W by the recovery ship ( re fer  to sect ion 
on "Recovery Operations"). 
30.5447 
72.2157 
528 467 
86.97 
453.7 16. 7 
25 730 15 
77.7043 .2169 
-. 0062 -. 0084 
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Range t ime ,  s e c  
Range time, min:sec 
Geodetic latitude, deg N 
Longitude, deg W 
Altitude, ft  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Altitude, n. mi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Space-fixed velocity, f t /sec . . . . . . . . . .  
Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N . . . .  
Range, n. mi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg . . . . . . .  
05:18.9 0O:ll. 1 
30.5885 . 1278 -. 3654 71.9946 
307.8 
05:07. 8 
30.4607 
72.3600 
528 451 528 510 
86.97 86.98 
445 465.5 20.5 
25 736 25 751 -. 0006 -. 0085 -. 0079 
77.5660 77.8228 .2568 
Per igee  altitude, statute mi. . . . . . . . . .  100.08 
Perigee altitude, n. mi. . . . . . . . . . . . .  86.97 
Period,  min:sec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88:45 
Apogee altitude, statute mi. . . . . . . . . . .  166.3 
Apogee altitude, n. mi. . . . . . . . . . . . .  144.2 
Angle of inclination, deg . . . . . . . . . . . .  32.52 
100.05 -0.03 
175.84 
152.8 
88:55 0O:lO 
32.55 
Altitude, statute mi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  166.3 
Altitude, n. mi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  144.2 
Space-fixed velocity, f t /sec . . . . . . . . . .  25 736 
Earth-fixed velocity, f t /sec . . . . . . . . . .  24 420 
Exit acceleration, g . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7. 7 
Exit dynamic p r e s s u r e ,  lb/ft . . . . . . . . .  a966 
Exit dynamic pressure ,  lb/ft 2 . . . . . . . . .  b877 
Reentry deceleration, g . . . . . . . . . . . .  7.6 
Reentry dynamic p r e s s u r e ,  lb/ft . . . . . . .  456 
2 
2 
~~ 
175.84 
25 751 
24 435 
8. 1 
964 
9 64 
7.6 
458 
Latitude, deg:min . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Longitude, deg:min . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
32"06' N 1 pc32"06' N I 
-05, 174"33' W c174"28' W 
TABLE XXIV. - ORBITAL-INSERTION CONDITIONS AVAILABLE AT THE MERCURY CONTROL CENTER 
Insertion conditions 
Inertial velocity 
with posigrades,a'b ft/sec . . . . 
Inertial flight-path angle, deg . . . 
Insertion altitude, n. mi. . . . . . . 
Inclination angle , deg . . . . . . . . 
Apogee, n'. mi. . . .. . . . . . . . . 
b 
Nominal 
25 736 
-. 0006 
87.0 
32.52 
144.2 
General 
Electric 
Bur roughs 
25 746 
-. 0281 
87.0 
32. 5 
150 
Impact 
predictor 
25 762 
-. 120 
--  
-- 
-- 
Bermuda 
25 783 
+. 203 
_ -  
-- 
-- 
Back from 
Muchea 
25 751 
-. 0078 
86.98 
32.55 
152.8 
a For  previous flights, the variation in the data from the different sources was not as great. However, 
the increased disagreement for the MA-8 mission was expected because of the high noise level observed in 
the data. 
bAverage of go -no -go. 
Station Used differential observations correction I Accepted 
Bermuda 
FPS-16 
VE RL ORT 
Grand Canary Island 
Muchea, Australia 
Woomera, Australia 
Guaymas, Mexico 
White Sands Missile Range, 
New Mexico 
Texas 
Eglin AFB, Florida 
FPS-16 
VERLORT 
Cape Canaveral, Florida 
Bermuda 
FPS-16 
VERLORT 
Grand Canary Island 
Muchea, Australia 
Woomera, Australia 
Hawaii 
FPS-16 
VERLORT 
California 
FPS-16 
VERLORT 
White Sands Missile Range, 
New Mexico 
43 
73 
57 
81 
38 
39 
20 
55 
39 
15 
14 
42 
0 
45 
50 
38 
34 
20 
48 
39 
10 
Second orbital pass  
48 
6 
48 
75 
27 
13 
30 
9 
43 
37 
46 
0 
38 
50 
27 
13 
0 
9 
37 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
Rejected 
Late report  
No improvement 
in solution 
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TABLE XXV. - RADAR TRACKING - Concluded 
-~ 
49 
27 
Station 
~ - . . .. - - . - 
45 
27 
Texas 
Eglin AFB, Florida 
FPS-16 
VERLORT 
Cape Canaveral, Florida 
Muchea, Australia 
Hawaii 
FPS-16 
VERLORT 
California 
FPS-16 
VERLORT 
Rejected 
Second orbital  p a s s  - concluded 
l1 I 
14 I 14 
Third orbital  pass  
62 
37 
16 
5 
12 
- .  
50 
37 
0 
4 
11 
- .. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
L. 
Late report  
.. . .- -- 
138 
, 
Based on signals from 
SOFAR bomb 
TABLE XXVI. - LANDING-POINT DATA 
32'04' 1 1 174'32' 1 
I 
' Incremental longitude, ! 
n. mi. Longitude W ; 
Incremental latitude, 1 I n. mi. I Data source I Latitude N 
Actual landing point 32'06' 
reported by recov- 
ery ship 
I : 32'06' I  
(assuming correct i I 
Based on assumed 
I 
I 
time of retrofire 
attitudes) I 
174'28' 
1 
I 
1 : 174'32' j 
i 
Based on actual time 32'09' 4 I of retrofire and I 1 174'29' I 
I 
I 
I 
Planned nominal I 32'05' i I ' 174'33' I 
reported attitudes 
Y w 
(D 
TABLE XXVII. - COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY 
Station 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
Bermuda 
Muc hea, Australia 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
Bermuda 
Muchea, Australia 
Hawaii 
California 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
Bermuda 
Command carrier 
ON 
Launch 
00 :05 :58 
(00 :05 :58) 
00:45:00 
(00 :45 :OO) 
01 :20 :oo 
(01 :20:00) 
01 :33:00 
(01 :33 :30) 
01 :37 :58 
(01 :38:00) 
02:15:00 
(02:15:00) 
0 2 4 5  :00 
(02:45:00) 
02:56:35 
(02 :56:30) 
03:04:35 
(03:04:35) 
03 :06 :50 
(03:06:51) 
03 :12 :50 
(03:12:50) 
1 ~- 
OFF 
00 :06:88 
00:06:00 
00:12:00 
_ _ _ _ . _ .  
(00:12:00) 
00:59:00 
(00 :59 :OO) 
01 :33:00 
(01 :33:00) 
01 :38:00 
(01 :38:29) 
01 :45 :oo 
(01 :45 :OO) 
02:32:00 
(02:32:00) 
02:56:35 
(02:56:00) 
03:04:35 
(03:04:35) 
03 :06:50 
(03:06:50) 
03:12:50 
(03:12:59) 
03 :18 :20 
(03 :18 :20) 
+ 7 . 5 - ~ V  ca r r i e r  coverage 
above line of sight, 
percent 
I
a Times in parentheses are actual; t imes not in parentheses a r e  planned. 
98 
44 
25 
26 
90 
82 
46 
91 
85 
06 
94 
93 
140 
TABLE XXVII. - COMMAND HANDOVER SUMMARY - Continued 
Station 
Muc he a ,  Australia 
Hawaii 
California 
Guaym as, lexico 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
(San Salvador) 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
(Grand Turk) 
Hawaii 
California 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Cape Canaveral, 
Florida 
Pacific Command 
~~ 
._ 
ship 
Command ca r r i e r  
ON 
03 : 54 :00 
(03:54 :OO) 
04:15:00 
(04 : 1 5 :04) 
04:31:00 
(04:31 :OO) 
04:38:00 
(04 :38:00) 
04:40:00 
(04:40:01) 
04:46:30 
(04 :4 5 : 3 2) 
04:47:45 
(04:47:45) 
05:56:30 
(05 : 56:OO) 
06:03:00 
(06:03 :OO) 
06:09 :20 
(0 6 :O 9 : 20) 
06 :15 :00 
(06:15:01) 
07:15:30 
(07:ll:OO) 
OFF 
04:05:00 
(04 :05 :OO) 
04:31:00 
(04:31 :OO) 
04:38:00 
(04 :38 :OO) 
04:40 :00 
(04:40 :OO) 
04:45:45 
(04 : 45 : 3 2) 
04:47 :45 
(04:47 :45) 
04:51:45 
(04:51:45) 
06:03:00 
(06:03:31) 
06 :09 : 20 
(06 :09 :45) 
06:15:00 
(06:15:03) 
06 : 20 :00 
(06 :20 :OO) 
07 :23 ZOO 
(07 :23 ZOO) 
+7.5-pV ca r r i e r  coverage 
above line of sight, 
percent 
32 
15  
87 
15  
74 
56 
71 
67 
85 
12  
77 
23 
a Times in parentheses are actual; times not in parentheses are planned. 
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TABLE XXVII. - COMMAND " D O V E R  SUMMARY - Concluded 
I
Station 
Hawaii 
California 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Pacific Command 
ship 
~~ 
Command carrier 
ON 
07:31:00 
(07:31 :OO) 
07 :38:30 
(07:35:22) 
07 :42 :30 
(07:42:30) 
08 :47 :QQ 
(08:46:00) 
3- 1 i. 
OFF 
07:36:00 
(07:36:05) 
07:42:30 
(07:45:22) 
07 :47 :00 
(07:47:00) 
08 : 57 : 00 
(08:58:00) 
. _ _ _  
+7.5 -pV carrier coverage 
above line of sight, 
percent 
34 
15 
0 
33 
a Times in parentheses a re  actual; t imes not in parentheses are planned. 
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TABLE XXVIII..- COMMAND FUNCTION SUMMARY 
Pacific Command ship 
I 
Signal transmission 
I j Approximate Signal strength 
R-Cal 
Z -Cal 
R-Cal 
Station at spacecraft, Function ’ i Duration of signal Slant range, 
n. mi. PV 
Time of initiation, transmission, 
I sec hr :min:sec 
Cape Canaveral, Florida ~ ASCOa 
b Z -Cal 
R-Calc 
Z -Cal 
R-Cal 
I 
Hawaii 
Guaymas, Mexico 
Z -Cal 
R-Cal 
Z -Cal 
00:05:16 
01:35:22 
01 :35:37 
03:lO:lO 
03:10:22 
04 :25 :24 
04 :25 :41 
06:lO:Ol 
06:10:25 
07:18:18 
07 :18:42 
5 
14 
9 
11 
11 
9 
19 
10 
dl 
d5 
3 
1 
19 
17 
aASCO - Auxiliary sustainer cut-off. 
bZ-Cal - Instrumentation zero calibration. 
‘R-Cal - Instrumentation full -scale calibration. 
dFunctions dropped out because signal strength went below receiver threshold. 
430 
515 
460 
276 
250 
34 5 
290 
39 5 
300 
375 
330 
30 
25 
25 
40 
35 
15 
20 
1 to 3 
0 to 3 
10 
10 
TABLE XXM. - AIR-TO-GROUND SIGNAL STRENGTH 
Station 
Grand Turk Island 
Average signal strength, 
Uhf hf 
I.Lv __ Orbital 
pas s  
Launch 20 2 
1 2 02 202 
I 2 127 602 
3 202 --- 
Grand Bahama Island Launch 1500 2500 
1 --- 2500 
2 Weak --- 
3 Weak --- 
4 Weak --- 
TABLE XXM. - AIR-TO-GROUND SIGNAL STRENGTH - Concluded 
Texas 
Eglin AFB, Florida 
Station 
1 --- 107 
2 12 
3 38. 7 --- 
22 --- 4 
5 15 2 1  
1 5 20 
5 2 
7 3 
4 5 15 
--- 
--- 
--- 
I 
Average signal strength, Orbital 
wass 
Uhf  hf 
I Canton Island 22.5 I 16 
Hawaii --- 
Recording trouble 
Recording trouble 
Recording trouble 
Guaymas, Mexico 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
150 
Weak 
California 1 
2 
3 
4 I 
--- 
20.6 
27 
23.7 
13 
30 
10. 7 
--- 
10 - 
Cool 
(a) Flight elapsed time, 0O:OO to 05:OO. 
Figure 18. - Variation of space suit inlet temperature, suit heat-exchanger dome 
temperature, and associated suit coolant-valve settings with time. 
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Figure 18. - Concluded. 
k c 
\ 
2 
Valve setting, position number 
(One valve position number change = 10" rotation of valve stem.) 
Figure 19. - Comfort-control-valve calibration curve. 
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Figure 20. - Variation of cabin air temperature, cabin heat-exchanger dome 
temperature, and associated comfort-control-valve settings with time. 
CI 
u1 
0 130 - 
120 - 
L L  
0 
g 110- 
CI 
m L
a, 
5 100- + 
c l  
LL 
0 
+ 
m 
z. 
40 - 
(b) Flight elapsed time, 05: 00 to 10: 00. 
Figure 20. - Concluded. 
Figure 21. - High-frequency dipole antenna in the extended position. 
Figure 22. - One element of the hf dipole antenna in retracted position. 
1 5 1  
Figure 23. - Postflight appearance of heat-shield ablation surface. 
Figure 24. - Cross-section view of heat shield showing major cracking of 
ablation laminate and separation at bond line. 
152 
Figure 25. - Postflight photograph of main-parachute deployment bag showing tears. 
Figure 26. - Standard light source. 
I f ,  
Figure 27. - Extinction photometer. 
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Figure 28. - Hand-held camera. 
., 
Figure 29. - Film magazine for  camera. 
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, ..._._ - -..- " . 
-=- 
Figure 30. - Filter mosaic slide. 
Figure 3 1. - Weather photograph showing fi l ter  comparison. 
156 
i 
Figure 32. - Exposure meter. 
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_--. .... .I_ 
Figure 33. - Preflight photograph of ablation-material samples 
mounted on beryllium shingles. 
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. .. 
Res p i  r a t i on 
ECG I ( S i d e s )  
1 
ECG I1 (Ches t )  
Figure 34. - Sample of the playback record from the onboard tape during launch (at 00:07:20 g. e. t. ) 
illustrating the clarity of the trace at normal record and paper speed 25 mm/sec. 
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130' 
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m 4 0  J J  I I 
Time.  hr:min Y 
(b) 05: 00 to 09: 14 
Figure 35. - Concluded. 
Figure 36. - Sample of playback of onboard record illustrating a typical 
blood-pressure cycle (at 2: 32 g. e. t. ), paper speed 10 mm/sec. 
ECG I (S ides)  I 
.  . . . . 
. -. .- . . 
- .  ..... 
~- ~- . . . . ,  : , _ , .  * , . . . . . . . . 
ECG I1 (Chest)  
. -- - 
Fusion b e a t  
_- 
Figure 37. - Sample of the playback record from the onboard tape during launch (at 00: 07: 00 g. e! t. ) 
illustrating a ventricular fusion beat, paper speed 25 mm/sec. 
Y 
Q) 
6 
Res p i  rat ion 
. . . 
I 
EGG I (Sides)  
ECG I1 (Ches t )  n 
Figure 38. - Sample of the playback record from the onboard tape illustrating the 
appearance of artifacts on the bioinstrumentation record (at 09: 05 g. e. t. ), 
paper speed 25 mm/sec. 
Figure 39. - Star navigation charts. Figure 40. - Time-conversion computer. 
Figure 42. - Checklist for critical 
orbital operations. 
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Figure 43. - Flight turnaround maneuver with background of five procedures- 
trainer -turnaround maneuvers (0.41 lb  H202 usage). 
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Figure 44. - Yaw maneuvers. 
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(b) Night. 
Figure 44. - Concluded. 
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Figure 45. - Hydrogen peroxide fuel usage. 
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(a) Space-fixed velocity. 
Figure 46. - Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in the region of 
cutoff using launch-vehicle guidance data. 
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(b) Space-fixed flight-path angle. 
Figure 46. - Concluded. 
05:22 05 :24  05:  26 05:  28 05:30 05 :32  05:  14 05: 16 05:  18 05 : 20 
Time, min:sec 
(a) Space-fixed velocity. 
(a) Space-fixed velocity. 
Figure 47. - Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle in the region of cutoff 
using IP 7090 data. 
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(b) Space-fixed flight-path angle. 
Figure 47. - Concluded. 
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Figure 48. - Space-fixed flight-path angle versus space-fixed velocity in the 
region of cutoff. 
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Figure 49. - Altitude versus longitude profile. 
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Figure 50. - Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-8 mission launch phase. 
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(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle. 
Figure 50. - Continued. 
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(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle. 
Figure 50. - Continued. 
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(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number. 
Figure 50. - Continued. 
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(e) Longitudinal acceleration along spacecraft Z-axis .  
Figure 50. - Concluded. 
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Figure 51. - Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-8 mission orbital phase. 
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Figure 51. - Continued. 
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(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle. 
Figure 51. - Continued. 
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(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle - Concluded. 
Figure 51. - Concluded. 
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Figure 52. - Time histories of trajectory parameters for MA-8 mission reentry phase. 
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(b) Space-fixed velocity and flight-path angle. 
Figure 52. - Continued. 
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(c) Earth-fixed velocity and flight-path angle. 
Figure 52. - Continued. 
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(d) Dynamic pressure and Mach number. 
Figure 52. - Continued. 
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(e) Longitudinal deceleration along spacecraft Z-axis. 
Figure 52. - Concluded. 
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Figure 53. - C-band radar coverage for  MA-8 mission. 
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Figure 53. - Continued. 
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Figure 53. - Concluded. 
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Figure 54. - S-band radar coverage for MA-8 mission. 
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Figure 55. - Telemetry coverage for MA-8 mission. 
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Figure 56. - High-frequency/ultrahigh-frequency coverage for MA-8 mission. 
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CONCLUDING _. - REMARKS 
The third U. S. manned orbital mission, because its duration was greater  than 
that of the two previous missions, was intended to increase the knowledge and capabil- 
ity in manned space operations. The decision to proceed with the Mercury-Atlas 8 
mission was largely based upon the experience gained in the previous manned orbital 
and suborbital flights conducted as a par t  of Project Mercury. The spacecraft systems 
operated satisfactorily throughout the 9 -hour flight, although some concern was caused 
by the inability of the environmental control system to stabilize the temperature in the 
pressure suit at a comfortable level in the first 2 hours of flight. However, the me- 
thodical adjustment of the suit  coolant control valve by the pilot brought the temperature 
under control, and the flight proceeded without further anomalies. Postflight inspec - 
tion revealed that coagulated lubricant in the control valve partially blocked the flow of 
coolant in the system. The instrumentation system did not perform as satisfactorily 
as might be desired, but the data collected were adequate to conduct the comprehensive 
postflight analysis, from which this document is derived. A number of scientific ex- 
periments were  completed successfully, and the resul ts  of these experiments extended 
the knowledge of the space environment. The physiological responses of the pilot 
during his 9-hour exposure to space flight were considered to be well within normal 
ranges; however, during the postflight period soon after recovery he did exhibit a re- 
action to weightlessness. This cardiac response, known as orthostatic hypotension, 
was exhibited by a drop in blood pressure with a corresponding r i se  in heart  rate. 
pilot performed a se r i e s  of in-flight activities, including precise attitude maneuvers, 
satisfactorily, and through close observation of the spacecraft operation, the pilot was  
able to participate actively in the postflight systems performance analysis and de - 
briefings. 
control and monitoring task, and although the communications were not as satisfactory 
as those of previous flights, the flight-control team w a s  able to assist the pilot in his 
regulatian of the environmental control system during the initial phase of the flight. 
Because the remainder of the mission was  performed according to the preestablished 
plan, the flight -control responsibility became one of system monitoring and assist ing 
the pilot in his scheduled activities. For the first time in Project Mercury, planned 
recovery a reas  were located in the Pacific Ocean; but with the proper coordination of 
the available recovery personnel and vehicles, the overall recovery effort was compa- 
rable to that of each of the two previous manned orbital missions. 
systems effectively accomplished the retrograde maneuver and brought the spacecraft 
to a landing approximately 4 nautical miles from the intended recovery ship. Recovery 
was completed quickly and efficiently, and the spacecraft and the pilot were transported 
to the launch s i te  for  the postflight analysis activities. Because there were no mal- 
functions which compromised in any way the success of the mission and because the 
flight activities were completed as planned, the knowledge and experience derived from 
the Mercury-Atlas 8 mission provided valid application to future manned space opera- 
tions. 
The 
The Mercury Worldwide Network performed well in support of the flight- 
The spacecraft 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, July 1, 1968 
039 -00 -00 -00 -72 

I 
REFERENCES 
1. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: First United States Manned Three-Pass 
Orbital Mission (Mercury-Atlas 6, Spacecraft 13). 
formance Analysis. NASA TM X-563, 1964. 
Part I, Description and Pe r -  
2. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Second United States Manned Three-Pass 
Orbital Mission (Mercury -Atlas 7, Spacecraft 18). Description and Performance 
Analysis. NASA TN D-3814, 1967. 
Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Second United States 3. 
Manned Orbital Space Flight. NASA SP-6, 1962. 
4. Staff of NASA Manned Spacecraft Center: Results of the Third United States 
Manned Orbital Space Flight. NASA SP-12, 1962. 
5. Erb, R. Bryan; and Jacobs, Stephen: Entry Performance of the Mercury Space- 
craft Heat Shield. 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Entry Technology Conference (Williams - 
burg, Hampton, Virginia), Oct. 12-14, 1964. 
Presented to the Heat Protection Session of the American 
6. Summers, J. ; and Charters,  D. : High-speed Impact of Metal Projectiles. P ro -  
ceedings of the Third Symposium on Hypervelocity Impact, Vol. 1, Feb. 1967. 
NASA-Langley, 1968 - 31 S- 171 2 09 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20546 
OFFICIAL BUSINESS FIRST CLASS MAIL 
POSTAGE A N D  FEES PAID 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AN1 
SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
i 
I 1  
I , I : ' ; , , . ,  : :  >';$ ; , r l . . , : ;  L L i i ~ ~  T : ' -  \..L4G t I 
Postal Manual ) Do Not Retu 
POSTMASTER: If Undeliverable (Section 15 1 
' T h e  aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be 
condzcted,.so as t o  contribute . . . t o  the expansion of hanian Knowl- . 
edge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space. T h e  Administration 
shall provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination . 
of inforiization concerning its activities and the results thereof." 
-NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT OF 1958 
NASA SCIENTIFIC A N D  TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS 
TECHNICAL REPORTS: Scientific and 
technical information considered important, 
complete, and a lasting contribution to existing 
knowledge. 
TECHNICAL NOTES: Information less broad 
in scope but nevertheless of importance as a 
contribution lo existing knowledge. 
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUMS : 
Information receiving limited distribution 
because of preliminary data, security classifica- 
tion, or other reasons. 
TECHNICAL TRANSLATIONS: Information 
published in a foreign language considered ' 
to merit NASA distribution in English. 
SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS : Information 
derived from or of value to NASA activities. 
Publications include confecence proceedings, 
monographs, data compilations, handbooks, 
sourcebooks, and special bibliographies. 
TECHNOLOGY UTILIZATION 
PUBLICATIONS: Information on technology 
used by NASA that may be of particular 
interest in commercial and other non-aerospace 
applications. Publications include Tech Briefs, 
and Technology Surveys. 
CONTRACTOR REPORTS: Scieqtific and 
technical information generated unher a NASA Technology U;ilization and Notes, 
contract or grant and considered an important 
contribution to existing knowledge. 
Details on the availability of these publications may be obtained from: 
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION DIVISION 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
Washington, D.C. 20546 
